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This thesis is neither e page to page commentary nor en
assessment of Hume's place in the history of Philosophy. It
mainly consists in an attempt at justifying a certain approach
to the Interpretation of his theory of value with special
reference to morals.
The bibliography is composed on the principle that only those
works to which I am conscious of a direct debt are included
Where abbreviations have been used to refer to works, these
are given in brackets after the relevant entry in the bibliography.
Italics in passages quoted are here represented by underlining.
Where underlining of words in a quotation is my own, this is stated
in a footnote.
Page references are given in brackets after quotations. In
the case of Hume's Treatise, reference is given to both the page
in the Everyman edition and the page in the' Selby-Bigge edition,
in that order.
I have not used cross references. Thus I have been unable
to avoid a certain amount of repetition.
INTRODUCTION
The study of a limited aspect of Hume's philosophy, such es
hi3 theory of value, must involve a grave risk of misrepresenting
his thought. For the three books of the Treatise possess a
singular unity in spite of the fact that commentators have found
it easy to draw attention to certain apparent Inconsistencies
between doctrines in the different books. Thus in Book II, the
impression of the self plays an indispensable part though Hume
emphasizes the impossibility of finding such an impression in
his di3cu3sion of personal identity in Book I (K.S., p.171).
This is a notable example of Hume's alleged inconsistency, but
many others could be cited. They have, indeed, been found to
be of such gigantic proportions that it has been considered hard
to say whether Hume "...Taught or did not teach, this or that
particular doctrine". (S.B., p.VII)
Some later commentators have agreed with Selby-Bigge's
estimate of the difficulty of interpreting Hume's works and
have concluded that he taught different and incompatible doctrines
in different parts of his philosophical writings (J.B. Fassmore,
Hume's Intentions). It is no part of my purpose openly to
challenge the view that Hume's many intentions may have led to
inconsistencies in his published works. But too much emphasis
on the lack of unity in his thought has its dangers. Passmore
himself stresses that although Kume may have had many intentions
in writing his Treatise "Yet there is a unity in his work; it
is dominated by a single over-riding intention". (?•, p.2)
With this I agree. Hume's main aim in the Treatise is to
establish the science of human neture on a firm foundation.
A modern reader, brought up in the cult that e philosopher
must model his method upon the sciences by developing a strictly
defined technical terminology, is not unlikely to consider Hume'
use of language loose and unscientific. We must, however,
remember that although he sought to introduce the "experimental
method into Moral Sciences" he was essentially a man of letters,
writing for the educated reader of his day and not a specialist
addressing himself exclusively to other specialists. The style
is varied according to the context; the same doctrine is
expressed in many different ways. It is therefore essential to
try to follow the drift of the argument rather than to take a
forceful statement of doctrine out of context, assuming it to
contain the essence of Hume's thought at t^e time of writing.
In this thesis the main emphasis will fall on Hume's
doctrines as expressed in the Treatise. One obvious reason
why it is undesirable to q--ote the Treatise and the Enquiry
indiscriminately in dealing with Hume's theory of value i3 the
change in style. One cannot assume that terms that bear a
special technical sense in the Treatise have the same meaning in
the Enquiry, for Hume retains little of his subtle psychological
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analysis in the later and more popular work.
This would be of relatively small importance if his theory
of value could be understood without reference to the psycholog¬
ical analysis. I hope in the sequel to show that this is not
the case. This thesis can, indeed, be partly described as a
reasoned plea for an approach to the study of Hume's moral
theory as an aspect of the more general problem of man's
emotional nature. There is no neat division between Hume's
psychology and his moral theory. Unless this is realised it is
quite natural to conclude with a.H. Basson that most of Hume's
writings on morals are psychologically interesting but of no
philosophical importance:
"it is assumed, then, that the only parts of
Hume's moral philosophy that are of real
importance are (i) his theory that moral
judgments are a matter of feeling and not of
rational conviction, and (ti) his belief that
the doctrine of free will is irrelevant to
morals. Hume's discussion of the particular
virtues and vices Is psychologically interest¬
ing but not philosophically important." (B., p.17)
If the view expressed in this quotation from A.H. Basson's
book were accepted, all that the Treatise contains relevant to
moral theory is to be found in the three first sections of Book
II Part III and Part I of Book III. It is, I believe, often
thought that Hume's moral theory can be mastered by reading
these parts of the Treatise as a supplement to the Enquiry.
My aim will have been achieved if I can convince the reader
that Hume's constructive moral theory can only be understood if
the second and third books of the Treatise are read as a unity.
For the sub-title of the Treatise is to be taken seriously. He
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la attempting to introduce "the experimental method of
reasoning into moral subjects". In the Abstract, where Hume
is intending to give a simplified account of the main
argument of the Treatise, he begins by making the point that
"it Is at least worth while to try if the
science of man will not admit of the same
accuracy which several parts of natural
philosophy are found susceptible of.
There seems to be all the reason in the
world to imagine that it may be carried to
the greatest degree of exactness". (A., p.6)
In his book on Hume Passmore emphasizes the unity of the
first two books of the Treatise, quoting Hume's words in the
Advertisement that "the subject of the understanding and the
passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves".
But it is misleading to suggest that these two books had to be
published together because these two topics are to be disting¬
uished as a unity by "the fact that In both cases association
is the source of order and complexity". (H. I., p.106) This
does not provide us with an adequate reason for suggesting that
the relation between Books II and III Is not as close as the
relation between the first two books. It is in fact unlikely
that Passmore wanted to give this impression, for he emphasizes
that Hume's main interest was in the "science of man" and
describes this as "the science which concerns itself with the
human mind and with human relationships in society". (H.I.,
p.104) This, indeed, describes admirably the subject matter
of the last two books, whereas Passmore himself considers the
first book to be largely concerned with methodological topics.
"Without anachronism we can think of it (the first book) as
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Hume's methodology of the social sciences." (H.I., p.6)
Though partly true this Is of course an overstatement, for
Hume discusses In Book I many topics that are not strictly
speaking methodological, such as our knowledge of the
external world and personal Identity. In Books II and III
the main doctrines of Book I are Indeed oresuppoaed but the
two later books have a peculiar unity In that both deal with
the active or 'passionate' side of human nature rather than
the understanding.
It seems to me clear that though there is less explicit
mention of th© principles of association in Book III of the
Treatise one is not 1ustifled in concluding that It plays no
fundamentally important role in the argument. Book III is
to be understood in the light of the arguments in the earlier
books. I consider it a mistake to place too much importance
upon Hume's statement in the Advertisement to Book III:
"i think it proper to inform the public that
tho' this be a third volume of the Treatise
of Human Nature, yet 'tis in some measure
independent of the other two, and requires
not that the reader should enter into all
the abstract reasoning contsin'd in them."
Notice first of all that Hume only claims for Book III
"some measure" of Independence and that it is not necessary
to understand "all the abstract reasoning" in the earlier books.
But the most important point to bear in mind is this. The
first two books of the Treatise had already been badly received.
All we may assume from Hume's words is that he is of course
anxious that the prejudice against the earlier books will not
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deter people from reading the book on morals. It is not
unreasonable to see in the following words, quoted from the
ouening chanter of the book on morals, Hume's fear that peonle
may prejudge it. A certain bitterness against the reading
public can also be detected:
"What affects us, we conclude, can never be
a chimera- and, as our passion is engaged
on the one side or the other, we naturally
think that the question lies within human
comprehension- which, in other cases of
this nature, we are ant to entertain some
doubt of. Without this advantage, I
never should have ventured upon a third
volume of such abstruse nhilosonhy, in an
age wherein the greatest nart of men seem
agreed to convert reading into an amusement,
and to reject everything that requires any
considerable degree of attention to be
comprehended." (T.H.N. Ill, pn.lr5-lff-
np.455-456)
I have so far tried only to ooint out that it is prima
facie not vnolausible to suggest that Hume's discussion of the
passions and emotions may be relevant tc the understanding of
his moral theory as expressed in the Treatise. What follows
is not intended as a detailed commentary on Hume's discussion
of the passions. The emphasis will throughout be placed on
those aspects of Book II which seem to me to throw light upon
Hume's views as to the nature of evaluation in general and
moral evaluation in particular.
THE PASSIONS AKE SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS
It Is Important to clear up at the outset certain points
regarding Hume's method In the two later books of the Treatise.
A careful look at his initial classification and character¬
isation of the passions should convince us that a reductivist
analysis of the passions is not to be expected. The point is
important, for Hume is undoubtedly a naturalist, and yet there
is a sense in which it is unplausible to foster on him a
naturalistic theory of morals. If nsturalism in morals is
understood as the definition of moral concepts in terms of non-
moral concepts Hume is not a naturalist, for no passions can be
defined, at least not in Moore's sense of define, and moral
approval and disapproval are In this respect no exceptions.
It may be recalled that to define is for Moore to
analyse. After discarding several senses of 'define* as
irrelevant to the sense in which he wants to emphasise that
•good' is indefinable, he says:
"We may mean that a certain object, which
we all of us know, is composed in a certain
manner: that it has four legs, a head, a
heart, a liver, etc., etc., all of them
arranged In definite relations to one
another. It is in this sense that I deny
good to be definable, I say that it is
not composed pf any parts, which we can
substitute for it in our mind3 when we are
thinking of it." (P.E., p,8).
Yellow and good are alike indefinable in that they are
not composed of any parts. Hume would, I think, agree with
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this. It will appear later in this thesis that he is not
at all likely to argue that moral approval and disapproval j AtuAAa v^,
are not different from all other emotions though very similar
to some other passions. To quote Butler against him to the
effect that "everything is what it is, and not another thing"
is peculiarly irrelevant, Hume is, on the contrary, much
inclined to maintain that for each meaningful term standing
for passions there must be a different impression, and he
nowhere tries to argue that "morally good and morally bad" do
not derive their meaning from specific imnressions, though
they are not the impressions of qualities in the object
evaluated (except in the case of self-valuing). In a similar
way, we may recall, causal necessity is not derived from an
impression discoverable in the object, between which the causal
relation holds.
In an introductory chapter Hume indicates certain principles
of classification. Referring back to the distinction between
impressions and ideas in Book I, the passions are obviously
impressions, he tells us. But impressions were there distinguished
into two kinds, impressions of sensation and impressions of
reflection. Of the first kind are "all the impressions of the
senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: of the second are the
passions and other emotions resembling them". (T.H.N. II, p.3;
p.276) .
The impressions of sensation are original in that they do not
arise from other impressions or ideas. They make their appear¬
ance "without any introduction" (T.H.N. II, p.3; p.276).
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This does not mean that they have no causes though they must
be regarded as ultimate data from the point of view of the
science of the mind. A causal explanation of these impressions
would belong to "anatomy and natural philosophy". (T.H.N. II,
p.3; p.276) Hume begs to be excused from tackling these
subjects. He is concerned only with explaining the origin of
those impressions which arise from other impressions or from
ideas. His explanation is to be psychological and not physical
or physiological.
Bodily pains and pleasures are not themselves passions as
we have seen, though passions arise from them. We can, indeed,
distinguish the passions into two kinds according to the way in
which they arise. If they arise immediately from pleasure or
pain they are called direct, whereas other qualities are needed
in order to give rise to the so-called indirect passions. It
goes without saying that the explanation of the indirect passions
is more complicated and the first two parts of the book are
concerned with this topic, whereas the direct passions are
discussed much more briefly.
One further distinction is introduced by Hume. He points
out that passions are either calm or violent. "The sense of
beauty and deformity in action" are instanced as calm passions
(T.H.N. II, p.4; p.276). The distinction between calm and
violent passions is in important resnects different from the
distinction between direct and indirect passions. The latter
distinction refers to tho way in whfch the passions arise. No
passion can on some occasions be direct and on others indirect.
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This may sometimes appear otherwise, v/here en expression Is
used to cover a class of passions. TVms there are some
grounds for thinking 'approval' denotes different passions
when It Is used of consequences of actions on the one hand
and the agent responsible for these consequences on the
other. On the other hand, the "fundamentum divlslonia"
between the calm and the violent is the intensity of the
feeling involved. Thus a calm passion Is distinguished by
the fact that it involves on most occasions low emotional
intensity. Hume's statement is quite explicit on this
point. We shall have occasion to say more about calm and
violent passions later on, but attention must be drawn to
the fact that "the sense of beauty and deformity in action,
composition and external objects" is a passion according to
Hume. Prom this it seems to follow that It arises either
directly or indirectly from pleasure or rain. It is one
among the nassions. It is important to remember this, for
many passions are pleasant or pairfijl, though they can he
considered neither as approval nor as disapproval.
Hume emphasizes the uniqueness of each different passion
as a simple impression. Speaking pride and humility he
says "... it is impossible we can ever, by a multitude of
word3, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the
passions." (T.H.N. II, p.5; p.277) Thus a passion is a
simple impression and can obviously not be constructed out of
simpler elements. Passmore is therefore more than a little
misleading when he says "the central psychological problem is
to construct the more complicated 'indirect passions' out of
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the direct passions, with the aid of the associative
principles". (H.I., p.124) Direct and indirect passions
are equally simple as the quotation of Hume's words above
indicates. There is no analogy at all between the relation
between these two classes of passions and the relation
between simple and complex ideas. One can justify saying
that complex ideas are constructed out of simple ideas.
But if we consider Passmore to be using the term
"construct" in a somewhat extended sense, he can perhaps be
acquitted of confusion. In the usual sense of "construct"
that which we construct out of is part of the completed
structure. Thus the timber out of which a building is
constructed is part of the building itself. But in an
extended sense we might want to say that x is constructed out
of y if y cannot arise unless x 1s presupposed. An account
of the origin of y would, necessarily mention x as a pre¬
condition without which y cor3d not have arisen.
Pasamore's failure to appreciate thet the passions are
simple impressions can also be seen from the following
quotation:
"He does not think that all the passions
consist in the association of certain
perceptions with pleasure or with pain."
(H.I., p.123)
The answer is of course that no passion consists in such an
association, though we may have to appeal to the principles of
association In order to erive a causal explanation of a passion.
It is fairly obvious that Hume's contention that the
passions are simple impressions determines the kind of 'analysis'
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we can expect in the two later books of the Treatise where
he is engaged in constructing his "science of man". The
simple cannot be reductively analysed for such an analysis
would be tantamount to the denial that the simple really is
simple. The analysis given is indeed meant to be causal in
nature and free appeal is made to the principles of
association. Since, however, association cannot work unless
simple impressions can he described as similar something must
be said about the charge that similarity is inconsistent with
simplicity, that the similarity of two perceptions is
inconsistent with the simplicity of each of them. If this
charge can be upheld it must he concluded that the whole of
Hume's account of the passions is based upon a simple logical
howler.
A simple perception cannot be analysed into distinct
parts . Yet Hume thinks it can be characterized by pointing
out its similarity to other simple perceptions or its difference
from them. We can also state the conditions under which it
is found to arise or, in other words, its causal conditions.
Thus for Hume, a simple perception is not lust something we
can only point to and give a name. Many things may be
predicated of it. We shall, indeed, emphasize that the bulk
of the second book of the Treatise is concerned with stating
the causal cond tions for the emergence of simple impressions
and indicating various similarities between them.
Hume first introduces this doctrine in a long footnote
when discussing abstract ideas. The correct understanding of
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Hume'3 view on this point is important for our purpose and
consequently it seems Justifiable to qtiote this footnote in
full:
"it is evident, that even different simple
ideas may have a similarity or resemblance
to each other; nor is it necessary, that
the point or circumstance of resemblance
should be distinct or separable from that
in which they differ. Blue and preen are
different simple ideas, but are more
resembling than blue and scarlet: though
their perfect simplicity excludes all
possibility of separation or distinction.
It is the same case with nartieular sounds,
and tastes, and smells. These admit of
infinite resemblances upon the general
appearance and comparison, without having
any common circumstance the same. And of
this we may be certain, even from the very
abstract terms simple idea . They comprehend
all simple ideas under them. These resemble
each other in their simplicity. And yet
from their very nature, which excludes all
composition, this circumstance, in which they
resemble, is not distinguishable or separable
from the rest. It is the same case with all
the degrees in any quality. They are all
resembling, and yet the quality, in any
individual, is not distinct from the degree."
(T.H.N., p.28; p.*37)
It will be argued later in this thesis that much of Hume's
trouble arises from treating each passion as a simple impression
of which he can give only a causal explanation and. point out its
similarity or similarities with other passions. At present,
however, we are not concerned, with a special application of
this doctrine, but the theoretical plausibility of the doctrine
as such, as a general thesis about simple perceptions.
Hume's view has met with severe criticism by a recent
commentator, Professor J.A. Passmore. Passmore thinks Hume
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should ha\Te concluded from the observation that all simple
Ideas resemble at least In being simple "that there are no
simple ideas" . Bis ground is that "the least which can
possibly confront us would be something simple, vivid (or
faint) and, for example blue, i.e. a complex ides". This
does not seem to me a just criticism for we must remember
that Hume's reason for treating particular tastes, sounds,
smells, colours as simple is that they "exclude all
composition". Would Professor Passmore then want to argue
that the idea of a particular shade of blue is composed of
vividness, blueness, and simplicity? If we use the word
•compose' here it would be manifestly different from the sense
in which the complex idea of a horse would be composed of the
ideas of its various parts in certain relations.
It soems to me that Processor Passmore is wrong when he
asserts in criticism of Hume "that it is Quite unintelligible
to assert that an idea can have various distinguishable
characteristics without any sacrifice of its simplicity...".
The whole point rests on the assumption that to say x resembles
y is to say that x and y have a certain characteristic in
common. Since x and y are ex hypothesi different and also
have a characteristic in common neither can he simple. Each
would be split up into that quality which is the same in each
and the quality which makes them different.
But is this assumption a lust one? Hume obviously did
not subscribe to it and I think his position perfectly
defensible. Let us take the example of the colours. Hume
Is surely right in claiming that It makes perfect sense to
say that blue and green ere more similar then blue end
scarlet. Would it not be a bit annoying if we were not
considered iustified in making this statement unless we could
point out that blue and green had something in common? Would
we not rather say: "They have nothing in common. They ere
lust similar."? The same situation would often be met with
in dealing with smells. Some resemble more than others,
but if we were asked what they had in common we should he
puzzled .
It is perhaps not out of place to emphasize here that when
we are not satisfied that we have conveyed to a person the idea
of a certain smell, or colour for that matter, we point out the
causal conditions, the circumstances within which it arises.
In the case of force or vividness it is not easy to see
what it is that vivid olfactory, auditory and visual images
have in common. If we use the same word here we presumably
see a resemblance, though not a characteristic which is
identically present in each. What of 'a cold colour', 'a
warm colour'? It is not accidental that we use these phrases.
But try to find an identical characteristic in a cold colour
and a cold drink.
It seems to me clear that it Is not absurd to suggest that
simplicity may be consistent with similarity unless you want to
define a simple idea as that which can only be named and not
described in any sense of 'describe' . Hume does not use the
terra 'simple' in this way, and I see no very obvious reason for
claiming that he ought to have done this. In fact he always
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holds that you can 'describe' a simple idea In three ways:
(1) by using a scale of Intensity, (2) by pointing out its
similarity or difference from other simple ideas, and (3)
by describing the conditions under which it arises. It must
be admitted, that the notion of intensity, vividness or force
is an obscure one. Hume recognizes this, but can do no
better than appeal to the reader's experience. Sometimes
emotions seem to involve a violent disturbance of our conscious
state. We all know what it feels like to become violently
angry. if we contrast this with the peaceful contemplation
of a beautiful landscape we can see what Hume is driving at.




It has been maintained, that Hume's discussion of the
indirect passions in Book II of the Treatise is of little
importance for his treatment of ethical problems. Thus
Professor Kemp-Smith says:
"More than a third of Book II is employed
in the treatment of four passions which
have no very direct bearing upon Hume's
ethical problems, and play indeed no
really distinctive part in his system -
pride and humility, love and hatred,
viewed as operating in and through a
complex double process of association."
U.S., p.1*0)
Kemp-Smith seems to Consider the discussion of the
indirect passions as important only as illustrating Hume's
attempt at proving that "the laws of association play a
role in the mental world no less Important than that of
gravity in the physical world". (K.S., p.l.ro). He therefore
emphasises that there is here a connection with the account of
causal inference in Book 1, though he does not seem to think
that the discussion of the indirect passions is important for
Hume's ethical doctrines. This view may be challenged, and
it will be argued hereafter that we can learn a great deal
about Hume's views on the nature of evaluation from his
discussion of the indirect passions.
Hume begins by drawing a distinction between the object
of a passion and. its cause. The ob.lect of both pride and
humility is the self. There is really nothing very surprising
In this terminology, for Hume is thinking of the direction
of our thought or attention when we feel proud or humble.
Kemp-Smith's criticism of Hume's terminology is, I think,
unfounded. He says:
"... Hume speaks of the self as being the
•object' of pride and humility: we
should have expected him rather to say
their 'subject'." (K.S., p.180).
but we talk quite naturally of 'the object of our
attention' or 'an object of thought'. We must furthermore
remember that the object of love and hatred is,according
to Hume, some other person, and these passions ere in this
respect contrasted with pride and humility, where the object
is self. It is, it must be agreed, much more natural to
talk of a person we love as 'the object of our love' rather
than 'the subject of our love'. Hume's terminology seems
well-suited to bring out the contrast he >>as in mind.
A syntactical point may perhaps further vindicate Hiime's
terminology. We can on most occasions use interchangeably
the two verbal expressions »I am proud of x because y' and
'x's possession of y makes me proud'. This seems to me to
remove the only objection to Hume's terminology, since the
oddity of calling self the object of the passion of pride
seems to be derived from the fact that 'I' is the grammatical
subject of the sentence 'I am proud of x'. The point may
not seem of any great importance, but it is clear that Kemp-
Smith's complaint might incline people to think thst Hume is
thinking of self as qualified, hy pride, whereas he is thinking
of self as the object of nrid© in a different sense.
We clearly must distinguish Hume's use of 'object' in
this context from the use of 'object' when we talk of objects
of our desires. The indirect passions we are concerned with
are not desires end Hume suggests they only have objects in
the sense that our attention is drawn to a particular object
when they are aroused. This is mistaken in two ways.
(1) Pride and humility, love and hatred, are names for
dispositional characteristics. These dispositions may be
dispositions to feel in certain ways. But my love is
directed at the object of mv love even when I am not thinking
of him or her. (2) When I do have the feeling, e.g. when I
feel proud at the prize-mivinr ceremony at school because my
child gets a prize, it is certainly not true to say that the
pride has an object in that it makes me think of the object of
it. This suggests the connection is looser than it is.
Without its object X could not be proud at all. The object
is, if you like, an essential aspect of the pride.
Simply because the self is the object of both pride and
humility it cannot be their cause, for these two passions are
opposites . If we have our own value enhanced and diminished
in our own eyes at the same time by a cause equally suited to
produce both, the effect of the cause would cancel itself out.
The two opposed emotions would leave an equilibrium. The two
contrary emotions would leave the mind indifferent.
The cause of these nassions can be placed upon a great
variety of different subjects. Thus we may bo proud because
of some quality we ossess ourselves but we may also be made
proud by qualities of other persons or objects if they are
closely enough related to us. Thus I might be nroud of my
skill in golf or dancing, but my warden or the exploits of my
family might also arouse my pride. Nothing arouses pride in
a nerson unless it is closely related to him. If we take
the subject which arouses my nride to be my beautiful garden,
we can distinguish between the object itself, the garden and
the quality it possesses which arouses my nride, for unless
the garden is thought by us to possess some valuable quality
it would not arouse our pi*ide. Thus we see that the object
must have a close relation to a person and also be thought to
possess some valuable quality if it is to arouse pride.
The fact that Hume talks of beauty as a quality in an
object must not mislead us into thinking that he is contradict¬
ing his later refutation of obiectivism or intuition!sm. All
he needs is the admission ihat an object does not make a man
proud unless it is valued by him, and when asked why he values
the object he would enumerate those qualities it possesses
which make him value it. I talk here of valuing wherea3 Hume
says the quality must be an independent source of pleasure.
I do this to bring out the fact that Hume is thinking of the
quality in question as a pleasing quality, and this is to
attribute a nositive value to the object.
Hume thinks he is giving the causal conditions for the
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creation in our consciousness of an absolutely unique
simple imoression. The ultimate criterion for deciding
whether a men is croud or not would be the nresence or
absence of this impression. This might be doubted, for
we would often persist in our contention that a certain
person is proud in face of his sincere claim that he is not.
We would be considered justified in doing this, for it is
accepted that a person is not always himself the best ludge
as to whether he is oroud or not. It seems that Hume could
not allow this for an impression is in its very nature such
that one cannot be deceived as to its nresence or absence.
If this is admitted we should at least have to say that Hume
has not given us the causal conditions for being proud. We
might be forced to make the distinction between feeling proud
and being proud. Hume, one might say, has stated the causal
conditions for feeling proud, though admittedly some neople
are proud though they do not feel proud. The answer to this
is that Hume most certainly did not draw this distinction.
To be proud is for him to feel proud.
Although we may feel sceptical about Hume's argument
considered as an account of the causal conditions for the
emergence in consciousness of a special impression, it is
quite admirable as a piece of conceptual analysis. It is
certainly true that I could not claim to be proud of Sir
Winston Churchill unless I stood in some special relation to
him. If per impossibile I were his father, this relation
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would certainly be close enough. Members of the same
nation might be taken to be closely enough related to
enable them to say that they are proud of any one member of
that nation. It becomes a hit more doubtful whether an
Icelander could claim to be proud of Churchill even though
he is a member of the Icelandic Conservative Party. It is
certainly the case that one cannot claim to be proud of a
person simply because one thinks that person has valuable
qualities, unless one stands in some special relation to that
person. It is furthermore certainly correct that pride is
in some sense directed towards oneself, for a man who is made
proud is having his own value enhanced in his own estimation.
The fault to be found with Hume's account is this. If we see
a man enthusing about something which has special relations to
him, such as his own garden or a member of his family, we feel
justified in saying that he is proud of this thing or person.
But we would be less inclined to think that we were stating
that he was experiencing a special emotion or passion of a
unique kind and that the statement was true or false according
to whether this special emotion was experienced.
But Hume might retort to our argument that a simple
impression, though it reveals itself lust as it 1s in
consciousness, does not entail that a person himself is always
the best judge as to whether he is proud or not. Passions
resemble one another, sometimes closely, and I might make a
I
mistake in classifying a feeling as pride when it was in fact
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a closely similer passion. To say that x is a simple
impression involves that there are only two ways in which
it can be characterised. (1) We can say that it is
similar to certain other impressions, for similarity is
not inconsistent with simplicity as the term is used hy
Hume. (2) We can describe the conditions or
circumstances in which it arises. An observer may he
more clearly aware of the attendant circumstances than the
person himself and consequently could upon occasion point
out that the person must be proud since all the conditions
for pride are there.
Hume turns to an account of the principles that mU3t he
assumed to be at work in accounting for the creation of the
impression of pride. It would he absurd to think that each
object arousing pride was by nature suited to arouse this
passion. We must attempt to find a common principle which
would explain why pride arises in any o^ its occurrences.
The principles of association are now appealed to. We are
familiar -with the association of ideas from the first book
of the Treatise, but the association o* impressions is here
first introduced. The only relation hy which this operates
13 resemblance, though noticing a resemblance is no part of
the operation of the association. The relation here is a
natural and not a philosophical relation. We notice
reflectively that passions that resemble one another in a
certain way follow one another in our experience.
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If Hume thought the 'association' depended upon a
reflective comparison it might be odd for him to talk of
the "association of impressions" . Su.ch is not his meaning,
for x would see its first appearance give rise to y even
though y had not been previously exnerienced either. Hume
states this principle thus:
"All resembling impressions are connected
together, and no sooner one arises than
the rest immediately follow. Grief and
disappointment give rise to anger, anger
to envy, envy to malice, and malice to
grief again, until the whole circle he
completed." (T.H.N. II, p. 10; p.283)
Taken literally this statement is obviously absurd, though
it may be true that disappointment tend3 to make a person
angry with anyone responsible for it, and an envious person
might easily become malicious. But Hume is in real
difficulty, for if the association of impressions operates
by resemblance only it seems difficult to explain why any one
of a number of resembling impressions should be aroused in any
given case. Let us consider the way in which pride or humility
arise. Hume says:
"When an idea produces an impression,
which is connected with an idea related
to the first idea, these two impressions
must be In a manner inseparable, nor will
the one in any case be unattended with
the other. It is after this manner that
the particular causes of pride and
humility are determined." (T.H.N. II, p.lG; p.289)
If thinking of x nlease3 me and x is related to me, then
the pleasure gives rise to pride, which is related to pleasure
by similarity. Pride in turn is naturally such as to make one
think of self. We thus have a double association of ideas,
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between self and the object related to self and pleasure
and pride, which is itself a pleasant passion. This
double association is conceived as a mechanism by which the
passion is oroduced .
Hume talks as if the relation between pride and its
object were purely contingent. We might have had the
impression of pride and. this might have been directed at
others if we had been differently constituted. The thought
of self and the passion of pride are iust naturelly connected
One always follows the other. One can only note this but
not explain it. Association does not help us here at all.
I want to suggest that what is here called a natural relation
is in fact logical. This point has already been mentioned,
but it may perhaps be made clearer if we consider the
difference Hume thinks there is between ioy and pride.
An ob.lect mu3t be related to us to give us ioy; in this
it resembles pride. but a much closer relation is required
for the production of nride. A feast may give us ,1oy, but ir
most cases it would only make the host proud. On the
occasions where merely being at a feast causes pride, this
must be due to the fact that being there is seen as an
indication of value in the people present. A feast at
Buckingham Palace might be a case in point. But here we
should be closely related to the feast in contrast with all
the people who are left out. It is where the cause of .1oy is
no more closely related to me than it 1s to a great number of
other people that it may furnish no reason for pride. Return
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to health gives rise to loy, hot it Is not very often that
it is an occasion for pride, because it is shared with such
vast numbers. Hume explains this as follows:
"The reason why pride is so much more
delicate in this particular than joy, I
tatce to be as follows. In order to
excite pride, there are always two
objects we oust contemplate, viz. the
cause, or that object which produces
plea sure; and self, which is the real
object of the passion. But joy has only
one object necessary to its production,
viz. that which gives pleasure: and
though it be requisite that this bear
some relation to self, yet that is only
requisite to render it agreeable; nor
is self, properly speaking, the object of
this passion. Since, therefore, pride
has, in a manner, two objects to which it
directs our view, it follows, that where
neither of them have any singularity, the
passion must be more weakened upon that
account than a passion which has only one
object. Upon comparing ourselves with
others, as we are every moment apt to do,
we find we are not in the least distinguish¬
ed: and, upon comparing the object we
possess, we discover still the same unlucky
circumstance. By two comparisons so
disadvantageous, the passion must be
entirely destroyed." (T.H.N., pp.18-19; p.292)
It is fairly obvious that Hume thinks of his account as
an explanation of the origin of the passions of joy and pride
respectively. Two unfavourable comparisons will weaken a
passion more than only one, and may in fact destroy it. The
passion is thought of as separable from its ohject end its
cause. He is making a perfectly valid point in a misleading
way because of his predisposition to state a logical point in
causal terms. The difference between joy and pride Hume is
drawing our attention to has surely to do with the justification
- 27 -
of pride, the attempt to meet the challenge, 'How can you
be proud of x?' It is certainly the case that a man can
be ,1oyful though the source of his Joy has nn very close
relation to him. But the challenge 'You have nothing to be
proud of cannot be met unless there is something special in
the relation between the cause of pride and its object. Thus
our return to health might Justify pride if it were due to a
certain exceptional courage or effort of our own. If this
effort were no greater than could be expected, one could not
be said to have Justified one's pride in it. But, and this
is an important point, unless the person thinks that there is
a special relation between the cause and the object of pride,
he simply cannot be proud of it. To be proud of x ta, partly,
to think there is a special relation between oneself and x.
It is essential for pride that a special relation should be
thought to exist. On the other hand I can quite legitimately
<t
claim to experience Joy at the thought of objects I do not
consider to have any special relation to me. Joy, but not
pride, can logically arise from the contemplation of any
purely imaginary objects.
The third limitation Hume mentions makes it clear that
pride and humility are forms of self-valuing and an appeal is
really made to the influence of sympathy, though this principle
is not explicitly mentioned. The happiness of others tends
to make u.s happy, and this is why the fact that the object is
pleasing to others increases the happiness we derive from it.
"This circumstance like the two forecoing,
has an effect upon 1oy as well as pride.
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"We fancy ourselves more hapny, as well
as more virt1 ous or beautiful, when
we apoear so to others; but are still
more ostentatious of our virtues than
of our pleasures." (T.H.N. II, p.19; p.292)
Happiness derived from sympathy with the happiness of others
only becomes a form of valuation when it arouses a separate
passion, in this case pride. This already suggests an analogy
between evaluation in the form of moral and aesthetic Judgments
and the indirect passions. We shall later try to show how
this analogy can help to clear up some nuzzles in the
interpretation of the function op sympathy in moral and
aesthetic valuation.
The fourth point Hume makes refers to the fact that in
order to arouse pride or humility the cause must have a certain
degree of constancy. "What is casual and inconstant gives but
little Joy, and less pride." (T.H.N. II, p.19; p.293) We may
here again think of Hume's insistence that a quality must be
relatively constant in order to arouse morel approval. The
following perhaps emphasizes still more how pride and humility
are forms of valuation: "it seems ridiculous to infer an
excellency in ourselves from an object which is of so much
shorter duration, and attends us during so small a part of our
existence." (ibid.) The imol lost ion see^s to be that unless
we can infer some excellency in ourselves we cannot be proud.
But I do not think Hume really thinks the evaluation of oneself
is an inference fromthe qualities observed in oneself or in
objects closely related to us. The expression 'it would be
ridiculous to infer...* seems to indicate that Hume is insisting
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that one could not justify pride unless one could point
out valuable qualities of a relatively constant kind. But
I take this to be another instance where H^me is vaguely
aware of what makes his observations plausible although he
is still concerned to 3tata the conditions under which pride
arises, i.e. causal conditions. I think, indeed,that pride
and humility are for him equivalent to feeling satisfied or
dissatisfied with oneself. "... I observe that by pride I
understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the
mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or
power, makes us satisfied with ourselves; and that by
humility I mean the opposite impression." (T.H.N. Ii, p.23;
p.297) What gives rise to the evaluations of oneself gives
rise to these passions, for they are the evaluations.
Hume's final observation regards the important concept of
'general rules' which have considerable influence on the
passions. The fact he seems to have in mind is that people
are sometimes proud of something which does not give them any
sensible enjoyment. Hume's example is, however, curious, for
it regards the esteem of the rich and powerful. We esteem a
rich man because of his riches even though he does not derive
any enjoyment from them. This is because our esteem is
governed by the general rule that riches are a source of
enjoyment to the possessor, even though the particular case in
question may be an exception to the rule. But the same rule
may be seen to apply in the case of the rich man himself. He
may be proud of his riches even though they no longer give
him any enjoyment, for "custom and practise,,., have settled
the lust value of everything: this must certainly contribute
to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by
means of general established maxims, in the proportion we ought
to observe in preferring one object to another". (T.H.N. IX,
p.20; p.294) We esteem the rich because riches are pleasing
to the possessor. But though this is the ultimate source of
the valuing of riches a rich man may still value his riches
even though they no more furnish him with any enjoyment. His
evaluation is governed by the general rule which determines
the value of riches as such. We can only understand this as
a reference to 'objective evaluation' which disregards the
special point of view of the person evaluating. The rich man
disregards the circumstance that in his own case riches are no
source of pleasure to him personally.
If my suggestion for the interpretation of Hume's words
here is accepted we may, at least partly, defend Hume against
the charge that he is here admitting that pride may arise
without any separate pleasure being produced by the cause of
the passion of pride. If this is admitted, Hume would have
to modify his view that a double association is necessary to
produce that passion, for the association of impressions could
not operate. But esteem is a pleasant passion and would
still make that association possible. Whether this defence
can be accepted as adequate may depend upon our interpretation
of Hume's doctrine of evaluation. In what sense can we be
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guided in our evaluation "by means of general established
maxims"? If it is possible to evaluate from a settled
habit without having a feeling of approval, at all, our defence
of Hume becomes questionable, although he could still claim
that feelings of approval and disapproval must be presupposed
if we are to understand how habitual approvals and disapprovals
in the absence of the feelings could arise. The situation in
which it is proper to claim that one is proud may be fixed
by a general rule in a society. A men may use the
expression 'I am proud of x' according to this general rule
even though he no longer feels any sensible enjoyment from
the 'cause', Hume seems to think, though, that in the
case whore the cause has ceased to be separately pleasing
the habit acquired may directly produce the pride.
In giving an account of the passions of love and hatred
Hume again emphasizes that these, like other passions, are
simple impressions and hence indefinable. They are rightly
classed v/ith pride and humility as indirect passions, because
a double association of impressions and ideas is necessary
for their production. Some important differences are to be
noticed, however, for the object of love and hatred is always
"some sensible being external to us". (T.H.N. II, p.51; p.329)
But the object of pride and humility is always the person
himself who is proud or humble. If it be objected that in
self-lov© the object is surely the person himself, Hume's
answer is that this is not properly speaking love at all.
Substantiating this claim he simply apneals to introspection.
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The sensation it (self-love) produces hes not "anything
in common with that tender emotion which is excited by a
friend or mistress". (ibid.) The final distinguishing
characteristic of a passion is the intrinsic quality of
the feeling or emotion itself. This intrinsic quality
cannot be the pleasantness, for this is common to the two
passions under consideration, love and self-love.
The object of love and hatred is the same and
consequently it cannot be Identified with the cause, since
these passions are opposites in the seme way as pride and
humility are opposite passions. The cause is in both
cases a quality or the subject which arouses a separate
pleasure and pain. The causes of the two pairs of passions
are alike, but the difference lies in the object. The
relation of the cause to oneself causes pride or humility,
whereas if related to some other person it causes love or
hatred. Hume points out that the connection between pride
and vanity confirms this for the vain person desires the love
and esteem of others and tries to gain this by exhibiting to
them those qualities which are the cause of his pride. This
procedure is deemed sensible, but would be completely
irrational if the cause of pride and the cause of love and
esteem were not the same. Any quality which, when we possess
it, makes us proud, arouses love when it belongs to another.
But this is hardly the whole story, for people may win
our love by pleasing us, though wo might not be proud of the
quality from which the pleasure arises if it were our own.
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"Whoever can find the moans, either by his services, his
beauty, or his flattery, to render himself agreeable to
us, Is sure of our affections; as on the other hand,
whoever harms or displeases us never falls to excite our
anger or hatred." (T.H.N. XI, p.*7; p.348) This brings
out the fact that a person who pays us compliments arouses
our love or good will even though we might not be at all
proud of our own characteristic as flatterers if we
possessed it. Here it is the fact that the man pleases
me rather than the fact that he possesses a pleasing
characteristic that arouses my love. This is important,
for it draws attention to the essentially biassed nature
of many of our passions. We find it difficult, not only
to love our enemies, but to form an unbiassed view of their
qualities.
Perhaps pride, unlike love, Is not so often or so
obviously biassed, for the proud man is laying a claim to
be enhanced in value, and the cause of the pride must thus
be obvious to others as a source of pleasure, as something
valuable. In this connection Hume himself considers it
necessary "that the pleasant or painful object be very
discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves but
to others also". (T.H.N. II, p.19) The biassed nature of
love and hatred is, indeed, very obvious. We do not love
people in proportion to merit, for those more closely
related to us arouse our love to a higher degree than
strangers, even though we may be aware of the superior merit
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of the latter. Thus love can lead to a biassed evaluation
or when this is not the case it may be aroused even though
the object possesses no very obvious pleasing qualities.
This is brought out clearly by the love of relations for
"whoever is xmited to us by any connection is always sure
of a share of our love, proportioned, to the connection,
without in uiring into his other qualities". (T.H.N. II, p.71;
p.352)
The fact that a bare relation between two persons seems
to be sufficient to produce love appears to contradict the
doctrine that a double association of Ideas and Impressions
is necessary. It does not seem to be necessary that the
cause produces a separate pleasure or pain. Hume, however,
tries to explain this by appealing to the enjoyment derived
from company, the enjoyment of being closely related to others.
This is hardly sufficient, for a man who only hears of the
exploits of a son he has never seen and does not know would
often be likely to overestimate these. One might, indeed,
say that the lack of social relation might tend to increase
the pride. It seems all the same that the quality of being
closely related to a person may sometimes be sufficient to
arouse a separate pleasure wh ich could account for the
emergence of love. No wonder therefore that the passion of
love is not aroused in direct relation to merit, for
contiguity in space or time, or the causal relation of
kinship, are deemed irrelevant in deciding upon the merit
of any object.
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However difficult It may be to distinguish between
the pleasant feeling of love and the independently produced
pleasure, Hume still has to hold to the distinction In the
interest of the theory that a double association of
impressions and ideas is necessary for the prodtjction of the
indirect passions. A certain uneasiness is betrayed on
this point, as the following ouctetion shows:
"it Is not so evident at first sight, that
a relation of impressions is requisite
to these passions, and that because in
the transition the one Impression is so
much confounded with the other, that they
become in a manner indistinguishable."
(T.R.N. II, p.53; p.331)
He Is talking of love and hatred, but he has of course to go
on to say that distinguishable they must be. But perhaps
the reason why one does not seem to have to refer to the
cause as a separate source of pleasure in the case of love
is In no way connected, with the difficulty of introspectively
distinguishing between two emotions .
One might want to say that the reason why the cause of
pride must be an independent source of pleasure lies in the
fact that a man who says he is proud of x can always be called
upon to lustify his pride. The Justification would consist
in enumerating the valuable characteristics. In the case of
love, on the other hand, this is only sometimes the case, for
we may claim to love x though we are not claiming x to be in
any respects lovable. Thus we can claim to love our children
without having to meet the challenge that there is nothing
lovable or valuable about them. But we cannot claim to be
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proud of our children unless we ere prepared to say that
they have some valuable qualities. There is of course a
sense in which I may be proud of my children considered as
mere signs or indications or effects of a valuable quality
in myself. Thus I might be proud of my family as showing
my fruitfulness, irrespective of any quality they may
possess. But this does not destroy the point I am making
that love differs from pride in that one may claim to love
without in any sense imnlying the existence of any valuable
quality at all.
If Hume had not been so convinced that the passions are
simple impressions, he might have seen that some of the
difficulties he encounters are due to the fact that 'love*
and 'hatred', 'pride' and 'humility' are complex concepts.
Hume in fact comes near to realizing this when he says that
"esteem and contempt, indeed, arise on some occasions instead
of love and hatred; but these are, at the bottom, the same
passions, only diversified by some causes..." (T.H.N. II,
p.58; p.337) His confusion, however, is obvious in this
passage for if the causes of esteem and contempt are different
from the causes of love and hatred these passions are to some
extent different. It is only his associationist scheme
according to which there can in the end be only four indirect
passions, which dictates to him that love must 'at the bottom'
be the same passion as esteem, hatred the same as contempt.
But it seems the neat scheme of passions as simple impressions
is threatened, for esteem is only to be differentiated from
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love in terms of the attendant circumstances, for 'at the
bottom the same' could only, one would think, here refer
to the impression, if they are 'only diversified by some
causes',
It might be argued that this Is too uncharitable.
The identification might only refer to the fact that the
same associative principles explein the origin of both.
'To the feeling' there might still be differences though
the similarity might be close. It might even be difficult
to decide whether one was 'esteeming' or 'loving'. This,
one might think, could only be decided by a closer attention
to the impression according to Hume's principles. But we
might also pay attention to the attendant circumstances, for
there must be some difference here to indicate whether 'love'
or 'esteem' is the passion aroused. Hume would still have
to say that the two 'impressions' ere slightly different, for
though they might be closely similar they are yet specifically
different to the feeling.
Two circumstances must be reme-ibered when wo are talking
about the causes of love or hatred. (1) When we love someone
for actions he has done our love is only aroused if the action
was intentional and it is "by the intention we judge of the
actions, and, according as that is good or bad, they become
causes of love or hatred". (T.H.N. II, p.c8; p.348) But
this doctrine is soon modified, for tn the case when a
characteristic belongs permanently to a person our aversion is
aroused even though the person did not Intend to harm us.
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This is the case with bodily deformity. But even in the
case of an intentional action this arouses our love because
the intention i3 a sign of a quality of character. It is
only as a sign of a desirable quality of mind that the
intentionality arouses our love.
(2) But there are also undoubtedly cases where an
unintentional injury to us arouses our hatred, and It is only
upon reflection that this may come to be modified. And even
when a person's motives in injuring us are strictly honourable
f "t- * ,
we may still feel antagonistic towards him although here also
our antegonism or hatred may be modified upon reflection.
Hume, indeed, makes an explicit reference to reasonable hatred
as opposed to unreasonable hatred. This can only be understood
as a reference to the fact that when we look upon the source of
our hatred objectively, from a spectator's point of view, our
feelings in the case may come to be modified.
"One that has a real design of harming us,
proceeding not from hatred and ill-will,
but from justice and equity, draws not
upon him our anger, if we be in any degree
reasonable; notwithstanding he is both
the cause, and the knowing cause, of our
sufferings." (T.H.N. II, p.70; p.350)
But of course we are not always reasonable. Our passions are
not always modified by objective evaluations. Our approval
of the characteristic in the person which is the source of the
injury done to us may be too weak to destroy our hatred. The
reference here seems to be to what is vulgarly called a conflict
between reason and the passions, which Hume considers to be
misdescribed in these terms. "We speak not strictly and
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philosophically whon wo talk of the combat of passion and
of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of
the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than
to serve and obey them" (T.H.N. II, p,127; p.415). This
is not an exceptionally extreme statement in Hume's philosophy
but a general statement of his main thesis. For not only is
it the case that an 'objective judgment• can only influence
our attitudes by arousing a passion, but reference must be
made to human passions in order to account for the fact that
we take up an objective point of view at all. This cannot
be explained without bringing in the notion of sympathy and its
function in Hume's doctrine of evaluation.
SYMPATHY IK THE TREATISE
In this chapter the doctrine of sympathy will be
considered only in relation to the Treatise. There are some
grounds for thinking that this term has a different function in
the Enquiry. The account given will have to be qualified and
elaborated later. Let us for the time being concentrate on
emphasising some of the more striking features of the principle
of sympathy as it functions in Hume's associationist scheme.
It can be most emphatically stated that 3t 3s impossible to
give an account of Hume's views on the nature of evaluation in the
Treatise without introducing the principle of sympathy. An account
has in actual fact been given of Hume's ethical theory without the
word 'sympathy' being used even once. I am referring to the
chapter on Hume in Broad's "Five Types of Ethical Theory". This
is explained by Broad's view that "the best account of Hume's
theory of ethics is to be found in his Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals" (C.D.B., p.84). It is true that Broad
mentions "benevolence or humanity" but the first thing we must
emphasise in explaining the concent of sympathy in the Treatise is
its difference from benevolence. The two concepts are never
treated as identical in that work.
Benevolence is defined by Hume as desire for the happiness or
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aversion to the misery or unhapniness of someone. nnger is
the opposite of this. These are passions that are naturally
attached to love and hatred. In fact one of the things that
distinguish love and hatred from pride and humility is this
connection with desire for the happiness or misery of the person
loved or hated. But Hume resists the temptation to identify love
with the desire for the happiness of others. We may, he thinks,
love another without giving any thought to hi3 happiness or misery.
When I say benevolence is a passion I am using that word in
Hume's sense. We must always bear in mind that 'passion' is used.
by him in a very extended sense when wo compare it with its U3e in
ordinary discourse today. But he is not using this word even in
the way in which it was used In ordinary language of the 18th
century, but giving it a special technical sense. This we can
see clearly by looking at the way in which Held attacked Hume for
abusing language, but Raid was fond of appealing to common usage.
Talking about "natural desires and affections" he says:
"When they are so calm as neither to produce any
sensible effects upon the body, nor to darken the
understanding and weaken the power o<* self-command,
they are not called passions. But the same
principle, when it becomes Xo violent as to produce 3
these effects upon the body and upon the mind, is /
a passion, Or, as Cicero very properly calls it, a
perturbation". (T.R., p.272)
Thus It seems the 18th century use of 'passion' was not very
different from our own. But even though Hume extends the use of
the term greatly it does not on the whole include sympathy.
There Is no room for the passion of sympathy In his scheme of the
passions at all.
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There is a reason why one might feel inclined to think that
Hume thought of sympathy as one of the oassions. In talking
about compassion Hume says:
"There remains only to take notice of a pretty
remarkable phenomenon of this passion, which
is, that the communicated passion of sympathy
sometimes requires strength from the weakness
of its original, end even arises from a
transition from affections that have no
existence". (T.H.N. IIf p.87; 370)
He then goes on to ergue that we re.loice more for a man
who ha3 met with great good fortune if he seems little
preoccupied with it himself. And a man who meets great mis¬
fortune with equanimity arouses our compassion to a higher
degree. But this need not be interpreted in such a way that we
must find a place for sympathy as a special nassion distinct
from pity,compassion and admiration. Yet it shows that in some
cases we are affected by the situation of others in our attitude
towards them where there does not seem to be any passion to be
communicated. Here we should have to appeal to the imagination
a3 a necessary feature in arousing these nassions. Yet sympathy
is involved in this sense that if we were totally indifferent to
the experiences and fates of other human beings no concern for
others would be aroused in us from the knowledge of their good or
ill fortune. If sympathy is a passion in the two cases enumerated,
it would in any case be equivalent to admiration in the one case
and pity or compassion in the other and these are manifestly
different passions.
Sympathy is the name of a principle in virtue of which the
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passions are communicated between sensitive beings. Hume,
indeed, talks about "the principle o? sympathy or communication"
(T.H.N. II, p.137; p.427). He thinks he can analyse the way in
which sympathy operates by en apnea! to the principle that an
impression may infuse some of its liveliness into a related idea
in such a way as to raise it to the status of an impression.
This principle was appealed to by Hume when in the first book he
was giving an account of belief engendered by causal inference
and the doctrine obviously depends upon the view that the
difference between an idea and an impression is a difference in
force or vivacity or liveliness only. A thought of pain may
become real pain simply by an increase in liveliness and force.
There is no difference in kind between the impression and the
idea .
The way in which Hume conceives the operation of sympathy
is indicated in the following passage:
"The idea of ourselves is always intimately
present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of
vivacity to tho idea of any other ohlect to which
we are related. This lively idee changes by
degrees into a real impression; these two kinds
of perception being in a groat measure the same,
and differing only in their degrees of force and
vivacity". (T.H.N. II, p.73; p.354)
Earlier on Hume had talked of "the idea, or rather impression of
ourselves" which he claims to be "always intimately present with
us" (T.H.N. II, p.41; p.317). It is obvious that the perception
of the self must be an impression if it is to have the enlivening
influence already mentioned. We can then say that sympathy
operates as follows. We have an idea of, or think of, a passion
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in the mind of another being related to us. This idea or
thought is raised to the status of an Impression "because of
the enlivening influence of the impression of self.
It is not our present concern to discuss whether the
appeal to an impression of the self as a constant factor in
our experience is consistent with his denial in the first book
of the Treatise that no such impression is to be found. But
the following points must be noticed. A. To sympathise with
X is to have X's "opinions and sentiments" communicated to us.
It is to have X's opinions or sentiments because of a communic¬
ation according to the principles of operation laid down.
B, To sympathise with X is not as such to be motivated in any
way unless I am sympathising with a motive in X. Thus to
sympathise with X's hatred for Y is to come to feel this hatred
end to have the consequent desire to hurt the hated oh.lect.
G. The being with whose sentiraonts or opinions we sympathise
must have some relation to us. We sympathise more easily and
more completely with those who are closely related to us.
Let us reflect upon each of these points separately.
A; It is obvious that the expression "sympathise with X" is
here used in a special technical sense. The criteria for its
use seem to he (a) that a person has the same feeling or
opinions as X and (b) that this feeling or opinion has come to
be that person's feeling or opinion in a special way. The
special way is of course the process already described as the
operation of the principle of sympathy. This condition is
absolutely necessary for the bare fact that I and a chap in
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China both feel angry in no way indicates that I sympathise with
his anger nor that he sympathises with mine.
The second point worth mentioning is that Hume says we may
sympathise with another's opinions as well as with his sentiments,
emotions, in fact his passions in the wide sense Hume gives to
that term, and his bodily pleasures and pains. It seems strange
to suggest that I may come to agree with another's opinion by the
process of an idea being enlivened so as to become an impression.
Perhaps Hume is using the term in a loose sense. It may be
thought that he is just referring to another's approvals and
disapprovals which in ordinary language would be called his moral
opinions. But there is no need to suppose this to he the case
and Hume's own words rather suggest that he is also referring to
people's opinions as to matters of fact. The influence of
sympathy !,is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly
embrace every opinion proposed to them; but also in men of the
greatest judgment and understanding, who find it very difficult to
follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of
their friends and daily companions5' (T.H.N. II, p.40; p.316) .
The expression "every opinion" rather suggests that the term is not
being used in a restricted sense.
It must be admitted though that Hume's words are not
unambiguous enough to necessitate the Interpretation here given,
although he goes on to say that "to this principle we ought to
escribe the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same
nation" (T.H.N. II, p.40; p.31r). But in a sense our view that
the influence of sympathy stretches to opinions of matters of fact
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is the more natural one. We know that certain opinions may be
widely accepted in a community in such a way as to make it
extremely difficult to convince a member of that community of
their falsity. Let us take as an example the opinion that horse-
meat is poisonous. This is to be dlshinguished from the
disapproval of the eating of horsemeat though the belief that
horseraeat is poisonous would almost certainly lead to the general
disapproval of eating it. One would not consider it unnatural
to expect that a person brought up to the belief that horsemeat
is poisonous would adhere to this view in face of considerable
evidence to the contrary, unless the opinion came to be questioned
by other members of the community. The knowledge that the other
members of his community were somewhat shaken in their opinion
would tend to decrease the tenacity with which any one of the
members would adhere to it. This we might ascribe to the
influence of sympathy. Let U3 now apply Hume's analysis of the
working of sympathy to the case. X, Y, Z, etc, all say to A:
"Horsemeat is poisonous". In each case X, Y and Z are related to
A and in each ease A conceives horsemeat to have poisonous
qualities. According to Hume the only difference between conceiv¬
ing and believing is one of force and vivacity. Why should the
conception in this case not tend to be enlivened into a belief if
the thought is closely enough related to myself by my having
thought of horsemeat as having poisonous qualities in the past?
This would be in perfect harmony with the fact that frequent
repetition tends to engender belief. And Hume In fact emphasises
the enlivening effect of repetition "... we may feel sickness and
pain from the mere force of imaginetlon and make a malady real
by often thinking of It" (T.H.N. II, p.42; p.319).
Even though the suggested extension of the Influence of
sympathy may not have been intended by Hume we must still remember
that sympathy may be at work even though it does not lead to an
identity of sentiment or opinion, for it may only have the effect
of making it difficult for men "to follow their own reason or
inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily
companions" (T.H.N. II, p.40). Sympathy in fact admits of degrees
and may only succeed in creating in our mind a certain tension.
The most conspicuous and perhaps the most important would be a
conflict of motives engendered in this manner.
B. The fact that to sympathise is not necessarily to have a
motive is of supreme importance. In this Hume's use of 'sympathy'
differs from our own, for we should normally think that to sympathis
with X Is to have a motive for helping X in some way. This can
be accepted only with considerable reservation. Expressions
indicating motive may be used in order to explain actions that have
taken place. We might perhaps call this the retrospective use of
motive words. Thus we might ask the question "Why did he help the
old woman accross the road?" . The answer to this might be: "Out
of sheer sympathy with her". If it is now asked: "But why did he
sympathise with her?" the answer might be: "Because she was blind".
The fact that she was blind indicates that It was nossible for the
man to be motivated by sympathy. "Because her eyesight was good"
would be absurd and "because she was rich" would Indicate that the
motive was not sympathy. It is undoubtedly true that we often
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accept "because he sympathised with X" as both a proper and an
adequate explanation of an action, always providing that the
agent thought he was in some way helping a person that needed
help. But the proviso is not always necessary, "Why did you
vote Conservative?" This question may he properly answered by
the statement "Because I sympathise with the Conservative point
of view" , The answer would be proper even though I did not
believe the Conservatives to be in a precarious position of any
kind. This use of 'sympathise with' is similar to the use of
'agree with' though it commits one perhaps to rather less. This
use of 'sympathise with' is obviously similar to Hume's use of
that expression, as so far considered, since it indicates an
identity of the opinions of different individuals. But here too
we should be explaining actions by indicating a motive.
But let us now approach the question of motive from the point
of view of commitment rather than retrospective explanation.
Merely to state that you have a motive is very often not to commit
yourself to any line of action at all, I might truly say that I
have a motive for murdering a rich uncle without committing myself
to any line of action which would tend to hasten his death. But
reverting to the phrase 'sympathise with' it certainly is the case
that 'I sympathise with X' quite often involves a practical
commitment. One should feel justified in expecting a person who
sympathises with X to assist X rather than to increase his suffer¬
ing, if it is in his power to do so. But the commitment is not a
very strong one, for one can often claim to sympathise without
feeling committed to any very definite effort to assist X, One
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would hardly question a person's sincerity in his claim that he
sympathises with the coloured population of South Africa even
though he has taken no actual 3teps to try to improvo their lot.
If one wanted to give a complete analysis of the expression
'sympathise with' much more would have to "be said. It is
sufficient for my purpose to point out that when 'to sympathise'
is 'to be motivated in some way' it sometimes involves an
inclination to assist the person sympathised with in some sense.
In other cases no assistance may be needed. This is the case
when 'to sympathise with' almost means the same as 'to agree with'.
When it is taken to mean this no practical commitment is involved
unless we are sympathising with another's motives, his attitudes,
in fact the practical commitments of that other person.
One further point must be made. Mere agreement is not
enough. An onlooker who knows that A and B have the same
attitude to X would not be entitled to say that they sympathise
with one another's attitude unless A knows of B's attitude and B
knows of A's attitude. Hume's use of 'sympathise with' is
similar to the one we have .lust described although he would make
it a necessary condition that A's attitude has been causally
influenced by B's if A is to be correctly described as sympathis¬
ing with B. It is not clear to me whether ordinary usage lays
this down as a necessary condition. Though this needs to be
qualified later, we could say that sympathy for Hume is the
principle in virtue of which a sentiment or opinion in X comes
to cause an identical sentiment or opinion in Y. It may seem
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unnecessary to press this home so much, hut we shall soon see
Its importance, for it follows from this that to sympathise is
not to approve or disapprove unless we are sympathising with
another•s approval or disapproval. Even this is not completely
true for we must remember that we may be affected by sympathy
even though a complete identity of sentiments or opinions is not
achieved. I hope to show that the relation between sympathy and
approval and disapproval has not always been rightly understood.
G. We have already had occasion to mention the biased nature
of the passions. They tend to be strengthened by close relations
in such a way as to be out of proportion to the 'real merit' of
the object. The immediate effect of sympathy is by no means
always such as to counteract this partiality. Relations (i.e.
contiguity, causality and resemblance) are necessary in order that
sympathy may work. We sympathise more easily with the sentiments
of those who are closely related to us in space or time. In so
far as sympathy with the good opinion of others strengthens cur
pride, the mere fact that the people who hold us in high regard
are contemporaries and belong to the same community would
facilitate the sympathy and thus increase the pride. The same
can be said of causality. We tend to sympathise more easily
with those who are related to us by blood, but blood relation¬
ship is an example Hume gives of a causal relation. The only
relation which would explain our sympathy with eny other human
bolng is that of resemblance:
"Bow, It is obvious that nature has preserved
a great resemblance among all human creatures,
and that we never remark any n®ssion or
principle In others, of which, in some degree
or other, we may not find a parallel in
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"ourselves. The case is the same with the
fabric of the mind as with that of the
body. Ho^ev^r the oarts may differ in shape
or sise, their structure and composition are
in general the same. There is a very remark¬
able resemblance, which preserves itself
among all their variety: and thi3 resemblance
must very uch contribute to make us enter into
the sentiments of others, and embrace them with
facility and pleasure". (T.H.N. II, p.41; p.318)
But the closer the resemblance the easier and more complete is
the sympathy for "where, beside the general resemblance of our
natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or
character, it facilitates the 3'mpathy" (T.H.N. II, p.42; p.318).
Approval and disapproval arise when we abstract from the special
relations in which we stand to the person we approve or
disapprove of. It is fairly obvious that sympathy does not have
this effect as a matter of course. It is not in its very nature
an unbiased principle though we must appeal to it when we are
accounting for the origin of the habit we form o** taking up an
objective point of view.
It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the capacity for
sympathy as such does not imply that a being possessed of this
capacity possesses the sense of virtue and vice. We need only
point out that the capacity for sympathy is shared by animals
though they have no sense of virtue or vice. "It is evident
that sympathy, or the communication of passions, takes place
among animals, no less than among men" (T.H.N. II, p.112; p.398.)^
It seems that some knowledge and understanding is necessary
as sympathy in order to have the 3ense of virtue or vice.
Talking of pride and humility in aeimals Hume says:
"The causes of these passions are likewise much
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"the same in beasts as in us, making a ,1ust
allowance for our superior knowledge and
understanding. Thus animals have little or
no sense of virtue or vice; they quickly
lose sight of the relations of blood; and
are incapable of that of right and property;
for which reason the causes of their pride
and humility must lie solely in the body,
and can never be placed either in the mind
or external objects" (T.H.N. II, p.49; p.32«).
Since virtue for Hume is a quality of mind, it seems that the
hesitation he appears to have In saying that animals have no
sense of virtue or vice is unnecessary.
We have emphasised the way in which Hume thinks the
passions are influenced by relations which would tend to make
us feel more strongly about people closely related to us
irrespective of merit. I have called this the biased nature
of the passions and have pointed out that sympathy, since it is
also facilitated by close relations would tend to Increase rather
than decrease this bias. We shall of course have to show how
Hume thinks this bias is overcome, and examine the precise way
in which we can justifiab3.y talk of biased passions according to
Hume's theory.
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THE SENSE OF VIRTUE AND VICE
We can now turn our attention to the sense of virtue and
vice and the function Hume allots to sympathy in accounting
for the occurrence of approval and. disapproval.
Before we can enter into a discussion of the origin of
the sentiments of morality we must soy a few mords about their
nature. It is important to distinguish the account given of
the definition or analysis of approval and disapproval from the
causal explanation of the emergence in human consciousness of
these passions. Some commentators have failed to appreciate
that Hume appeals to sympathy in accounting for the origin of
the sentiments of morality, the conditions under which they
arise, and does not define these sentiments in terms of
'sympathetic consciousness'. He never thinks that approval
and disapproval are a species of sympathy. It would be much
more plausible to suggest that he considers these sentiments -
at least sometimes - as a speeies of the indirect passions.
Approval and disapproval are at any rate passions and I hope to
argue hereafter that the close relation Hume emphasises between
the indirect passions and the moral sentiments may help to
solve certain artificial problems in the interpretation of his
moral theory.
I have already emphasised, that Hume looks upon the passions
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as simple impressions which are indefinable and unique although
they may resemble one another. Something has already been
3aid about the criticism that what resembles cannot be simple
and there is no need for us to enter further into this
controversy at this point. It is, therefore, sufficient to
remind ourselves that Hume thought that resemblance between
simple impressions was consistent with their simplicity. We
need not he surprised, therefore, that Hume emphasises the
unique nature of the sentiments of morality when specifically
dealing with this topic in Chapter II, Book III of the Treatise.
The sentiments of morality are either pleasant or painful.
When we are satisfied that "morality is more properly felt than
Judged of" (T.H.N III, p.178: p.^70) it is not unreasonable to
go on to ask "... of what nature are these impressions and after
what manner do they operate upon us?" (T.H.N. Ill, p.178; p.470)
and Hume appeals to our experience in support of the view that we
—'hrnjslr^rbnbunce the Impression arising from virtue to be
agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy'1 (T.H.N.
Ill, p.178; p.470). We have now concluded "that the distinguish¬
ing impressions by which moral good or evil, is known, are nothing
but particular pains or pleasures" (T.H.N. Ill, p.179; p.471).
But we must be careful to remember that there are many pains
and pleasures that are not of the peculiar nature which
distinguishes the sentiments of approval and disapproval. "An
action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious: why?
because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular
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kind"*"" (T'.H.N. Ill, p.179; p.471) . In the same paragraph Hume
again stresses that here we are dealing with "a particular Kind"
of pleasure, "To have the sense of virtue is nothing but to
feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation
of a character" (T.H.N. Ill, p.179; p.471). It must be strongly
emphasised that Hume is here referring to the sentiments as
impressions, as they appear in consciousness, though we can no
doubt also differentiate this peculiar kind of pleasure from
other pleasures in terms of the causes or attendant circumstances
that arouse it.
For Hume goes on to say that perhaps people might ob.lect
that since pleasure and pain determine approval, and disapproval
then any object that arouses pleasure co^ld be thereby deemed
vicious or virtuous. To this Hume gives an answer which is of
the utmost importance:
Mi?or it i3 evident that under the term
pleasure, we comprehend sensations which are
very different from each other, end which have
only such a distant resemblance as Is requisite
to make them be expressed by the same abstract
term". (T.H.N. Ill, pp.179-180; p.472)
The pleasure aroused by the contemplation of character is
intrinsically different from the pleasure aroused, by drinking
good wine and the pleasure derived from listening to good music
differs from both. But this is not all, for Hume goes on to
say:
"Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain,
which arises from characters and actions, of
that peculiar kind which makes us praise or
condemn" . (T.H.N. Ill, p.180; p.472)
1. My underlining.
2. My underlining.
I have quoted extensively from the text in order to show
that it would he most unreasonable to suppose that Hume is
merely guilty of a gross carelessness in insisting upon the
peculiar character of the pleasure or nain which give rise to
the moral sentiment. It is of course important to remember
that approval is pleasant and disapproval painful, but it 1.3
equally important to bear in mind that they are simple
impressions arid consequently unanalysable, though we may
describe those circumstances which occasion their occurrence
and point out their similarity to other impressions.
In the chapter we are dealing with Hume goes on to point
out "a still more important difference between our pains and
pleasures" (T.H.N. Ill, p.180; p.473). The passage is
difficult to interpret, but it refers to the close relation
between the sense of virtue and vice and the indirect passions.
We shall have occasion to stress this relation a good deal and
may therefore be excused for quoting the passage in full:
"Pride and humility, love and hatred, are
excited, when there is anything presented to
us that both bears a relation to the object
of the passion, end produces a separate
sensation, related to the sensation of the
passion. Now, virtue and vice are attended
with these circumstances. They must
necessarily be placed either in ourselves or
others, and excite either pleasure or uneas¬
iness; and therefore must give rise to one
of these four passions, which clearly
distinguishes them from inanimate objects,
that often bear no relation to us; and this
is, perhaps, the most considerable effect that
virtue and vice have upon the human mind".
(T.H.N. Ill, pp.180-181; p.473)
We see here a reason why the sentiment aroused by virtue must be
pleasant and the sentiment aroused by vice unpleasant, for unless
this were so Hume co\:ld not explain why virtue gives rise to
pride and love and vice the contrary. The resemblance, which
isnocessary for the association of impressions to work, would
otherwise be missing.
But perhaps the close relation between the moral sense and
the indirect passions has not yet been fully spnreciatcd. Again
V
we must emphasise that Hume's statement here 5s no momentary
aberration. The ssme point is repeated at the beginning of
Book III, Part III, even more forcefully*
BWe have already observed, that moral
distinctions depend entirely on certain
peculiar sentiments o'"" pain and pleasure,
and that whatever mental quality in
ourselves or others gives us 8 satisfaction,
by the survey or reflection, is of course
virtuous; as everything of this nature that
gives uneasiness is vicious. Now since
every quality in ourselves or others which
gives pleasure, always causes pride or love,
as everyone that produces uneasiness excites
humility or hatred, it follows that these two
particulars are to be considered, as equivalent,
with regard to our mental qualities, virtue
and the power of producing love or pride, vice
and the power of producing humility or hatred.
In every case, therefore, we must ludge the
one by the other, and may pronounce any
quality of the mind virtuous which causes love
or pride, and any one vicious which causes
hatred ar$ humility." (T.H.N. Ill, pp.271-2;
pp.574-575)
A little later we are told that "Actions themselves, not
producing from any constant principle, have no influence cn
love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never
considered in morality" (T.H.N. Ill, p.272; p.575). Here
again it is stressed that the causes of the indirect passions
and sentiments of morality or pleasure and pain of the peculiar
kind which makes us praise and blame are the same. Perhaps the
connection between the account of the origin of the indirect
passions is more important for the understanding of Hume's moral
theory than some commentators have maintained.
If Hume's account of the indirect passions has as little
bearing upon his moral philosophy as Professor Kemp Smith appears
to think, it seems strange that he should take such pains to
emphasise in Book III of the Treatise the identity of csuses of
the indirect passions with virtue and vice, so much as to give
as the reason why certain qualities are not taken account of in
morality, that they fail to arouse the indirect passions. We
can only make sense of Hume's statements in this connection if
there is a strict parallelism between the principles accounting
for the origin of the indirect passions and those accounting for
the origin of approval and disapproval of persons. If we can
show that this is the case by a direct appeal to Hume's own
pronouncements we shall cease to think of his preoccupation with
the indirect passions in Book II as a useless game instigated by
his fondness for the principles of association but of no
importance for his moral theory.
But is there any justification for thinking that the
indirect passions are necessary in accounting for morality?
The answer to this question is put beyond doubt if we pay
attention to the following passage:
"The pain or pleasure which arises from the
general survey or vie," of any action or
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"quality of the m.lnd^ constitutes its vice
or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation
or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and
more impercentible love or hatred". (P .H.N.
Ill, pp .50^-307; p.-1.4)
This passage, occurring towards the end of Book III furnishes
us with a key to the understanding of Hume's moral theory when
its implications are rightly understood.
The first observation that springs to mind at this point
is that approval and disapproval (approbation and blame) are
indirect passions, but before we come to investigate the
implications of this view we must say a few words about the
apparent identification of approval and disapproval with love
and hatred. It might be felt that this supports the contention
that Hume is a reductionist, also concerned to show that
apparently different passions are really the same. This might
seem to throw some doubt upon my view that each passion is a
simple impression and consequently unanalysable and indefinable
on that account.
This objection is, however, based on a mistake. We may
here remind ourselves of the emphasis Hume puts upon the great
variety of those feelings we include in the concept 'pleasure'.
Pleasures are very varied and only related by resemblance to a
sufficient extent to justify the use of the 3ame abstract term.
This is no way indicates that these feelings are not simple
impressions the full, intrinsic nature of which is immediately
revealed to an individual's consciousness. In a similar way
Hume emphasises that an indirect passion, such as love,
1. My underlining.
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"may show itself in the shape of tenderness,
friendship, intimacy, esteem. good will, and
in many other appearances; which at the
bottom are the same affections, and arise
from the same causes, though with small
variation, which it is not necessary to give
any particular account of. It is for this
reason I have all along confined myself to
the principal passion". (T.H.N. II, p.l5f;
p .448)
Hume realises that it may be misleading to suggest that
there are only four indirect passions. This number is
dictated by the kinds of association which could give rise to
such passions. Still some differences In the causes may be
noticed though the associative principles are the same. Thus
'love' may be made to cover all those passions produced according
to one general scheme of association and we may thus say that
though there is variety among these passions they are at bottom
the same. They are also related by resemblance to the feeling;
their feeling Is similar, though not identical. The minor
differences in the causes may lead to a difference in the
sentiment. "it Is easy to imagine how a different
situation of the object, or a different turn of thought, may
change even the sensation of a passion: and this may in general
account for all the particular subdivisions of the other
affections, as well asof fear!! (T.H.N. II, p.15^: p.448)
Thus it is perfectly In conformity with Hume's view here that
the pleasure that is aroused by the contemplation of character
from an 'objective' point of view may arouse in us a special kind
of pleasure or pain which also make the resultant love or hatred,
approval or disapproval different to the feeling.
We are now in a position to see why Hume should have
adhered to the strange doctrine that approval Is always
pleasant and disapproval unpleasant. The Indirect passions
operated through a double association and the association of
impressions involved always referred to a similarity in
pleasantness in the one case and unpleasantness in the other.
It would have been impossible to make thi3 scheme work unless
the pairs of opposite passions involved pain and pleasure
respectively. In so far a.3 approval and disapproval are
treated as a species of indirect passions they must
consequently be opposites In precisely this hedonic sense.
It seems that Hume's fondness for his associationist scheme
cloud3 his view of the facts. We know perfectly well that some
people dote on disapprovals. When ladles, or members of staff
of a university for that matter, meet for a cup of tea the time
is thought to be most pleasantly passed in malicious gossip,
dwelling on the less fortunate characteristics of colleagues and
acquaintances. We can furthermore hardly say that approval is
always pleasant. Is It not often painful when we find ourselves
forced to approve grudgingly of the deeds and character of a
person we intensely dislike? When Hume emphasises how difficult
it is for us to allow Justice to prevail In our estimate of
enemies he ought to have become more suspicious about the
influence of the similarity in hedonic quality in the origination
of the indirect passions, approval and disapproval.
Even when we confine our view to love and hatred, pride and
humility, it is not obvious that these passions are necessarily
pairs of opposites as regards hedonic tone. What is more
painful than the love of an undeserving person or unrequited
love? It is only when we think of a man as 'glowing with
pride' that pride is necessarily pleasant. When 'pride* is
used as a description of a character trait little is implied
about the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the proud man's life.
One can of course answer that Hume is not concerned with the
latter sense of the term, but his account would undoubtedly have
been more interesting if he had been less obsessed with the
notion that terras such as pride and love could be treated as
names of simple impressions. It also makes it difficult to
understand how these passions thus understood can have an object.
But at the same time as he thinks of them as simple impressions
he treats them as forms of valuing and as such they must have an
object, for to value must be to value something.
Approval and disapproval cannot be defined any more than
the other indirect passions. We can only point out those
circumstances from which they arise. Hume does not bother to do
this with all the different species of indirect pas dons, deeming
it "not necessary to give any particular account of them". But
approval and disapproval are of such central importance in
accounting for the nature of evaluation that a special examination
of these passions is necessary. It is only when we take up an
'objective' point of view that they are aroused, even though we
sometimes mistake the love and hatred aroused, because of a close
relation of their object to ourselves, for the 'calmer' variety.
Some evidence has already been drawn from the Treatise in
order to show that Hume thought there was a close analogy between
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those approvals and disapprovals that make us call a person
virtuous or vicious and the indirect passions of love and
hatred. Sympathy may he appealed to in accounting for the
origin of both, but Hume must somehow characterise those
approvals and disapprovals properly described as evaluations
of character in order to distinguish them from love and hatred
in the ordinary sense of these terms.
We are told that approval and disapproval are love and
hatred "which arise from mental qualities" and a warning is
given that the enquiry will take us "pretty deep" and that w©
shall have to compare some principles which have been already
examined and explained. We must appeal, to these principles in
order to discover "the true origin of morals". The discovery
of the "origin of morals" is the main topic of the third book of
the Treatise. It is therefore reasonable to presume that a
discussion specially concerned with this topic Is of central
importance in understanding the principles in terms of w^ich the
origin and nature of morals are to be explained,
Hume begins by emphasising that sympathy is a principle
which can be seen to operate universally in human nature. It
is described as essentially a principle of communication of
passions between human beings.
"As in strings equally wound up, the motion of
one communicates itself to the rest, so all the
affections readily pass from one person to
another, and beget correspondent movements in
every human creature". (T.H.N, III, p.272; p.57f)
There is a sense in which it would seem logically Impossible for
us to have another's experience. But it is, Hume thinks, equally
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Impossible ^or us to observe directly another's experience.
When I observe someone in pain I do not observe his pain.
Behavioural signs are the only data we have for inferring
what the nature of another's experience is. In Hume's view
the signs lead us first of all to have an idea of the
experience of another. It would seem, though this is not
clear, that this idea must be vivid enough to constitute belief,
for unless I believe that someone is in pain I am unlikely to
be much affected. It is only if I believe in the reality of
the pain that I treat the behavioural signs as its effects.
Thi3 idea or belief is then enlivened into a real impression
through the Influence of the impression of the self. If I
thought a person was merely pretending to be in pain my sympathy
would certainly not be aroused. I might be made angry or
scornful, but there certainly would be no feeling communicated.
It must,however, be noted that in watching drama one is often
profoundly affected by watching the actors portray emotions.
It is not clear to me that there is any sense in which one must
be said to believe the pleasures and the pains of the actors
real. This raises a large issue which cannot he discussed here.
But it is the cause of what I sympathise with that I approve
or disapprove of. The feeling sympathised with and the ob.lect
of the passion are different and this is Important when we come
to consider the view thet Hume thinks of approval end disapproval
as a species of "sympathetic consciousness".
Talking of the causes that lead us to call ob,1ect3 beautiful
or ugly, he emphasises that it is to a considerable extent the
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tendency of objects to produce pleasures and pains that
determines the aesthetic valuing of them. It is sympathy with
the effects that leads to the valuing of the cause. The
principles involved are the same in moral evaluation. This is
perhaps most conspicuously true of our approval of the artificial
virtues since they derive all their value from utility. The
sympathy, however, in no way constitutes the evaluation, but
"... produces our sentiment of morals" (T.H.N. Ill, p.274;
p.577) . Since wo find that sympathy with the effects of Justice
upon happiness or misery is the sole productive agency in giving
rise to our approval of justice and other artificial virtues, we
may presume it to have some effect In the case of the other
virtues. We find, indeed, that a great number of the natural
virtues have a tendency to increase the happiness of society.
This tendency would have no effect on our passions If it were not
for the influence of sympathy. The difference between the natural
and the artificial virtues lies In this, that the pleasures with
which we may come to sympathise arise Immediately from each
individual act in the case of a natural virtue. The artificial
virtues on the other hand only have pleasant results when a
conventional system of behaviour is presupposed, and given the
system we may find that an action considered without its relation
to It may have no beneficial consequences at all.
But it soon appears that sympathy is not sufficient to
account for the origin of morality, though it is Indeed e
necessary condition without which our sentiment of morals would
be incomprehensible. Sympathy, as we have already insisted,
may be a universal principle in human nature, but varies with the
closeness of relations. "We sympathise more with persons
eontiguctis to us, than with persons remote from us, with our
acquaintance than v/ith strangers; with our countrymen than with
foreigners'1 (T.H.N. Ill, p.277; p.581). As a result of this
our love or hatred is strengthened or weakened according to the
closeness of the relations. In fact I find that my love is much
more lively and intense when the qualities arousing it belong to
someone closely related to me than in the case of a person living
in a distant time or age. The difficult point 1s that this
variation in our passions is to a considerable extent accentuated
t>y sympathy. Since, however, the closeness o* relations is deemed
Irrelevant in pronouncing about the virtuous or vicious nature of
a character, how on earth can \"e claim that a principle which
contributes to a biased view of qualities of character can be said
to be the foundation of morality? It Is Iiume's answer to this
question which determines the fundamental nature of bis moral
theory and the precise way in which sympathy operates in producing
that approval and disaporoval which account for the distinction we
draw between vice and virtue.
"Judgments of value" appear to be objective In some important
sense in which love and hatred are not. Objectivity consists in
taking into account only those features of a situation which would
be common to any spectator. Hume's answer to the rationalists
consists in his attempt to establish that we can show how the
taking up of this objective point of view, the point of view of an
impartial spectator, can b© accounted for in terms of quite well
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known human motives which are operative throughout human life,
in our understanding as well as in practical affairs. There
is no need to appeal to a special intuitive faculty of reason
to account for this. In fact the motive behind judging of
actions in the way required can be seen to belong to our passions
as much as any other motive. "Reason is and ought to be the
slave of the passions." The 'ought* here is perhaps
rhetorical, but the 'is' must be taken perfectly seriously.
To judge objectively of situations is an acquired habit.
Let us now see how it is acquired. We find that our situation
in regard to objects varies from time to time and our moods may
also change the effect the same object has upon us at different
times. We soon learn that changes in our situation change the
appearances of things. An object looks small at a distance,
but appears to become larger as I approach nearer to it. It is
fairly obvious that if we tried to base our actions upon the
momentary appearances of things we should be much more often
thwarted in seeking the satisfaction of our needs and wants.
A golfer deciding upon a club to play his shot to the pin will
take a stronger club when he realises there is a dip in the
fairway between his position and the flag, a dip he does not see.
I may have had a drink of stagnant water when plagued with
extreme thirst. Yet I might not be inclined to claim that such
water was delicious because I realise that the unusual condition
of my extreme thirst may have had something to do with the way
the water tasted to me at the time.
The facts are familiar. The appearances of objects vary
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according to our situation in regard to them and our own
condition. Some changes in appearances seem to be most
naturally explained by attributing the variation to a change
in us or in our position. Differences in the apparent
colours of objects come to be attributed to changes in the
light or to a change in my sense organs as in jaundice. Thus
with wide experience I com© to distinguish in general between
changes due to a change of qualities in the object and those
changes due to my special situation or condition which is
perhaps not shared by others. The motive for lodging of
things from a special point of view, distinguishing the
subjective appearance from the objective reality, is simply
convenience.
The argument gains added force when we consider the
advantages of language, the value of which depends largely
upon the ease with which it allows us to communicate with our
fellow men. In order that communication may be achieved a
general rule of usage must he observed by people talking the
language. It must be objective in the sense that the various
people talking the language must apply the rule more or less
in the same way. What then more convenient than to abstract
from all the most variable conditions that govern apoearances 1
We then fix on some more or less definite standard or general
rule. an object is red if it appears so to any spectator,
given normal conditions of light and a normal state of a man's
sense-organs. In judging of size we have standards of
comparison that may be applied by those using the language.
There is no suggestion that anyone has invented the standard
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for the use of words. As in the case of the artificial virtues,
experience teaches us the advantages of language and a tacit
agreement to abide by the rules of language grows up. It is
indeed natural to say that on Hume's view a correct use of
language is one among the artificial virtues.
The case is precisely parallel in 'moral Judgments». We
come to form the habit of lookinc upon a situation In which a
certain character finds himself in such a way as to take into
consideration only those characteristics which are independent
of the special situation in which any one spectator may find
himself with regard to it. The acquisition of this habit is
convenient,for it eliminates the friction which arises in our
arguments about the value of qualities of character which are
due to our talking at cross purposes about them. It does
not necessarily eliminate all disagreement about the value of
objects, though as a matter of fact the habit of objective
Judgment will tend to decrease friction due to disagreement
about value, because we are all more or less alike in being
affected by the pleasure or pain of others through sympathy,
though in somewhat unequal degrees. But although in many cases
where our habit of objectively Judging of a character may not
determine our love or hatred it may still have an effect in
modifying conduct, for the objective view will make us realise
the causes of the strong love or hatred we bear to a person, and
the objective view will raise in us a calm passion which is a
species of love or hatred, that species which we call Approval or
disapproval. This may at least serve to regulate our language
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and may to a certain extent counteract our biased passions in
determining our will if a settled disposition points in the same
direction as the calm passion and counteracts the violent passion
in this particular case. In other cases the objective point of
view may only suffice to direct our use of language, may make us
pronounce a person vicious or virtuous even though we may still
be determined to act by a violent passion which is Inconsistent
with this.
Thus Hume's theory is to have the merit of both explaining
how we come to form 'objective moral judgments' or, indeed,
judgments of value generally, while at the same time accounting
for the fact that our actions very often go against our judgments.
In some cases this happens even though we have looked at the
situation objectively. We may not be able to control our bias
in favour of our children or friends even though we know others
to be more deserving.
Now there is also another case where we may be quite sincere
in pronouncing a person vicious or virtuous where our moral
valuation is still biased. This need not he due to the fact that
we did not try to be impartial. Vile may have tried this, but due
to the similarity between that love and that hatred which arises
from objective reflection and the biased variety we may mistake
the one for the other. We may think we really approve or
disapprove when in fact we only dislike intensely or like, love
or hate. Hume quite often mentions how we may mistake one
passion for another which is similar, though at the same time a
passion i3 a simple impression and thus revealed in consciousness
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just as it is. The mistake in a case like this only consists
in the association of the wfonp verbal expression with the
impression you have. Approval and disapproval can only be
distinguished from other kinds of love and hatred by describing
the circumstances in which it arises, and in this case it would
seem that the special circumstance is that it arises from
objective reflection or consideration of the case in question.
That it is still a species of the class of passions we call
generally love or hatred makes it possible for the one to be
mistaken for the other. One can hardly doubt the psychological
fact that we may in many cases genuinely think our feelings
towards a man are righteous indignation when in fact we detest
him for different reasons. I think it would be misleading in
all such cases to say the man knows his feelings but only does
not know how to describe them.
Hume is not out to deny that there is something special
about approval and disapproval considered as an experience.
Quite the contrary; for as we have seen he seems to insist
upon this. At the risk of being charged with repetition, I
should like to quote a passage towards the end of the chapter on
the Natural Virtues:
"Now in judging of characters, the only
interest or pleasure which appears the same
to every spectator, is that of the person
himself whose character is examined, or that
of persons who have a connection with him.
And, though such interests or pleasures touch
us more faintly than our own, yet, being more
constant and universal, they counterbalance
the latter even in practise, and are done
admitted in speculation as the standard of
virtue and morality. They alone produce that
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"particular feeling or sentiment on which moral
distinctions depend. As the good or ill
deserts of virtue or vice, it is an evident
consequence of the sentiments of pleasure or
uneasiness. These sentiments produce love
or hatred; and love or hatred by the
original constitution of human passion, is
attended with benevolence or anger; that is
with a desire of making happy the person we
love, and miserable the person we hate. We
have treated of this more fully on another
occasion". (T.H.N. Ill, p.28*; p.591)
The other occasion referred to is of course the discussion
of the passions in Book II, particularly the discussion of
love and hatred and their connection with benevolence or anger.
This is by no means a unique passage in its emphasis upon the
importance of the discu33ion of the passions in Book II for
Hume's moral theory.
One further point must be emphasised. When Hume refers
to "extensive sympathy" end seys that the sentiments of virtue
depend upon it he is not referring to any form of benevolence
or desire for the happiness of another. He is simply referring
to "the principle of communication" we have mentioned so often
and it is extensive, extends to all human beings, in that it
operates by resemblance, which is the one relation which has
any force at all when we take up an objective point of view.
It operates in virtue of the fact that all human beings
resemble one another, though the relation of causality (such
83 family relations) or that of contiguity in space or time
are absent. Hume can still hold with absolute consistency
that there is no such passion as "love or humanity merely as
such" or desire for the happiness of every other human being.
He is not making an appeal to altruism as an essential feature
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in human nature, if by this we mean a desire for the
happiness of human kind irrespective of their relation to
us and their personal qualities. Extensive sympathy may
serve to determine our approvals or disapprovals without
determining our actions.
"Sentiments must touch the heart to make
them control our passions: but they need
not extend beyond the imagination to make
them influence our tastes'. (T.H.N. Ill,
p.282; p.58^)
Hume makes no sweeping assumptions as to the essentially
egoistic or altruistic nature of man. He nowhere commits
himself to more than to say that the benevolent tendencies
in man generally outweigh the egoistic. But when he says
this he is not intimating any altruism in human nature.
Many of the benevolent tendencies would be of essentially
limited scope and would involve on the whole e bias in
favour of those closely related to us. If we think of an
altruist as a person who devotes himself to the increase of
happiness of human beings as such other than himself, Hume
would consider such a saintly being highly exceptional.
Hume always emphasises the view that in so far as
objects are valued for their utility it is not the actual
consequences but their "seeming tendencies" that determine
the mind to approve or disapprove. The reason for this is
that in taking up an objective point of view we approve or
disapprove of the object because of its causal properties and
distinguish this from certain accidental circumstances which
may prevent the effect from occurring on special occasions.
This goe3 for all evaluation of the useful and not only that
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peculiar evaluation we call moral. It is a misunderstanding
of Hume's view to suggest that he holds that 'moral evaluation'
is distinguished from other forms of valuation In being
objective. Aesthetic valuation of inanimate objects is
objective in exactly the same way. In distinguishing
objective valuation from our subjective attitude Hume in fact
takes as an example aesthetic 'judgment'.
It is perhaps worth while to point out that we must
distinguish between apnroval of an object, such es a work of
art and the approval of the arti3t as the originating cause
of the work. It is possible that this may help us to see
that what we call approval may sometimes refer to a direct
and sometimes to an Indirect passion. In so far as it has as
its object a man as the source of pleasant effects it is a
special kind of love, an indirect passion. If the object were
oneself, it would be a species of pride. In so far as we
approve or disapprove of the results, the rainful and the
pleasant, the passions arise immediately from pleasure or pain
communicated by sympathy and are conseeuently direct ones.
Let us now turn our attention to a "remarkable
circumstance" which is of the utmost importance for understand¬
ing the way in which sympathy helps to arouse the sentiments
of morals .
In describing the way sympathy operates we talked as if
the thought of somebody's pain or pleasure comes through
sympathy to be enlivened in such a way as to pain or please us.
It would thus seem that we can only svmpathise with actual
pain3 and pleasures, or at least pains and pleasures believed
to be actual. If therefore it is sympathy with the effects
of qualities of mind that lead us to approve or disapprove
it would seem that our approvals and disapprovals must be
determined by the actual consequences op actions or at least
by those consequences believed to be actual.
But virtue for Hume ie a quality o** mind or character.
Surely this can remain unaltered even though circumstances
prevent the beneficial effects this quality would normally
have?
"Virtue in rags in still virtue: and the
love it procures attends a man into a
dungeon or desert, where the virtue can
no longer be exerted in action, and is
lost to all the world." (T.H.N. Ill,
p.280; p.584)
Hume agrees that this appears prima facie an objection to his
system for it appears to be the case that
"if sympathy were the source of our esteem
for virtue, that sentiment of approbation
could only take place where the virtue
actually attained its end, and was beneficial
to mankind". (T.H.N. Ill, p.280; p.584)
But we approve of a dwelling house that is well adapted to
its purpose and value a fertile soil and a good climate even
though the soil is uncultivated and the climate belongs to a
desert island. We approve of the generosity of a pauper and
the courage of an imprisoned hero. This is so because we Judge
of the character by reflection upon the beneficial effects these
qualities would have if the normal effects of these qualities
were not hindered. "it is sufficient if everything he complete
in the object itself." (T.H.N. Ill, p.280; p.584)
In accounting for this Hume has to have recourse to the
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Imagination.
"The imagination has a set of passions belonging
to it, upon which our sentiments of hearty
much depend. These passions are moved by
dogrees of liveliness and strength, which
are inferior to belief, and independent of
the real existence of their obiects."
(T.H.N. Ill, p.280; p.585)
It is thus the fIttlngness of the object to have beneficial
effects that determines our evaluation of it. We are, that
is to say, determined in our evaluation by the kind of effects
the qtiality in question would have as a general rule and not
by the actual effects of the characteristic in the particular
case under consideration. It is instructive to see that
Hume here talks of the ideas that move the passions as
inferior to belief in strength and liveliness. He talks as
if no belief is involved in our actual evaluations according
to general rules. This is clearly not the case and Hume's
statement depends upon a somewhat narrow conception of belief.
What I believe when my approval is determined by a
general rule is that certain beneficial effects would follow
If certain specifiable conditions were absent, such as a
man's imprisonment or his poverty. It clearly has nothing to
do with whether we think the beneficial effects will probably
in fact occur for our approval Is not determined by whether we
think the man will he released, from prison or meet with
financial success. This important point is not clearly made
by Hume and is in fact obscured by his talk of the imagination
here as 'inferior' to belief in liveliness, that we are here
only dealing with a "species of probability" as opposed to
belief. The fact is that the belief in the hypothetical
proposition involved here is not just a weaker form of
conviction as to the likely occurrence of something.
Perhaps Hume wants to convey this by saying that the ideas
of the imagination which affect our passions are in this
case "independent of the real existence of their objects".
Yet his talk in terms of determination by ideas of the
imagination "inferior to belief" certainly is ill adapted
to bringing out the point that the difference lies in being
determined by a belief in a different proposition. If we
believed that the absence of the restricting conditions would
not tend to make the man behave in a way which would have
beneficial effects we should no longer approve of him. If the
imprisonment for example kills the hero's spirit we might pity
him, but he would now no longer be a courageous man in our
eyes .
But Hume is clearly right in emphasising that in judging
of a man as virtuous or vicious we are talking about his
disposition and abstract from the accidental circumstances
that may hinder the deeds. We might count as ecually generous
the man who as a pauper can only give a cigarette to a friend
and the wealthy man who gives millions to charities. It is
perfectly true that Hume writes at some length about our
esteem for the rich and the powerful. He certainly thinks the
rich are valued more highly because of their riches. Yet I
doubt if even Hume, who extends the notion of virtue more than
most writers, wonld count 'being rich' a moral characteristic.
It is, after all, not a 'quality of mind'.
- "7B -
It should now be clear that in so far as sympathy
operates in accounting for approval and disapproval it is
misleadingly described as a principle of communication, for
we are affected by sympathy in cases where the pain or
pleasure sympathised with is not actual,
"When I run over a book with my eye, I
Imagine I hear it all: and also, by the
force of the imagination, enter into the
uneasiness which the delivery of it
would give the speaker-*-. The uneasiness
Is not real." (T.ti.M. Ill, p.281; pp.585-58f)
We are, how/ever, pained by the reading of the book because of
the tendency the expressions used have to cause pain and
consequently talk of the style as "harsh and disagreeable" .
These terms express disapproval and are a condemnation of the
style and not just an expression of personal preference, for
I am being determined in my evaluation by the effect the book
would have as a general rule.
Sympathy we see to be involved in these evaluations but
it i3 clear we cannot identify this principle with "limited
generosity" or benevolence. These latter are motives in man
that need not determine our actions even though sympathy has
made us approve or disapprove of a particular object. It is
clear that benevolence and sympathy cannot be identified when
we consider the following passage:
"My sympathy with another may give me the
sentiment of pain and disapprobation, when
any object is presented that has a tendency
to give him uneasiness; though I may not be
willing to sacrifice anything of my own
Interest, or cross any of my passions, for
his satisfaction. A house may displease
me by being ill contrived for the convenience
1. My underlining.
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"of the owner; and yet I may refuse to give
a shilling towards the rebuilding of It.
Sentiments must touch the heart to make
them control our passions: but they need
not extend beyond the imagination, to make
them influence our taste, (T.H.N. Ill,
pp.281-282; p.58*)
This quotation may also serve to 3how why I think Mrs.
Warnock more than a little misleading when she says:
"One of the differences between attitudes and
even the calm passions seems to me to be
that we do not necessarily act as a result
of adopting some attitude . (P.A.S. (S.V.) p.48)
She goes on to emphasise that Hume thinks of the passions as
motives. This is odd in view of the fact that none of the
four indirect passions, pride, humility, love, hatred, is for
Hume a motive.
The distinction drawn between taste and passions in this
quotation may be thought to go against my view that approval
and disapproval are passions. But one csn hardly think this
objection serious when one remembers that Hume has a little
earlier, in talking about aporoval and disapproval, made
reference to "a set of passions" belonging to the imagination.
We may also remind ourselves that love and hatred are not
motives as such. We may love someone as we may approve of
him without giving any thought to his hapnineas. These
passions are different from the desire for the happiness of
another. This also makes it clear that Hume could not give
an analysis of approval and disapproval in terms of a
disposition to act in a particular way. The point 1.3 in some
ways important for itsbearing upon the problem of testing
sincerity.
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If a man disapproves of the racial policies of the
South African government one has a certain uneasiness about
the view that he cannot really disapprove unless he is
willing to do something to ameliorate the lot of the negroes.
Would this be conclusive evidence that the man was insincere?
One may hesitate to accept this view because a man may through
weakness of will fail to live up to his standards of value.
The problem is complicated by the fact that we recognise both
that a man may deceive himself as to what he values and that he
may act against his 'better judgment'.
It thus seems we have deliberate deceit, self-deception
and weakness of will. Our own way of defeating the presence
of the first is the inconslstency between a man's avowed
i
> i i. '
evaluations and his actual behaviour. If a man has a great
deal to gain, by evaluating in one way and behaving in another
and tries to hide the inconsistency one would tend to suspect
deliberate deceit. Yet in some such cases It is possible
the man may be deceiving himself. He may believe that there
are good grounds for his apparently inconsistent behaviour.
Yet one often suspects such rationalisation of behaviour
indicates a limited self-deception only. The case is often
very similar to the case of a weakness of will. Yet in the
case of weakness of will one would look for some evidence that
the man makes some efforts to live up to his ideals, his avowed
evaluations.
To convict a man of insincerity Is, we can see, difficult
and one would tend to say that only a fairly consistent
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behaviour incompatible with the avowed evaluation would be
conclusive. We need, of course, less behavioural evidence
when a man acts against his evaluations when he seems subject
to no temptation to do so. If a man In what he believes to
be a secret ballot were known to vote against a rovernment on
a specific issue one would, it seems, have fairly conclusive
evidence that he does not approve of this piece of policy.
This course presumes that the man does not suspect that his
vote may come to be known and that he in other respects knows
what he is doing.
I must not be taken to deny that a man's behaviour is
generally a better guide to what he values than his verbal
pronouncements. This would be absurd for the simple reason
that a man is not always the best judge himself as to how
strongly he approves or disapproves. Be cannot decide this by
a simple introspection. He may have to be nut to the test.
He my genuinely believe he would be willing to make considerable
sacrifices for the sake of his convictions, that he feels so
strongly about it. Yet we may know his- character better than
he himself does and realise his approval or disapproval is
half-hearted,merely academic as one might say.
These considerations show, I think, the weakness of
construing approval and disapproval as recurrent feelings
whose nature and strength a man can determine by attending to
his state of mind. It is not, of course, obvious that Hume
is committed to this view. The strength of our approval
might be determined by the tendency of the "calm passions" to
determine conduct rather than the violence of the emotion
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involved. I would, on the other hand, hesitate to say that
a man disapproved strongly of any form of racial persecution
if he never got emotionally roused by glaring cases of
injustice and racial murders, however consistently he worked
for improved racial relations. There are other possible
motives for such behaviour.
We must, I think, admit that we know what it feel3 like
to approve or disapprove strongly about something In one sense
and yet when the question as to the strength of our feelings
arises we may accept behaviour as a test of this. If this is
admitted we see that neither analysis in purely behavioural
terms nor the construction of approval simply as a feeling can
be counted as wholly satisfactory. We may perhaps again
think that Hume oversimplifies the issue to a certain extent
by construing pasaions such as approval a3 simple Impressions
and thinking of the motives connected with these passions as
contingently connected with them, for this would make it possible
that genuine approval or disapproval may be consistent with
any behaviour. But though the criteria based on behaviour may
not always or only in perhaps a few cases decide the issue, the
fact that sometimes they are taken to be decisive would throw
doubt upon the adequacy of this analysis.
We have already stressed that in so far as we approve or
disapprove of people these passions can be construed as a
species of love and hatred. It is emphasised by Hume that
the peculiarly moral sentiments only arise from contemnlation
of tendencies of character, your own special position being
disregarded. The pleasures derived from the objective
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contemplation may
"touch us more faintly than our own, yet
being more constant and universal, they
counterbalance the latter even in
practise, and are alone admitted in
speculation as the standard of virtue
and morality. They alone produce that
particular feeling or sentiment on which
moral distinctions depend." (T.H.N. Ill,
p.285; p.591)
In this passage Hume is emphasising that we only have
genuine cases of approval and disapproval when our feeling
or sentiment arises from our adopting an objective point of
view. Such approvals and disapprovals commonly involve
less emotional tensity than love and hatred based on close
connections with the agent. Yet the former may be stronger
as motives. This is one of the *aets that lead him to talk
a great deal about calm passions. It is important to
distinguish calmness from l^ck in motivating power. The
concept of calmness in passions will be considered hereafter.
But when Hume considers the notion of desert we again
meet with the close relation he considers to exist between
approval and disapproval or persons and love and hatred as
these passions were discussed in Book II. The pleasure or
uneasiness that the contemplation of tendencies of actions
produce lead us to love or hate (approve of or disapprove of)
the agent. These passions are by nature attached to
benevolence or anger and this is why we think virtue
deserves happiness and vice deserves to he punished.
We may not be satisfied with this account of desert for
we may think a crime deserves punishment, a man deserves
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reward without desiring ourselves to reward or punish.
There is a clear difference between thinking that a man
deserves to he made happy and wanting to make him happy.
It is clear that Hume has in mind his discussion of
the passions in writing the chapter containing the arguments
we have been considering. We have seen how he tries to
give account of desert hy appealing to the natural connection
between love and hatred on the one hand, benevolence and
anger on the other. He does indeed conclude the short
paragraph devoted to this topic and end the chapter by the
observation wWe have treated of this more fully on another
occasion". (T.H.N. Ill, p.28f; p.591)
THE CALM PA3SI0NS
Only a brief reference has so far been made to calm
passions. Although it is no doubt true that the concept
of calmness as applied to passions is of considerable
importance in the Treatise I believe the point of the
distinction between calm and violent passions has often
been missed by commentators*
We have already drawn attention to the classification
of passions contained in the first chapter of the Second
Book of the Treatise, Let us now consider in more detail
the distinction drawn between calm and violent passions which
Hume states as follows:
"The reflective impressions may be divided
into two kinds, viz. the calm and the
violent. Of the first kind is the sense
of beauty and deformity in action,
composition, and external objects. Of
the second are the passions of love and
hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility.
This division is far from being exact.
The raptures of poetry and music frequently
rise to the greatest height; while those
other impressions, properly called passions,
may decay into so soft an emotion, as to
become in a manner imperceptible. But as,
in general, the passions are more violent
than the emotions arising from beauty and
deformity, these impressions have been
commonly distinguished from each other.
The subject of the human mind being so
copious and various, I 3hall here take
advantage of this vulgar and specious
division, that I mav proceed with the
"greater order: and. having said all I
thought necessary concerning our ideas,
I shall now explain those violent emotions
or passions, their nature, origin, causes
and effects." (T.H.N. II, p.4; p.276)
The first two points I want to make about this can
perhaps be called guesswork, but I hope not unreasonable
guesswork. (1) The quotation we are discussing occurs in
an introductory chapter where a short statement of key
concepts is given. Such chapters are likely to be written
after the bulk of the book has been completed, or at least
carefully revised in the light of the main arguments in the
book. If this is a reasonable contention one can, I think,
assume that the main distinguishing characteristic of a calm
passion is correctly stated here, (2) In a summary, a list
of the members of a class may be taken as a means of
illustrating a distinction. If there Is in the rest of the
book a longer list, we may therefore assume that the longer
list is to be taken-as a fuller, more complete account of the
author's meaning. This point is important because Hume gives
a longer list in another place and makes In pact a distinction
between two kinds of calm passions.
As regards the quotation itself, we might want to make
the following observations:
(l) The 1fundamentum divisionis' seems to he emotional
intensity, the "disturbance in the soul" as Hume sometimes
puts it. The term Is user"! to describe the conscious state
involved. It is analogous to the concept of "force and
vivacity" in impressions and certain ideas.
(2) The division is not exact in this sense, that a passion
classified as calm can upon occasion be violent. Witness
the reference to the rapture of poetry end music. A calm
passion is thus a passion which on most occasions involves low
emotional intensity in the sense explained. Hume, indeed,
emphasises the distinction between the violence and strength
of a passion, calmness and weakness. Thus in criticising
Hutcheson's Philosophise Moralis Institutio Compendieria he
writes to the author in November 1742:
"These Instincts you mention seem not
always to be violent and impetuous, more
than Self-love or Benevolence. There is
a calm Ambition, a calm Anger or Hatred,
which though calm may likewise be very
strong and have the absolute command over
the Mind." (L.R.Greig, p.19)
(3) Hume calls the distinction vulgar and specious and
indicates that he uses it as a methodological device merely.
The distinction can, indeed, be called 'vulgar and specious'
in the sense that there is nothing very sophisticated about it
as stated here and a similar distinction might well occur to
common sense. I think Hume probably also wants to emphasise
the fact that this is a rough and ready distinction since any
passion may become violent and the calm ones are those which
are so on most occasions. The distinction as such appears not
of any very groat Importance. We know well from experience the
difference between calmly enjoying something and being completely
carried away, becoming animated, excited, possessed, by a passion.
(4) The calm passions enumerated here seem to be evaluations
and according to the interpretation given by Kemp Smith they
Inevitably are such. He says:
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"... they can be identified as being the passions
which we experience on the mere contewnlation
of beauty and deformity 1n action and may~
accordingly be further described as being
modes of approval and disapproval^-" . (P.O.H., p.lP7)
In a schematic representation of the division op passions he
describes them "as proceeding from the contemplation of actions
and external objects, viz. the moral and aesthetic sentiments".
Kemp Smiths characterisation of the calm passions as modes
of approval and disapproval seems to pain added support from
Hume's statements in T.III, Part III, Section 1. Our sentiments
of praise and blame are as we have seen naturally biased as we
take a much livelier interest in anything close at hand than
far removed in space or time. We have also seen how experience
teaches us that it is convenient to judge all objects from a
common point of view, abstracting from the different locations
in space and time and our personal interest. In this
connection he says:
"Here we are contented with saying, that reason
requires such an impartial conduct, but that
it is seldom we can bring ourselves to it,
and that our passions do not readily follow
the determination of our judgment. This
language will be easily understood, if we
consider what we formerly said concerning
that reason which is able to oppose our
passions, founded on some distant view or
reflection". (T.H.N. Ill, p.279; p.583)
The 'reason' referred to here is of course a certain calm
passion and Hume is referring back to the chapter "Of the
Influencing Motives of the Will" in Book II. It seems to be
the case that Hume is indlcatinr that approval or disapproval,
the calm passion which arises from a distant view and
1. My underlining.
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reflection, can lead to action and that this has lead the
rationalists to think there can be a conflict between reason
and passion. It i3 to be noticed, however,that the "sense
of beauty and deformity in action" can be violent and in those
cases when these passions, which are usually calm, are violent
they certainly do not arise from a distant view and reflection.
The reference to the raptures of poetry and music shows this
clearly. Hume stresses here also that our approvals and
disapprovals do not have as much influence upon our actions
as might be supposed and this would explain that our value
judgments have on the whole nore consistency and uniformity
than our actual actions,
Kemp Smith's characterisation is, however, vague on one
important point. Is he making the same distinction as Hume
makes in the opening chapter of Book II? In that base
experiencing the raptures of music and poetry would be a calm
passion. Is he saving that the calm passions ere those only
which are objective modes of approval and disapproval, arising
from a distant view and reflection? In that case the calm
passions are those only which we express by an objective
judgment when for example we say "this is a good piece of
music" where this passion would arise from a consideration of
the piece in question, abstracting from our own personal point
of view. (I might for example find I was biased in thinking
the piece in question enjoyable by the fact that the composer
happened to be my son.) It seems this letter is his view.
In so far as this is his view it is partial and perhaps
misleading as I shall try to show, *or in the enumeration
Hume gives of the members of the class of calm passions in
the chapter on the Influencing Motives of the Will, he
includes members in this class which cannot be taken to be
forms of approval and disapproval at all. People often
fail to notice thi3. Thus Mrs. Mary Warnock in a paper to
the 1oint session of the Mind Association and the
Aristotelian Society makes the following statement:
"in general it (a calm passion) is a
feeling inspired by the rational and
detached consideration of some object,
a feeling either pleasant or painful.
An early example and indeed the only
example that Hume gives is^- "the sense
of beauty and deformity in action,
composition and external oblects"."
(P.A.S. (S.V.) 1957, p .44)
The following quotation from Hume is meant to show her
mistake:
"Now it is certain that there are
certain calm desires and tendencies,
which, though they be rea 1 pa s31 onsL,
produce little emotion in the mind,
and are more known by their effects
than by the immediate feeling or
sensation. These desires are of two
kinds; either certain instincts
originally implanted in our natures,
such as benevolence and resentment,
the love of life, and kindness to
children; or the general appetite
to good, end aversion to evil,
considered merely as such."
(T.H.N. II, p.129; p.417)
It seems fairly clear that the fundamentum divislonis is
still the same as the one we started off with. The calm
passions are those which on the whole involve low emotional
1. My underlining.
Intensity and this factor is decisive. It seems at least
obvious that when we are motivated by a calm benevolence to
children this need not be a passion arising from a distant
view or reflection and is therefore not to be equated with
approval or disapproval thus understood.
Kemp Smith notices the extension of the class of calm
passions, but in classifying the passions schematically he
puts these instinctive passions which do not arise from a
previous experience of pleasure and pain into a separate
class, which he calls primary passions. The secondary passions
are then divided into direct and indirect according to whether
they arise directly from pleasure or pain or through a
conjunction of other cualities with this. The calm passions
are then taken as a subdivision of the direct secondary
passions. My point is that this is misleading because the
division of passions into calm and violent cuts across this
classification since certain primary passions are here
classified by Hume as calm. The calmness or violence of a
passion though determined by causes is independent of tbe
mechanism which brings it about, whether direct, indirect,
primary or secondary, though the primary passions and some of
the secondary direct passions can he classified as calm since
they on the whole involve little emotional disturbance.
as regards the "general appetite to p:ood and aversion to
evil", the context seem3 to make it plain that 'good' and 'evil'
are here taken to mean pleasure and pain, for Hume here points
out how a violent passion may overcome a calm one by drawing
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our attention to the fact that we often prefer a nearer
lesser good to a greater distant good and are thus made to
act against our own best interest. In this case, the
conflict is not between an 'approval' and a passion, if
approval is taken to be moral approval. It is not the moral
sentiment which is involved here at all, but rather a conflict
between what we conceive to be prudent with a particular
passion. This is, I consider, a valid reason for considering
Kemp Smith's classification misleading.
Hume is in this chapter concerned to show that the
distinction between a calm and a violent passion is entirely
different from the distinction between a weak and a strong
passion. The latter is a distinction in terms of strength of
motivating power whereas the former refers to the intensity of
the emotion considered as a feeling. In this sense a violent
passion may prove weaker than a calm passion considered as a
motive. This shows up the situation which makes it initially
plausible to think that reason may be in direct opposition to
passions.
When Kb mp Smith classifies volition as a violent passion
we must bear in mind that on the occasion when a calm passion
determines the will there does not seem to be any reason to
believe that the volition is a violent passion. It must be
taken to be violent in the sense that It is so on most
occasions. Consider Hume's definition of volition as "the
Internal impression we feel or are conscious of, when we
knowingly give rise to any net? motion of our body, or new
perception of our mind". (T.H.N. II, p.113; p.399) This
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impression seems to accompany all voluntary acts, however
motivated and if we are to call it a passion at all it seems
on a different level with the other passions in question here
since it does not appear to be a motive, but appears whether
our motive is a calm or a violent passion.
Though Kemp Smith has textual ,1ustification for classifying
volition among the direct passions it may he doubted whether
this is strictly correct. Hume enumerates as direct passions
"desire and aversion, grief and .^oy, hope and fear" along with
volition. But when he introduces the description of volition
already quoted he prefixes the description by ssyine: that
volition is not properly speaking a passion. It seems
important to realise this when we are talking of the passions
as motives .
A similar mistake seems to be made by MacNabb with regard
to sympathy which he calls "another calm, regular and general
passion". For Hume sympathy is a principle which accounts
for the fact that we come to feel pleasant or painful emotions
at the thought of such emotions in others. It is not a
separate passion on a level with the other passions. In
fairness to MacNabb it is only right to point out that he does
not treat sympathy in this manner throughout his interpretation
of Hume. But even though this may be a mere slip, it is an
unfortunate one. It will later become clearer how unfortunate
it is for there is a tendency to think Hume considered approval
and disapproval "a species of sympathy" and since approval and
disapproval are undoubtedly ppssions it seems we must consider
sympathy a passion too if this interpretation is accepted.
- Cui -
Let us now confine our attention exclusively to the
calm passions of the second type, i.e. "the general appetite
to good and aversion to evil, considered merely as such .
Hume makes repeated references to the fact that we sometimes
have a conflict between a particular violent passion and what
we consider to be (1) our true interest or (2) the nature of
the object as a source of pleasure generally. The second
principle sometimes prevails, especially when we have developed
a firm unshakeable disposition. Strength of character
indicates that we are not swayed over much by particular
violent passions.
In this connection it is perhaps not inappropriate to
point out that Huteheson makes a distinction between calm
desires and particular passions in his "An Essay on the Nature
and Conduct of the Passions and Affections". Hutcheson says:
"There is a distinction made between calm
desires of Good and aversion to evil,
either selfish or public as they appear
to our Reason or Reflection and the
particular Passions towards Objects (|
immediately presented to some sense.'
(3.B., p.399)
The similarity between this statement and the use Hume makes
of the notion of "calm passions" as motives is obvious,
though Hume, as we have seen, wants to emphasise that even
such passions as anger may often be calm, though it must be
counted as a violent passionbecauso on most occasions anger
involves "emotional disturbance". In both Hume and Hutcheson
there seems to be here a denial of the doctrine which is
apparently implied in Locke's Essay, Book II, Chapter XX:
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"The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon
the absence of anything whose present
enjoyment carried the idea of delight with
it, is what we call "desire", which is
greater or less as that uneasiness is more
or less vehement,"
If 'greater or less' means 'stronger or weaker as a motive',
this is the very point Hume and presumably Hutcheson are
concerned to deny.
In Hutcheson's account of calm desires there is a
reference to these desires as arising from a reflection upon
(1) what is to the interest of the agent, (2) what is for the
public interest. He does not, however, say that when a passion
leads me to actions that are prudent or in the public interest
then the passion involved is calm. This is, however, the view
attributed to Hume by Sydd in her book "Reason and Conduct in
Hume's Treatise". Her view can, I think, be shown to be
mistaken and based on a wrong reading of certain passages In
Hume.
The calm passions, she thinks, are of four kinds:
"(1) Desires which accord with the real
qualities of their objects independently
of a special consideration of these
objects. (2) Desires which accord with
these qualities as the result of the agent
forming an adequate conception them.
(3) Desires which accord with the real
qualities of the object as constitutive of
or a means to happiness without the agent
considering them as such. (4) Desires
which accord with these qualities as
constitutive of or a means to happiness as
the result of the agent forming an adequate
idea of them in this relation." (R. and C., p.149)
The criterion for deciding whether a desire is calm is
here not taken to be emotional intensity but rather the
consideration whether or not the desire is such that it would
have arisen from an adequate consideration of the cb,1ect
giving rise to it. If we consider the first type of calm
passions such an interpretation leads to some paradoxical
results. Let us imagine that X falls passionately in love
with a certain woman and that his passionate desires lead
him to propose marriage, although he has given no clear
thought to whether or not she would be a suitable wife. It
would be rash to deny that this sometimes occurs and one has
reason to believe that some marriages contracted in this way
may be perfectly satisfactory. The man might later on decide
that he had, indeed, acted in his own best interest and this
might be the general opinion. But does this in any way
incline one to think that the passionate desire which caused
X to make a proposal of marriage was really a calm passion?
We do most certainly not decide whether a passion is calm or
not by considering whether the behaviour it leads us to has
fortunate consequences. Hume most certainly would not
consider the sexually inspired, love leadinm to this fortunate
action a calm passion.
Love is on the whole considered a violent passion. An
adequate conception of its ob.lect might have the result of
increasing it, making it ri3e to a higher pitch. This fact
does not entitle us to say that it is therefore calm on this
occasion. Kydd's mistake is to think that a calm passion is
always preferable to a violent one, that this is so by
definition. She is right in thinking that violent
emotional disturbance often leads to rash behaviour because it
hinders us in apprehending the real nature of the oblect
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arousing our passion. This point is, indeed., emphasised by
Hume. What she fails to realise is that Hume thinks also
that our passions may become too calm and this is brought out
in the next section where Hume discusses the causes of the
violent passions. Hume there says:
"There is not, in my opinion, any other
natural cause why security diminishes
the passions, than because it diminishes
that uncertainty which increases them.
The mind, when left to itself, immediately
languishes, and, in order to preserve its
ardour, must be every moment supported by
a new flow of passion. For the same
reason, despair, though contrary to
security, has a like influence.'' (T.H.N.
Ill, p.133; pp.421-422)
I think the suggestion here obviously is that it is desirable
that the mind should "preserve its ardour".
In the cases where the passion based on a calm consideration
of self-interest opposes a particular violent passion it is
certainly a false interpretation to suggest that the passion is
not really calm unless the man has formed an adequate idea of
his own interest, unless in fact his judgment is correct. The
motive would be a calm passion opposed to a violent one in each
case. Though violent passions nay hinder true lodgments of
objects we may be mistaken about the true nature of objects for
other reasons. We might for example have been given wrong
information of some sort. This important fact is overlooked by
Kydd because she is misled by the fact that Hume seems to
emphasise in thi3 chapter the cases where a calm passion is
dependent upon correct judgments because he is showing in \*hat
precise way there can be a conflict of motives such as to
mislead people into thinking there is a real opposition between
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reason and passion. Consider the following passage:
"Men often act knowingly against their
interest; for which reason, the view
of the greatest possible good does not
always influence them. Men often
counteract a violent passion in
prosecution of their Interests and
designs; it is not, therefore, the
present uneasiness alone which
determines them." (T.H.N. II, p.129; p.418)
The expression "the view of the greatest possible good" may
be road in two ways according to whether you emphasise the
word 'view* or 'greatest possible good'. Kydd would
emphasise the latter and thus consider the calm passion must
be based upon an adequate idea. I should want to emphasise
•view'. Consider the conclusion drawn at the end from the
premiss that men "counteract a violent passion in prosecution
of their interests and designs". This is taken to show
that the present uneasiness does not always determine the
direction of our will. Hume would have made his points even
though the designs in question might be based upon a false
estimate of the object.
But, one might now feel inclined to ask, does Hume not say
strength of mind indicates a prevalence of calm passions over
the violent? Does he not further say this is a virtue and
deplore that people give too easily in to "the solicitations
of passion and desire"? This is easily explained by the
obvious fact (l) that great emotional disturbance often hinders
us in forming an unbiased view of the objects of our desire and
(2) we often find that violent desires are due to a biased view
of the object. This can be admitted without making it a
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defining characteristic of a calm passion that It arises from
adeouate knowledge or is in harmony with adequate knowledge of
the objects desired. Such an interpretation gives an unduly
rationalist bia3 to Hume's doctrine.
iCydd seems to see vaguely that Hume is serious when he
distlnguishes the calm from the violent nassions in terms of
emotional disturbance or intensity and she tries to show how
this can be made to fit in with her interpretation. She says
on page 147:
"... it is evident that when passions are
calm in the sense that they are either
conducive to or directed towards our
greatest possible good they are co-ordinated
with one another and cannot come into conflict.
Such passions, since they do not conflict,
cause no disorder in the soul, for it is
only when our passions are not so co-ordinated
by a single principle that they can cause a
•sensible emotion'."
Kydd gives no textual reference to substantiate this
interpretation but it seems palpably false. It is true that
a conflict of passions is taken by Hume to increase on the
whole the predominant passion, to make it more violent, but a
calm passion may be turned into a violent one by the simple
expedient of bringing the obiect closer to the person. "The
same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when
remote, produces only a calm one," (T.H.H. II, p.131; p.419)
('Calm' and 'violent' here refer to emotional intensity on
particular occasions. This must not be confused with the sense
in which moral approval is a calm passion.) Hume further
points out that if we want to change a roan's attitude it is on
the whole an expedient more likely to meet with success to work
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upon his violent passions. It seems clear that we might
o^ten succeed in changing a men's attitude in this way for
hi3 own good, i.e. in such a way as to increase his true
welfare. The desire might be fully in harmony with the real
qualities of the object considered as a factor contributing
to the agent'3 welfare though he does not himself view it in
this light. According to Kydd's interpretation this could
happen only if the passion was a calm one. The mere fact
that the object in question is the object I ought to desire
more than anything else at this point o** *^y life would he a
sufficient condition for saying the passion motivating me was
a calm one. To press home the absurdity of saying that there
is only a 'sensible emotion' produced when there Is a conflict
of passions, one could multiply instances. What about
passionate sexual love mentioned, earlier?
The upshot of what I have been saying 1n criticism of the
treatment of the so called 'doctrine of calm passions' by
commentators is that they have failed to take Hume's own words
in the first section of the book on passions seriously enough.
When he there draws the distinction in terms of embtional
intensity and calls this distinction vulgar and specious he
means what he i3 saying. Kemp Smith makes the mistake of
thinking he is exclusively referring to approval and disapproval.
Kydd on the other hand fails to realise that in dealing with
the rationalists' claim that reason can he a motive to the will
Hume simply refers to the fact that this is a mistake engendered
by a failure to appreciate that the passion associated with a
firm disposition may be a stronger motive than a violent passion
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and further that when we reflect upon a situation objectively,
abstract from our particular y>osltion in regard to an object,
this arouses in us a passion directed towards this object
which on the whole involves little emotional disturbance,
although it is still a passion and may hinder a particular
violent passion in leading to action. The rationalists
think Reason is the motive here because there is hardly any
felt emotion, but they are wrong because we may be in
possession of all the facts, know the whole truth about the
situation and the conflict might still remain.
Whether the calm passion or the violent one will
determine our conduct depends entirely upon our situation and
the habits we have developed. But we must remember that it
is conceivable that we have contracted a firm habit based upon
a mistaken view of our own interest and in this case we should
have a calm passion inconflict with a violent one. Kydd
mistakenly thinks Hume has a special doctrine of calm passions
designed to replace the rationalist doctrine but essentially
based upon rationalist premises. He in fact uses his
distinction between calm and violent passions to exnlain how
they come to make their mistake, but in so doing he was well
aware of the fact that he was merely making use of a 'vulgar
and specious' distinction.
It must be emphasised that it is no part of my intention
to belittle the importance of the concept of calm passions in
understanding Hume's views on evaluation. I merely want to
stress the point that calmness is in one sense not the defining
characteristic or approval or disapproval.
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We must distinguish between •calm passions' as a class
name and as the characterisation of a passion occurring on a
particular occasion. If we take the first interpretation the
class includes more than approvals and disapprovals. If we
take the second interpretation many passions, even those that
are commonly the most violent, may he calm on a particular
occasion although they do not arise from "a distant view and
reflection", even though they do not arise from our adopting
an objective point of view.
But Hume realises that there must be some appearances
that seem to give support to the view that the moral conflict
is to be described as a conflict between reason on the one
hand and passions on the other. Unless there was an apparent
difference in kind between the two 'parties' to the conflict
it would be hard to explain why the mistake was so widespread,
why it even seemed plausible to the unsophisticated. When one
tries to control an incidental strong desire for something the
emotion tending to oppose the desire appears to he almost
indistinguishable from a mere opinion or belief. Hume takes
this to be a fact that cannot be denied and hence there must be
passions that involve so little emotional disturbance as to be
hardly discernible if It is true, as he contends, that passion
can only oppose another passion or desire in the directing of
conduct.
I think it is also possible to maintain that Hume thinks
one of the causes of the widespread belief in free will is
derived from the same source. A violent desire may seem to
necessitate conduct. If all our actions were thus
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motivated one might not have come to believe in freedom of
the will. It 1.8 becRiTse we often act contrary to violent
desires that we thin'* of the actions as having no reuse.
When further the desire has abated and we reflect upon the
situation it seems we can imagine ourselves as easily having
done the one thing as the other. This Is not the case while
the violent desire is determining our conduct.
There is the further imoortant point that though approval
and disapproval are emotions or oas3ions for Hume, he sees that
when we calmly evaluate and are not ourselves vitally involved
in the issue our state of raind seems often to involve little
detectable emotion. When we look at the facts the calmness of
our mind may load us to think o* our evaluation as a conclusion
inferred from the facts, whereas an evaluation is determined by
and not inferred from the facts as we see them. The following
quotation states clearly the main point of Hume's distinction
between calm and violent passions:
"flhat we commonly mean by passion is a
violent and sensible emotion of mind,
when any good or evil is presented, or
any object, which, by the original
formation of our faculties, is fitted
to excite an appetite. By reason we
mean affections of the very same Find
with the former, but such as operate
more calmly and cause no disorder in
the temper: which tranquillity leads
us into a mistake concerning them, and
causes us to regard them as conclusions
only of our intellectual faculties."
(T.H.N. II, p.147; p.437)
Though the fact that a calm passion often arises when we
do reflect may be an added reason for taking reason to be our
motive, reflection is not a necessary condition por the passion
being calm. This can be clearly seen from the fact that
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Hume goes on to 3ay:
"Generally speaking the violent passions
have a more powerful Influence: though
It Is often found that the calm ones,
when corroborated by reflection and
seconded by resolution!. are able to
control them In their most furious
movements." (T.H.N. II, p.147;
pp .437-438)
Thus It appears that reflection may add strength to a
passion already calm without making it violent. But
violence must of course not be equated with strength for
then 'reason* would always be the loser. A calm passion
can be made violent either by a change of temper, a change
in the situation of the object or a passion attending the
calm one in our mind may change its force. It can be seen
that Hume is here talking of a particular passion as being
thus changed without it changing its identity from the fact
that he talks of the passion as "borrowing force from any
attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the
imagination". (T.H.N. II, p.147; p.438)
It is also to be emphasised that what we wrongly take
to be the dictate of reason as opposed to passions may vary
between people according to their dispositions and tempers and
in the case of the same man at different times. He therefore
concludes the chapter from which I have been quoting by saying
that;
"Philosophy can only account, for a few of
the greater and more sensible events of
this war; but must leave all the smaller
and more delicate revolutions, as dependent
on principles too fine and minute for her
comprehension". (T.H.N. II, p.147; p.438)
1. My underlining.
Passions that are evaluations are distinguished "by
their qualitative character due to the fact that they arise
from special causes and have peculiar obleets. They may
vary in calmness or violence In the same way as an idea may
vary in force and vivacity. These ways of characterising
'experiences' (using experience to cover ideas) are parallel.
Since approvals and disapprovals arise in large measure from




It has often been maintained that it is In principle
impossible to give a satisfactory causal explanation of all
human actions. Some human actions at least are free end
to say that they are free entails thst they are not causally
determined. In so far therefore as a science of human nature
seeks causal explanations it cannot rive a satisfactory
account of free human behaviour. Since it is in particular
this aspect of man's life with which moral theory is
preoccupied, the whole of Hume's attempt to establish a
science of man must be doomed to failure unless he can show
that freedom and the causal necessity presupposed by this
science are compatible, that the same actions can at once be
free and causally determined.
Another great eighteenth century scientific optimist,
Immanuel Kant, agreed with Hume that one could not divide
actions into two mutually exclusive classes, the free and the
determined. He too thought all actions must be causally
determined, that the problem was to see how any action could
at the same time be free. To classify either of these thinkers
as determinists is more misleading than helpful. They both
thought that there was aperfectly good sense in which some human
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actions are free and. others are not free. Hume attempts in
fact to show that the freedom possessed by human beings is
in no way incompatible with the causal necessity presupposed
by science.
Hume then does not deny that the word 'will' has a
meaning. There certainly is such an idea. As in the case
of all other ideas, he hunts for the impression from which it
is derived.
"I desire it may be observed, that, by
the will, I mean nothing but the
internal impression we feel, and are
Conscious of* when we knowingly give
"rise to any new motion of our body, or
new perception of our mind".
(T.H.N. II, p.113; p .399)
Hume adds that this impression is, like pride and humility,
indefinable. He also seems to think that any further
description of this impression is unnecessary. The reader
is supposed to be capable of identifying this 'internal
impression' easily enough. In picking up the book in front
of me I have the experience which enables me to understand
what the will is. There is supnosed to be something common
between aLl those actions we describe as knowingly doing something
whether this is performing an overt action, thinking of something
or looking at something. It would seem that the decisive factor
is whether one thinks one is doing something. The truth of what
one thinks would seem to be irrelevant. If I think I am moving
my leg, though it is paralysed, I have an impression of volition.
My freedom is restricted in this case, but it seems one would
quite frequently have an Impression of volition when this is the
case.
It is fairly obvious why Hume should on the whole not
wish to call the will a passion, though he classifies it as
a direct passion at least once. The direct passions srise
immediately from pleasure and pain. We knowingly seek what
promises pleasure and avoid what threatens pain. Since the
will is present whenever we knowingly exert ourselves, one
can see the temptation to think of it as a direct passion.
But the slightest reflection will suffice to convince us that
there is something odd about this,for we may knowingly do this,
that and the other from a number of different motives. Thus
hatred may lead me to cause deliberate harm to an enemy and love
make me help a friend. There is no emotion, no one passion
that seems to be present in these two cases, yet in both cases
we have the impression we refer to in talking about the will.
According to the definition of will given abox^e, we must
thus conclude that 'will* does not name a passion. If there is
will there must be an impression of volition to which the word
refers. To talk of the will as a faculty, a hidden power in
man to choose to do or not to do an action, is to indulge in
the meaningless talk of mystics. Yet Hume himself sometimes
talks of the will as a faculty. It "exerts itself when either
the good or the evil may be attained by any action of the mind
or body". (T.H.N. II, p.148; p.439)
How Is this passage to be interpreted? May we not take
it as a further elucidation of the situation in which we have
the impression of volition? We desire ^any things we see no
chance of obtaining, or desire to avoid things we know no effort
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of ours will enable us to get rid of. In some cases our
desires can be fulfilled by our own effort and when, as b
result of the desire, this effort 1s made, we have a case
of volition. The faculty language is misleading. Yet we
find this passage illuminating in that we normally identify
the will with the effort or rather the power to make the
effort to attain what wo desire. By power we don't mean
physical power, but rather the mental power to keep to a set
course in spite of hindrances in the shape of temptations and
the opposition of others.
In spite of the fact that Hume sometimes talks of the
will as a power of choice or a faculty that enables us to make
choices, we must bear in mind that he is anxious to account
for the facts without an apneal to hidden faculties or powers.
He oven goes so far as to deny that we have any idea of power.
attacking the vie*> that there is real power in matter which
does not lie in any of Its discoverable qualities, he savsj
"All ideas are derived from and represent
impressions. le never have any impression
that contains any power or efficacy. We
never therefore have anv idea of nower."
(T.H.N. I, p.159; p.1*1)
Hume Is in this passage concerned with refuting the belief
that there Is necessary connection discoverable between
objects. One object is said to have a native power to produce
another. All we discover is an invariable succession and this
goes for the relation between mental events and actions in the
physical world.
"The motions of our body, and the thoughts
and sentiments of our mind, (say they)
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"obey the will; nor do we seek any
further to acquire a lust notion of
force or power." (T.H.N. I, p.159;
Appendix p.r32)
But the relation between what we call a volition and the
action is no more intelligible than any other causal
succession.
Iiume could hardly deny that the word 'power' has real
use and a proper use. What he in fact does is to give an
analysis of it which would fit in with hl3 notion of causal
necessity.
"... there is but one kind of necessity,
as there is but one kind of cause, and
the common distinction between moral
and physical necessity is without any
foundation in nature.
(T.H.N. I, p.158; p.171)
and he adds:
"The distinction which we often make
between power and the exercise of it
is equally without foundation".
(T.H.N. I, p.159; p.171)
Hume, indeed, appears to be denying an obvious distinction,
for do we not often truly say that a man makes an improper
use of his power ahd that another, although he has the power
to do something, in fact refrains from doing it? Hume
insists that, if we speak philosophically, the fact that a
man does not in fact harm me shows that he had no power to do
so. There must have been some motive determining his conduct
and this motive must have been more powerful than any faint
desire a person may have had to harm me. On this interpretati
it is impossible to draw a distinction between having power and
exerting it. Hume emphasises that "... the person never had
any power of harming me, since he did not exert any". (T.H.N.
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II, p.38; p.313).
We must not be too eager to conclude from the account of
power so far given that Hume does not realise that there is a
sense in which ve may be scared of or pleased with a power
which has not been exercised. Although
"the distinction we sometimes make betwixt
a power and the exercise of it, is
entirely frivolous, and that neither man
nor any other being ought ever to be
thought possest of any ability, unless it
be exerted and put in action. But tho1
this be strictly true in a ,1ust and.
philosophical way of thinking, 'tis
certain it is not the philosophy of our
passions: but that many things operate
upon them by means of the idea and
suppositions of power independent of its
actual exercise". (T.H.K. II, p.3fl; p.312)
The long passage ,1u3t quoted leads one to wonder how one
could have an idea of power as opposed to the exercise of it
on Hume's principles. It la not entirely surprising to find
him attempting an analysis of power in terms of probability and
possibility. We deem an action possible when there is no very
strong motive hindering the man from doing the action, and
probable when on the basis of experience we conclude the
occurrence of the action is likely.
The significant feature of this analysis of power is the
absence of any reference to the power of choice. There are
choices open to a rich man that a poor man does not have. Most
ordinary people would, I think, insist when pressed that this is
what they mean when them aay he has a power to do X, Y or Z. In
having this power he also has the power to refrain from doing
the actions.
Hume, indeed, moves very far from common conceptions in his
account of power. This can be well shown in the following
passage:
"I do not think I have fallen into my
enemies' power, when I see him pass me
in the streets with a sword by his 3ide,
while I am unprovided of any weapon.
I know that the fear of the civil
magistrate is as strong a restraint as
any of iron, and that I am in as perfect
safety as if he were chained or
imprison'd. (T.H.N. II, p.3«; p.312)
It i3 perfectly true that we would not think we had fallen
into our enemies' power in this situation, if we think he is
not going to attack us in spite of his fear of the civil
magistrates. But this is the point. We think he can kill
me if he so chooses whereas if he were chained or imprisoned
there is no sense at all in which he can do me harm.
To this Hume would no doubt retort - But can he choose?
Choices are determined by motives and in the example given the
fear of the magistrates makes the action of harming me
impossible. There is but one kind of necessity relevant in
these situations, causal necessity, and this operates as much
in the case of the actions of the mind as in determining the
movements of bodies. This conception is at the very heart of
Hume's philosophy upon which presupposition a science of man
must be founded.
Let us now look a bit more closely at the arguments in the
&<H , PART fTT
first two sections of Book -III.
Hume recalls his own analysis of causal necessity:
"Here then are two particulars, which w©
are to consider as essential to necessity,
viz. the constant union and the inference
of the mind; and wherever we discover
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"these we must acknowledge necessity."
(T.B.N. II, p.114; p.400)
He then sets out to "prove from experience, that our actions
have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and
circumstances..." (T.H.N. II, p.114? p.401). Hume, needless
to say, does not prove any such thing, it would, indeed, be
a tough order. It may be the case that the different sexes
differ in their emotional makeup, but such a difference is
surely not a clear-cut one. There will be men close in
emotional character to women and vice versa. The same applies
to all the other examples, Hume would find it difficult to
point to a constant conjunction. He himself in fact modifies
his claim:
"Necessity is regular and certain.
Hxjman conduct is irregular and
uncertain. The one, therefore,
proceeds not from the other."
(T.H.N. II, p.117; S.B., p.403)
In answer to this objection he appeals to the fact
"that there are many inferior degrees
of evidence and probability, nor does
one single contrariety of experiment
Entirely destroy all our reasoning".
(T.H.N. II, p.117: p.403}
Hume here makes use of the challenge that the sciences
concerned with the study of material objects are in no better
position than the science of man. W® must acknowledge thst
many of the inferences we make about material objects are not
based upon a hundred per cent regular seouences. We need be
in no sense apologetic or embarrassed about the fact that
human actions show certain Irregularities . In answer to the
charge that human actions are irregular and uncertain he says:
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"To this I reply, that in Judging of the
actions of men we must proceed upon the
same maxims as when we reason concerning
external objects. When any phenomena
are constantly and invariably conjoined
together, they accuire such a connection
in the imagination, that it passes from
one to the other without any doubt, or
hesitation. But below this there are
many inferior degrees of evidence and
probability, nor does one single
contrariety of experiment entirely destroy
all our reasoning. 'The mind balances the
contrary experiments, and, deducting the
inferior from the superior, proceeds with
that degree of assurance or evidence which
remains." (T.H.N . II, p.117; p.403)
&•
Hume thus only claims that wo make inferences about
human behaviour on the basis of past regularities. Though
the regularity may not be a hundred per cent regularity,
this is no objection against the view that human actions are
causally determined, for precisely the same applies in the
case of many of our inferences about the behaviour of
inanimate objects. He even goes so far as to emphasise
that we do not abandon the belief that events or actions are
causally determined though the evidence for and against an
occurrence is equal.
"Even when these contrary experiments are
entirely equal, we remove not the notion
of causes and necessity: but supposing
that the usual contrariety proceeds from
the operation of contrary >Rnd concealed
causes, we conclude that the chance or
indifference lies only in our Judgment
on account of our imperfect knowledge,
not in the things themselves, which are
in every case equally necessary, though,
in appearance, not equally constant or
certain." (T.H.N. II, p.117; pp.403-404)
There is not time to go into Hume's account of causality in
detail and the difficulty of accounting for concealed causes
on his view. Here, however, he seems merely to be insisting
- 115 -
that we proceed a3 if there are causes even when we do not
know what they are, and that this is the case whether we are
dealing with human actions or inanimate oblects .
The regularity of sequence is all that is insisted on and
it turns out that this need not be so very regular. The
comparison with non-human changes is all along emphasised.
"But are the products of Guienne and of
Champagne more regularly different than
the sentiments, actions and passions of
the two sexes, of which the one are
distinguished by their force and maturity,
the other by their delicacy and softness.
(T.H.N. II, p.115; p.401)
We see here that in both cases we are quite likely to
meet with exceptions. There are too many variables that are
ignored in these generalisations. Yet his point is made if
the same type of reasoning is involved in both end evidence
of inferior kind is accepted alike 3r. our arguments about
human actions and non-human change.
If regularity is the essence of necessity, if we exclude
the feelings of an observer, then it seems irregularity would
be the essence of liberty. Yet this is not so. We do not
think an action free ,1ust because it is unexpected on the basis
of past experience. 3ome madmen, Hume points out, behave in
the most surprising and erratic fashion. Yet we do not
ascribe to them more freedom than we attribute to a man who
consistently acts in a perfectly rational manner.
We constantly make use of moral evidence.
"Now moral evidence is nothing but a
conclusion concerning the actions of
men, derived from the consideration
of their motives, temper and situation."
(T.H.N. II, p.118; p,405)
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All our inferences from books on history ere based on our
faith in human veracity, and whenever we give orders to a
waiter we have no doubt that he will carry them out.
"Now, I assert that whoever reasons
after this manner, does ipso facto
believe the actions of the H11 to
arise from necessity, and that he
knows not what he means when he
denies it." (T.H.N. II, p.118; p.405)
All our insight into the operations of mind as well as
of matter is simply derived from observed regularities. To
drive home the point that the evidence is ofprecisely the
same kind, Hume mentions that we "cement together" natural
and mora1 evidence in many chains of arguments. He takes the
example of a prisoner who infers his impossibility of escape
from the thickness of the walls and the stubbornness and
incorruptibility of the gaoler. His death he foresees from
the operations of the guillotine as a mechanism and the
"constancy and fidelity of the guards" .
We may conclude then that Hume's kind of determinism is
of the methodological kind and is based on the contention that
it is born out by our practice that we think human actions
causally determined no less than inanimate objects. When we
remember that all the necessity involved in the causal
relation belongs to the mind thinking about or observing
sequences one may see that for Hume it would not appear in
any sense that causal necessity restricted human freedom.
It is because people have held erroneous views about necessity
that they have failed to realise this. The error stems from
confusing liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference.
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The first has as its opposite violence, the second has as its
opposite necessity and causes.
Hume does not explain the liberty of spontaneity very
adequately in the Treatise. A better statement is furnished
in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, where the
arguments on Liberty and Necessity in the second book of the
Treatise are reprodxjced with minor alterations. In the Enquiry
Hume says:
"By liberty, then, we can only mean a power
of acting or not acting, according; to the
determinations of the wilT; that is, if
we choose to remain at rest, we may; if
we choose to move, we also may. Nov this
hypothetical liberty is universally allowed
to belong to everyone who is not, a prisoner
and in chains. Here, then, is no subject
of dispute." (E.H.U., p,95)
Though the statement In the Enquiry is fuller than the
account given in the Treatise, It still does not make explicit
whether the only violence which could destroy the liberty of
spontaneity is external force. The last sentence of the
quotation above would seem to Imply that this is Hume's meaning.
Yet he also seems to define liberty in such a way as to allow
for the fact that a kleptomaniac would not have the liberty of
spontaneity. We should commonly say that he is to be
distinguished from the common thief by the fact that his actions
could not follow the determination of his will. If this is
allowed, the freedom of spontaneity does not lust refer to the
feeling we have when we do not consider ourselves compelled to
do something.
We may now be in a position to understand his reference to
a false sensation or experience even of the "1 iberty of
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Indifference, which la regarded as an argument for its real
existence. We only need to remind ourselves that necessity
does not refer to a quality in the agent but to a feeling in
an observer, to see why one could not possibly prove one's
independence of causal necessity from one's feelings when
doing something. The similarity between Hume and Kant on
this head is obvious. Kant is equally derisive of the
argument that we are free because we feel free.
One of the main reasons why we consider that we were free
to do what we did in fact not do is that we can easily imagine
ourselves doing it. We may, indeed., attempt to prove that we
could have done it by now proceeding to do it. But this does
not of course prove the point because the situation has altered..
There is now a new motive, a desire to show our liberty. A
spectator could ,1ust as easily have predicted this action from
knowledge of motives and circumstances as any other. This is
all that is meant by necessity.
MacNabb is right in saying that Hume Is here touching upon
a point that has been made use of since to show that human
/
actions are "unpredictable in principle in a way that physical
events are not, and dependent on human thoughts in a way that
physical events are not". (MacNabb, p.20l). He adds,
however, that "these facts do nothing to show that our actions
and our thoughts do not take place according to causal laws".
(Ibid.) If this is accepted, Hume would here have pointed to
a fact that would make hi3 own position entirely untenable. It
depends upon there being no difference in principle between human
actions and other events in this respect. The argument runs
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thus; 3ince human actions are effected hy thoughts, the
thought that mjr action has been predicted ray affect my
behaviour. I may deliberately decide to falsify the
prediction. This nay be granted. If one wants to predict
someone's behaviour, it may be relevant to know whether that
someone does or does not know that the prediction is made.
This, however, does not show that the action is not
predictable, for we may know the man'3 character . He might
be a chap who is always inclined to be difficult, trying to
prove people wrong. I might in fact make him aware of the
prediction in order to modify his behaviour. It is because
O
I think he will falsify the prediction I make him aware of^that ;
I am confident in making another prediction. The father says
to hi3 3on "I am sure you will ^ail your exam.". This he says
in order to put the boy's back up and his knowledge of the
boy's character and ability may make him confident that the
boy will pass . It may be argued that the statement made to
the boy is not a prediction, since one does not expect it to
come true. Yet It may plausibly be said that it is a
conditional prediction (it- will certainly fail in Its effect
unless It is taken to he a genuine prediction by the boy) and
in some cases the curious situation may arise that the
condition necessary to falsify it may be the makinr of the
prediction and allowing It to be known to the person about
whose behaviour it is made. The reason why the behaviour of
Inanimate objects and animals differs from that of human
beings lies In the simple fact that only human beings are able
to understand a prediction. It follows that therefore the
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knowledge that a prediction has been made can in the case of
human beings alone be a causal factor in determining behaviour.
It may be the case that it is difficult to predict what effect
this will in fact have though not impossible at le8st in some
cases, as I have suggested. But it may still be true that in
the cases where we are unsuccessful this is simply due to the
fact that we do not know enough about the character, abilities
and the situation of the agent. Remembering the very weak
form of determinism held by Hume, one may see why he 3hould not
be unduly worried by the peculiarity of the case we are
considering. Maybe he should be more worried. It depends on
whether one wants to emphasise the difference between causal
determination and determination by reasons. For Hume the
latter is just a special case of the former. Speaking entirely
from the point of view of a spectator it is easy to see why this
should be so. Any conditions that lead to a prediction on the
basi3 of previous experience of regularities are causal
conditions.
"We may imagine we feel a liberty within
ourselves; but a spectator can
commonly infer our actions from our
motives and character; and even where
he cannot, he concludes in general,
that he might, were he perfectly
acquainted with every circumstance of
our situation and temper, and the most
secret springs of our complexion and
disposition. Now this is the very
essence of necessity, according to the
foregoing doctrine. (T.H.N. II, p.121;
pp.408-409)
It is obvious, then, that the actions we say are done for
reasons are in Hume's sense as causally determined as any
others,
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Hume quite properly rejects the criticism that his
views are dangerous to religion and morality. The question
is whether they are true or not. Yet he thinks the criticism
based on a mistake and maintains his own doctrine is in fact
"advantageous to religion and morality". (T.H.N. II, p.122;
p.409) Is it not the case that all laws are based upon
the presupposition that hope of reward and fear of punishment
influence people's conduct? This, according to Hume, would
be enough to show that we presuppose that human actions are
subject to causes. Remember he has, he thinks, got rid of
the idea of a power in matter that somehow forces the effect
to occur.
"I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible
necessity, which is supposed to lie in
matter. But I ascribe to matter, that
intelligible quality, call it necessity or
not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy must
allow to belong to the will. I change,
therefore, nothing in the received system
with regard to the will, but only with
regard to material objects." (T.H.N. II, pp.
122-123; p.410)
Necessity consists in nothing but either "the constant union"
and conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the
mind from the one to the other.
There is a further reason why the doctrine of liberty is
Inconsistent with the religious hypothesis and our mora], notions.
Hume reiterates his previous doctrine that the object of love or
hatred is always a person or another b«inr endowed with thought
and consciousness. Unless the cause of these passions is
closely related to the object they are found not to be aroused.
Unless the cause of the actions were to be found in the
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character or disposition of the agent, the action world be
no more closely related to the person than to any other.
That he did it would be in a manner accidental. Though the
action be blameable, this would in no sense make the agent
blameable. Yet this is a necessary condition for all our
moral evaluations of character. It is also presupposed by
rewards and punishment that the action should follow from
something relatively permanent in the agent.
"it is only upon the principle of
necessity, that a person acquires any
merit or demerit from his actions,
however the common opinion may incline
to the contrary." (T.H.N. II, p.124;
p.411)
Thus it is the case that when people do an evil deed in
ignorance, we do not blame them. When we act hastily or
unpremedltatedly, we are blamed less than when the same actions
are deliberate. The reason for this is, according to Hume,
that the actions we blame a man for we only blame him for in so
far as they seem to indicate something relatively permanent in
•the agent, Thu.3
"Actions render a person criminal, merely
as they are proofs of criminal passions
or principles in the mind; and when by
any alteration of these principles, they
cease to be ,1ust proofs, they likewise
cease to be criminal. But according to
the doctrine of liberty or chance, they
never ware ,1ust proofs, and conseouently
never were criminal". (T.H.N. II, p.124;
p.412)
Thus Hume turns the charge against his opponents. To him
the libertarian must be holding that free actions take place by
chance. It seems this doctrine is subject to the criticisms
mentioned and that Hume's own view Is not. The whole case
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against Hume would have to rest upon the contention that
there is a distinction to he drawn between rational behaviour,
determinable by reasons, and other kinds of causal determin¬
ation in Hume's sense.
But Hume himself distinguishes as we have seen between
the cases where an agent knowingly does something and the cases
where he is compelled or restrained by external forces. I
have also pointed out that there are grounds <*or thinking that
he would deny freedom of spontaneity to such actions as the
actions of a kleptomaniac. He does not explicitly use the
paradigm case argument but be certainly points to a sense of
•free' in which he thinks we are so-netimes free, and claims
that this has been confused with 'uncaused*. It can thus be
said with some justification that his position is best described
as a way of reconciling freedom with determinism. To say that
he comes down on the side of determinists is misleading, because
the only libertarians he refutes are those who equate freedom
with chance. It ought at any rate to be clear that Basson's
contention that Hume thinks "the doctrine of free will is
irrelevant to morals " (see p.3 of this thesis) cannot be
defended. Hume on the contrary emphasises that the libertarian
view is incompatible with moral notions.
JUDGMENT AND EVALUATION
Hume is sometimes accused of reducing Ethics to Psychology.
This is in a sense true, although it would be fairer to say
that once the nature of evaluation has been established, there
Is no room for a normative science of Ethics as distinct from an
empirical enquiry into the principles in accordance with which
people evaluate. Thus we might say with some justification that
for him a science of Ethics Is only possible as a branch of
Psychology, depending for its data upon history and knowledge of
man's social behaviour. It must of course be borne in mind
that much of Hume's 'psychology• is of great Interest when
understood as conceptual analysis. I have, indeed., earlier in
this thesis emphasised this.
It is of the utmost importance to understand precisely in
what sense hume reduced Ethics to Psychology, for it is not
uncommon to attribute to him the doctrine that evaluative
expressions are descriptions of psychological facts. I shall
attempt to show that the general trend of Hume's arguments is
entirely at variance with such an interpretation and that it
would, indeed, make many of his arguments look somewhat silly.
Professor G .1). Broad, discussing Hume's view on "the meaning
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and analysis of ethical predicates and propositions" gives
the following interpretation of his view:
"There is a certain specific kind of
emotion which nearly all human beings
feel from time to time. This is the
emotion of approval or dlsapproval.
It is called forth by the contemplation
of certain objects, and it is directed
towards those objects. Now for Hume
the statement "X is good" means the
same as the statement "X is such that
the contemplation of it would call forth
an emotion of approval towards it in all
or most men" (Broad, p.84).
The definition of "X is bad" would be the same, with "disapproval"
substituted for "approval". The interpretation is plain enough,
though it is vague on one point. The statement "X is such that
it would cell forth an emotion of approval towards it in all or
most men" is, one presumes, to be amplified by "when people think
of X or meet with X in life". The value-judgment is then taken
to state what the feelings of people would be when confronted
with X in thought or experience. It would thus claim to be a
statement of fact and would be verified or falsified by examining
what people in fact feel when confronted with X.
Hume's doctrine would on this interpretation be a perfect
example of the naturalism which G.E. Moore attacks in his
Princlpia Ethica. One would not have been surprised if Broad
had felt tempted to ask whether it is a mere tautology to say
that what all or most people approve of is good. Taking the
expression as it stands this would obviously not be the case,
for we do at least think it logicelly possible that the minority
may be correct about the evaluation of certain things, but this
would indicate that we entertain the possibility that what mo3t
people approve of might be bad; but the expression of such a
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doubt would be self-contradictory, if the definition of
'X is good' is accepted. We would, indeed, be claiming that
what is approved of by most people might not be approved of by
most people.
Even if we take the more plausible interpretation and
leave out the reservation from 'all or most people' we can see
immediately that Hume's position would be extremely unplausible,
for 'X Is good' would now mean 'X is such that all people
approve of X'. The reason why this is unplausible is simply
this, that the statement seems to be a general statement about
people's evaluations, but is not a value statement itself.
•X is good' is a value statement, expresses an evaluation. It
seems obvious that when people approve of X they might express
this approval by the statement ^X is good*. But if Broad's
interpretation is correct, it would be possible for a person to
approve of X and at the same time believe that X is not good.
This would be the case because in believing that X is good, I am
believing the truth of a proposition about other people's
approvals as well as my own. The proposed analysis would make
it impossible to approve cf X, knowing; or bell ovine that one is
not concurring with other people's evaluations, since to think
that X is good or to approve of X is to believe a proposition
about everyone's emotions.
The result is startling if wa think it makes no material
difference to our interpretation whether we analyse 'X is good*
as 'all people approve of X' or 'most people approve of X'. For
now I could believe that 'X is good' in the sense that most
people approve of him, and yet believe that he is not good on
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the ground that I know at least one person who does not approve
of him. The paradox Is further complicated If I am the one
person who I know not to approve of X. If one takes 'approving
of X1 as 'thinking X good', one has the absurd situation that
approving of X is consistent with thinking X good and not good.
But the expression 'all or most people' is probably best
understood as meaning 'at least most people'. It certainly
cannot express an indecision, as if Hume were not quite sure
which interpretation to give.
A special difficulty arises about the extension of the
class of people. It may either mean those who have lived up
to the present, or it may include all future generations.
According to the first interpretation the expression 'X is good'
would be a historical statement and its truth would be entirely
determined by what is the case or has been the case, as opposed
to what will be the esse. This would make the status of the
moral teacher, the innovator, a peculiar one. He would be a
man who discovers something about the past and present rather
than a man who lays down the law for the future. He would,
indeed, be in the same position as any other historian making a
discovery about the past.
If we include future generations in the class of people
it would follow that we could never know the 'truth* of the
statement 'X is good*. The explanation for this would not be
that people have dlfferont ideas of what constitutes goodness.
This would be easily understandable and is most likely true.
The reason why we cannot discover the truth of such a statement
is that we can never know that we have in fact examined all
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people or even moat people. We mav have a hundred per cent
agreement now. All the cases In the future might turn out to
be unfavourable. This entirely misrepresents the doubt when
we doubt whether someone Is or is not a good man. It would at
least be misleading to suggest that what I doubt is whether all
other people feel the same way as I do about the person, though
this may be relevant.
It should now be clear that the Interpretation of Hume's
view we have been considering would be extremely paradoxical,
and even if we take the view that to approve or disapprove Is
not to evaluate, it would bo odd, to say the least, to maintain
the general statements of fact about approvals and disapprovals
would be evaluations. Would this in any case not be a fact
discoverable by reason in Its empirical capacity? Would not
this mean that the question 'Is X good?' would be a question
about empirical facts? If this were the case, reason would
discover goodness to us, and Broad, basing his interpretation
upon the Enquiry, would have to argue that Hume has made a
complete volte face between the writings of the third book of
the Treatise and the Enquiry.
a close study of the Treatise will reveal that Hume's
doctrine there is that to evaluate is: to have a certain feeling
of approval when confronted with something or when thinking of
it.
"We do not infer a character to be
virtuous because it pleases; but
in feeling that it pleases after
such a particular manner, we In effect
feel that it is virtuous"!. The case
1. My underlining.
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"is the same as in our Judgments
concerning all kinds of beauty, and
tastes, and sensations. Our
approbation is implied in the
immediate pleasure they convey to
us" (T.H.N. Ill, p.179; p.47l).
Is it not plain that Hume is here maintaining that a man who
feels that X is virtuous is in effect * judging* X to be good?
(The fact is, of course, that my view is that for Hume 'X is
good', in so far as it expresses an evaluation, is not a
Judgment in the usual sense of the word.) Would a man who
feels in the manner described by Iiume not be Justified, in
making the verbal statement 'X is good' on the basis of this
alone? Hoxv else should he verbally give vent to the feeling
that X is virtuous?
It is my belief that there is no conclusive evidence to
show that Hume radically changes his views on this point between
writing the Treatise and the Enquiry, but there are admittedly
passages in the Enquiry that seem to Justify Broad's
interpretation to a certain extent. It must be shown that
they do not necessitate that interpretation.
The following footnote seems damning to my criticism of
Br oad:
"it Is the nature and, indeed, the definition
of virtue1, that it is a quality of1 the
mind agreeable to or approved of by
everyone who considers or contemplates
it. But some qualities produce
pleasure, because they are useful to
society, or useful or agreeable to
the person himself; others produce it
more immediately, which is the case with
the class of virtues here considered"
(E.F.M., p.2fil, footnote).
1, My underlining.
The first point to notice about this 'definition' is
that Hume does not say the definition of 'virtue' is 'that it
is a quality of the mind agreeable to or approved of by
everyone who considers or contemplates it'. He does not say
that when people say that 'A is virtuous' they are in effect
saying that he possesses a quality of mind that is either
immediately pleasing to an observer or useful. For a true
understanding of Hume's pronouncement here one must consider
the context in which he makes this statement. The greet
bulk of the Enquiry is concerned with an empirical investigation
which is meant to bring out what is common to what people
approve of and what they disapprove of respectively. This for
Hume is an investigation into causal relationships and the
conclusion would be that human nature is such that people
approve of or deem virtuous (since this is the topic here)
mental qualities that affect themselves or others in a
particular manner .
I consider the definition of virtue proposed is to be
understood as meaning just this and no more, that when you
count as virtuous something which there is a general agreement
among men to deem vicious, there is a sense in which you will
'be thought to be wrong'. Your evaluation will be wrong, not
because you have made a false statement about the waligations
of the generality of men. You will, however, have the
majority against you, and since Hume's underlying assumption is
that the principles determining human behaviour and human
feelings are much the same in all times and places, the
presumption is that an exceptional evaluation, assuming that
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no mistake has been made about the facts of the case, will
be thought due to an aberration, some sort of disease in
one's emotional makeup.
So long as our evaluations are in complete harmony with
the principles which hitherto have been found to operate
throughout the species, we are not likely to land in conflicts
with others unless human nature were radically changed. This,
of course, is always possible; it is a contingent fact that
the laws governing evaluation are what thev are.
It follows directly from Hume's view that all the perceptions
of the human mind ere loose and separate that the feelings of
approval might have had other causes than in fact we find them
to have. This would be so if the constitution of the human mind
should undergo a radical change. If this should happen it would
of course be absurd to claim that what we now approve ought to be
approved after the change occurs, for there is no appeal, beyond
human nature and human nature is what we find it to be if we
t
methodically study the causal laws and principles of its working.
A statement asserting that people agree in approving of a certain
quality of mind forms part of this enquiry into the principles of
human nature, but as such it is an empirical statement of fact
and not an evaluation. Hume makes statements of this kind as an
investigator of human nature, but in the empirical science which
he wanted, to instigate there is to he no room for evaluations,
only statements about evaluations.
To think that Hume considers 'morally approving of X' 8nd
'believing X good' (M.S., p.47) significantly different is
quite an untenable interpretation of his words, and it is quite
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impossible to make sense of his pronouncements on this
interpretation, and D. Daiches Raphael seems to be too kind
to Broad when he charges him with oversimplifying? Hume's view.
Broad's is not an oversimplification but a radical misunder¬
standing of the very basis of Hume's ethical theory. I hope
to be able to show that Raphael, though his interpretation is
superior to that given by Broad, is himself wrong in saying:
MIn fact Hume combines both the view
attributed to him by Professor Broad
and Mr, Ayer, and the view of Mr.
Ayer himself (M.S., p.7*5).
Hume on this view considers the statement 'X is virtuous'
sometimes as a statement of fact and at other times as the
expression of emotion:
"His theory is therefore more complex
than is usually assumed, and is able
to escape many of the usual objections
brought against it since it can have
recourse to one or other of the two
analyses as is convenient" (Ibid., p«7g).
It is, indeed, the great advantage of Hume's theory as opposed
to Ayer's that Hume does attempt to give an account of the
objectivity of moral Judgments, but his account does not, as
we have seen, take the form of holding that they sometimes are
objective and sometimes not, depending upon the meaning the
person evaluating gives to the word3 expressing his evaluation.
It may be the case that on Raphael's Interpretation Hume
can escape some of the criticisms advanced of this theory, but
it would be open to an objection which, I think, would be
completely damning. It would involve the absurdity that a man
could morally approve of X, which is equivalent to thinking X
virtuous, and at the same time admit the falsity of the
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statement that all or most people approve of X, which is
equivalent to believing that X is not virtuous# This is a
hopeless position, for it is certainly the case that one cannot
morally approve of something and admit 'at the same time' that
the person approved of is not virtuous if, as most certainly
seems to be the case, 'to approve morally' is equivalent to 'to
think virtuous'.
It may of course be said that Hume is pointing out that
there are two ways in which we evaluate by use of the expression
•X is good' or 'X is virtuous'. This would invalidate the
criticism of Raphael contained in the preceding paragraph. It
can, indeed, be argued that there are occasions when to say 'X
is good' may be treated as equivalent to riving the information
that people in a certain society generally approve of X. I
might be studying a certain culture and be interested, in finding
out what people in society S thought good. I might try to get
the information by asking ruestion3 of the form 'Is X good?'#
If Mr. Obu, to whom I am talking, understands what I am after he
may answer 'Yes', even in a case when he himself disagrees with
the majority. It must be agreed,however, that the sense in
which 'X is good* means 'most people approve of X' cannot he
considered the primary evaluative sense of the expression. We
might even want to say that Mr. Obu ought to have said 'Most
people here think X is good but I don't agree'.
The main point to he emphasised is, of course, that Hume
never accepts 'all or most people approve of X» as a justification
of the truth of the statement 'X is virtuous* on the ground that
to say 'X is virtuous' is to say that all or most people approve
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of X. Knowledge of what people approve of is all the same
very relevant to our own approvals and disapprovals, not as
evidence, but as a causal factor which may operate through
sympathy. One has to remember that Books II and III of the
Treatise are part and parcel of the one science of human nature
and once this is realised it wiU, I think, be seen that his
breach with the Rationalists is more fundamental and of a much
more radical kind than commentators generally recognise.
It is now requisite to consider Hume's anti-rationalist
arguments, but only in so far as this is necessary in order to
give substance to the view hinted at above, that for Hume 'value
judgments' are neither assertions about the relation of ideas
nor assertions of a matter of fact. There is little disagreement
among commentators about his denial of the first of these views,
but I have already shown that there is a tendency to think he
did not entirely want to deny the second view. Broad and Ayer
think he always considered moral judgments to be judgments of
fact, and Raphael thinks he sometimes did.
The first section of part I of the third book of the
Treatise is entitled "Moral Distinctions not Derived from
Reason1'. It is, as this heading suggests, polemical in nature,
containing arguments against the rationalist position of his
time. It was a common practice of moral philosophers in the
18th century to develop their own positive view in the course
of a polemic against an alternative standpoint. Thus Samuel
Clarke propounds his views through an attack upon Hobbes, and
Hutcheson in his Inquiry develops his moral sense theory through
a concerted attack on psychological egoism. It is therefore
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not strange that Hume's polemic against the rationalists
should contain the best clue to the nature of his fundamental
position. He wants here to indicate once and for all that
an evaluation is neither to be understood as the apprehension
of an a priori truth, nor is it the implicit or explicit
assertion of a matter of fact. *This involves a radical
distinction between the questioning of the truth of an
assertion and the questioning of the correctness of an
evaluation. An evaluation can only improperly be called
true or false. To see this is to realise that sentences
expressing evaluations have a radically different logical
status from statements claiming to assert empirical facts and
a priori statements. A consideration of Hume's attack will,
I hope, justify this Interpretation, though I shall make no
attempt in this thesis to estimate Hume's relation to his
rationalist predecessors.
Hume's argument from the inertness of reason is a curious
one, and appears at first sight to beg the qiiestion. As the
argument is stated, here, Hume takes it for granted that reason
has been proved to be inert, incapable of influencing action
in Book II, Part III, section 3.
The position Hume wants to establish in this chapter is
1) that reason alone can never be a motive to the will, and
2) that reason and passion or desire can never be in conflict
as motives. The reservation introduced by the word 'alone' is
important, for Hume not only admits, but insists that reason plays
an important part in the practical life.
Hume here uses the terms 'reason' and 'understanding' as
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synonyms, and in the following quotation one may therefore
read •reason1 for •understanding•;
"The understanding exerts itself a^ter
two different ways, as it 'udges from
demonstration or probability: as it
regards the abstract relation of our
ideas, or those relations of objects
of which experience only gives us
information (T.H.H. II, p.125; p.413).
Though Hume goes on to *alk about "the first species of
reasoning" it is decidedly unfair of Broad to suggest that he
tacitly "reduces Reason to Ratiocination". By •ratiocination1
Broad here means "the drawing of Inferences, demonstrative or
problematical, from premises" (Broad, p.lOf).. Even a cursory
glance at Hume's argument shows that his main point is that
*
knowing that a proposition is true never influences actions
unless we presuppose interest, or a desire for some end. Thus
his example of the way in which mathematical reasoning may have
practical importance for us will also serve to Indicate the
value knowing the truth of an individual mathematical
proposition may have for us.
It may be helpful to put Hume's point bluntly as the
denial that there is a special function of reason which may be
called practical reason. Reason for him deals exclusively
in the truth or falsity of propositions, A Judgment of reason
is always either a Judgment of fact or a Judgment of the relation
of ideas, analytic Judgments. So-called moral lodgments are
practical and we can never explain how they can be practical
unless we take into account the emotional side of our nature.
Reason has no special function in practical matters. In so far
as Reason affects practice it is In virtue of the same function
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it performs In judging 0f matters of fact or relations of
ideas. There are no propositions at all, the truth of
which implies that people ought to behave in one way rs ther
than another. The link between the truth of any proposition
and practice Is always a causal link between belief in its
truth and practice and never a logical link.
The above is a bold statement, obviously in need of
justification. Let us now look at the arguments in search of
support.
The most important type of reasoning based upon the
apprehension of the relation between ideas is mathematical
reasoning, arithmetic and algebra. Such reasoning Influences
conduct.
"Mathematics, indeed, are useful in
all mechanical operations, and
arithmetic in almost every art and
profession: but it is not of
themselves they have any influence"
(T.H.N. II, p .1.26; p.413).
The Influence of such reasoning upon conduct always presupposes
"some designed end or purpose". It Is furthermore always
indirect In that it only influences conduct in so far as it
"directs our judgment concerning causes and effects". It is
thus only judgments of fact that directly influence conduct, but
they only have such Influence if we presuppose "some designed
end or purpose". Hume takes the example of a merchant's accounts
with a particular person. This may be useful to him in enabling
him to decide what total amount of money will have the same effect
in paying his debts as paying each individual item and receiving
payment for each individual, item in the business transactions with
that person. The ability to add and subtract may be useful to us
in deciding particular matters of fact. Thus, if I own an
apple tree Jointly with some person, my share of the apples
being one third, knowledge of how to find one third of nine
apples on the tree may help me to decide that there are three
apples on it belonging to me. The purely mathematical
Judgment 9 x i z 3 is o^ no practical interest at all.
3
In the case of causal reasoning or Judgments of fact, it
is of no practical importance to know true propositions asserting
causal connection "if both the causes and efr^cts be indifferent
to us", As already indicated, the function of reason is
exhausted in discovering a causal connection in this field, and
since it is only in some cases that the discovery of such a
connection influences our conduct, this influence cannot be due
to reason. Reason functions eoually in Judgments that do and do
not influence conduct.
Any practical conflict, involving tendencies to do different
things, must be a conflict o^ motives and the Judgment that a
certain proposition is true and another false never as such
furnishes a motive for anything at all. Cons ecuently there must
be something wrong with talking about the conflict between reason
and desire or reason and passion, but it had been common
"to talk of the combat of passion and
reason, to give the preference to
reason, and to assert that men are
only so far virtuous 83 they conform
themselves to its dictates" (T.H.N. II,
p.125; p.413).
It is in this connection that Hume makes the important
pronouncement that
"Reason is, and ought to be, the slave
of the passions, and can never pretend
to any other office than to serve and
obey them" (T.H.N. II, p.127; p.415).
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He realises this is a somewhat startling pronouncement and
consequently goes on to explain and support it. Here we
get a great insight into his real view.
A judgment asserts an agreement between ideas, taken as
copies with those objects they are intended to represent.
Since a passion is in no way representative it can never be
taken to contradict reason. It claims nothing at all beyond
itself and thus is neither true nor false. It cannot
contradict anything because it does not assert anything. It
is neither true nor false. It follows from this that a
passion can never be contrary to reason, though a lodgment or
an opinion accompanying the passion may be contrary to reason.
Such judgments may assert the existence of objects that do not
exist or may assert a causal connection between obiects that
are not causally connected. This latter is important when we
want to decide upon the means towards an end we have set
ourseLves. We can thus only 3ay that a motive is contrary to
reason in the sense that it may be dependent for its existence
or efficacy in affecting the will upon a **alse judgment of fact.
When the falsity of the judgment is brought home to the agent
the motive would disappear.
"I may desire any fruit as of excellent
relish; but whenever you convince me
of my mistake, my longing ceases. I
may will the performance of certain
actions as means of obtaining any
desired good; but as my willing of
these goods is only secondary, and
founded on the supposition that they
a„re causes of the proposed, effect; as
soon as I discover the falsehood of
that supposition, they must become
indifferent to me" (T.H.N. II, p.128:
pp .41^-417).
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The point Hume makes here is similar to Kant's hypothetical
imperatives, with one important difference. Kant's point is
a logical one. You are logically committed to willing the
means to an end so long as you will the end. Hume, on the
other hand, talks in terms of causality. If you will A as a
means to B, and only because A is 8 means to B, you will no
longer desire A when you discover that it is not a means to B.
Hume is concerned to show how Judgments may causally affect our
conduct and is not pointing out a possible contradiction in the
will. The Judgment may reveal a state of affairs that is
indifferent to us, arouses no passion or desire.
So long as we think of a passion as motive simply as an
impression, complete in itself, It seems the only thing that
could make a difference in the strength of* motives Intelligible
would be the relative Intensity of the passions. Hume, as we
have seen, denies the truth of this and since one of the calm
passions he enumerates Is "the general appetite to good and
aversion to evil" it becomes apparent that the upshot of his
argument is among other things an emphatic assertion of the
fundamental logical difference between an evaluation and a
statement of fact or a statement asserting a relation between
ideas. There can never be a contradiction between an
evaluation and a Judgment of fact, for example, simply because
the former simply is a fact, an expression of a passion which,
as such, does not represent anything, does not assert anything,
and consequently cannot contradict. It is thus not only the
case that we cannot decide whet is right and what Is wrong by
the application of the law of non-contradiction, por no empirical
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investigation could do this except indirectly by causally
changing our attitudes .
The whole question of the relation of reason to the
passions in Hume's theory cannot be adequately treated in
this thesis. The fact that I say so little about it must
not be taken to mean that I consider the topic unimportant.
ftas Hume simply an 'anatomist'? There is hardly much
doubt that this is the function he himself thought he was
performing in his grand conception or a science of human nature.
He nevertheless, upon occasion, seemed to take up the position
of preacher, appearing to apply the principle of utility to
decide between true and false morality. This attitude is
strikingly revealed in the discussion of the monkish virtues
in the Enquiry.
Though in the Treatise there is little evidence to support
the view that Hume i3 tryinr to establish a fundamental principle
of morals which can be applied as a criterion to decide
deductively whether particular virtues are genuine we must note
the following. There is the same tension in Hume's attitude
in the first book of the Treatise where his attempt to explain
all human knowledge in terms of associationist psychology seems
to clash with his attempt to distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate belief, for it does not appear to be sufficient to
distinguish truth from superstition on the grounds that the
latter does not have 3uch a firm hold over people's minds.
It is tempting to say that Hume cannot have thought th8t
the words 'X is good' expressed a feeling or sentiment except
in the sense in which 'to express a feeling' is to state that
- 142 -
on© has it or that one hag had It. It is, one might want
to suggest, a flagrant anachronism to maintain that Hume can
have held that to evaluate is not to judge, A judgment is
expressed in a proposition and a proposition must, "by
definition, be either true or false. Since therefore, Hume
certainly did not think that •good* was a predicate which
named a quality judged to belong to the object we call good,
V
he must have held that it named a quality of the agsnt judging,
i.e. the feeling we have in contemplating certain objects. The
truth or falsity of an evaluation must hence depend upon whether
or not the person evaluating had or had not the feeling which
the term 'good1 names. According to this, one must hold that
to evaluate is to judge, that the judgment is expressed in a
proposition. The verbal form 'X is good', since it is
undoubtedly used as an evaluative expression, must hence be
thought of as either true or false.
It is easy to find confirmation of the above interpretation
in Hume's words. He certainly talks repeatedly of moral
judgments and some of his statements seem to he intelligible
only if we consider him to have believed, that 'good' names a
quality of the person contemplating the allegedly good thing,
and that vice in the same way names a contrary quality.
"The vice entirely escapes you, as long
as you consider the object. You can
never find it till you turn your
reflectioninto your own breast, and
find a sentiment of disapprobation,
which arises in you, towards this
action" (T.H.N. Ill, p.177; pp.4*8-469).
It seems that Hume is saying here that vice is the name of
•a sentiment of disapprobation*, that we literally find the
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vice in our own breast when we introspect. If the vice must
be somewhere, there is nowhere else for it to be, since it is
not a quality of external ob.iects. This view seems to make
all evaluations into introspective judgments. But introspection
seems to presuppose that there is something to introspect. In
this case it seems we must approve and disapprove before we can
introspect that we approve or disapprove. If we construe
approval and disapproval as feelings or sentiments it seems
absurd to suggest that to feel or to have a sentiment is to
introspect anything at all. The reason why this is absurd is
perhaps that •introspection' is the name of a method of knowing.
We need no introspection in order to feel things, though some
people might suggest we come to know what we feel by introspection.
We are not concerned here with the merits or demerits of
this alleged method by which we know facts about our feelings and
conscious states in general. All I want to emphasise is that if
a value judgment consists in an introspective Judgment of what we
feel on some specific occasions then approvals and disapprovals
construed as feelings or sentiments are not evaluations. To
suggest that Hume did not think that to approve or to disapprove
are ways of evaluating would certainly be paradoxical, and it
seems queer, to say the least, if we can evaluate (approve or
disapprove) within ourselves, in our minds, but have no way of
evaluating in words,for to make statements about our evaluations
is to assert a proposition which is true if we evaluated in the
way stated, but can certainly not be challenged on the grounds
that there was something wrong with the evaluation itself.
To <fu3ti^y & factual statement about an evaluation is
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different from justifying an evaluation. Hume is, indeed,
quite emphatic in denying that to approve or disapprove is to
judge that we have a feeling, as the following ouotstion
indicates:
"To have the sense of virtue, is nothing
hut to feel a satisfaction of a particular
kind from the contemplation of a
character. The very feeling constitutes
our praise or admiration. We go no
further; nor do we inquire into the
cause of the satisfaction. We do not
infer a character to he virtuous,
because it pleases; but in feeling that
it pleases after such a particular manner,
we in effect feel that it is virtuous.
The case is the same as in our Judgments
concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes,
and sensations. Our approbation is
implied in the immediate pleasure they
convey to us" (T.H.N. Ill, p.179; p.471).
I take Hume to mean the same by the expression 'is implied
in1 and 'constitutes1. It is in any case clear that our
approval is a feeling and not a Judgment. It may of course be
ill-founded in the sense that upon a more adequate judgment of
the character of a person or the nature of the action we may
find that this feeling is no longer aroused in us, but the
feeling is as such neither true nor false. Since the approval
is 3aid to be constituted by the feeling it can obviously not
be equated with the judgment that we have the feeling. In fact
it seem3 that Hume here holds that approval and disapproval are
not judgments even though they are aroused on the basis of
judgments of fact. If therefore we can express our approvals
and disapprovals in words, it seems the verbal form cannot be
taken to express a proposition.
In so far as approval and disapproval are evaluations,
they are neither true nor false. These terms are logically
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inappropriate. It is only right to point out that the first
of the quotations we gave was taken from the chapter in which
Hume is attacking the rationalists. He Is in that chapter
most anxious to point out that the evaluative terms 'virtue'
and 'vice' cannot be taken to be names of qualities that can
be 'observed' to belong to the oblects we call virtuous and
vicious. The reason why we find use for these terms is to be
found in the fact that we feel differently about things.
Certain things please us and other things displease us. Unless,
therefore, we turn out attention to our own feelings we can
never understand why we should xise these terms at all. In
stating his case he perhaps overstates it in suggesting that th©
virtue and the vice are subjective qualities in the person
judging, judging about actions and characters. But this Is
hardly the whole story, for he seems to be genuinely confused
by the analogy with secondary qualities, an analogy which had
already been used by Hutcheson.
People had previously thought that secondary qualities
belonged to objects. The doctrine of secondary qualities
seemed to show that they really only existed in the conscious¬
ness of persons who mistakenly take them for qualities in the
objects themselves. In the same way people had thought virtue
and vice really were qualities in the objects we call virtuous and.
vicious. There are good grounds for thinking that this Is a
mistake. These qualities are mind-dependent just like secondary
qualities and hence we conclude on the analogy that they are
qualities in the mind of the person Uidging. This analogy may
go some way towards explaining Hume's curious way of speaking
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about virtue and vice as discoverable by introspection.
But tiie puzzle does not end here, for Hume'3 high praise of
the doctrine of secondary qualities in this connection is
somewhat strange when we remember that in the first book of
the Treatise he is a very stern critic of this doctrine indeed.
It is perhaps not inappropriate to quote 3ide by side his
panegyric in the third book and his condemnation in the first.
"Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared
to sounds, colours, heat, and cold, which,
according to modern philosophy, are not
qualities in objects, but perceptions in
the mind: and this discovery in morals,
like that other in physics, is to be
regarded, as a considerable advancement of
the speculative sciences: though like
that too, it has little or no influence on
practice (T.H.N. Ill, p.177; p.4*9).
The doctrine which is here called "a considerable advancement
of the speculative sciences" is described, in the following
terms in the first book:
BI believe many objections might be made to
this system; but at present I shall
confine myself to one which i9, in my
opinion, very decisive. I assert, that
instead of explaining the operations of
external objects by its means, we utterly
annihilate all these objects, and reduce
ourselves to the opinions of the most
extravagant scepticism concerning them.
If colours, sounds, tastes and smells be
merely perceptions, nothing, we can
conceive, is possessed of a real, continued.,
and independent existence; not even motion,
extension, and. solidity, which are the
primary qualities chiefly insisted on"
(T.H.N. 1, p.218; pp.227-228).
There can hardly be much doubt as to which of these
quotations represents Hume's real view as to the tenability of
the doctrine of secondary qualities. It would make nonsense
of his most cherished doctrines about our knowledge of the
- 147 -
external world If we took his eulogy of this doctrine In
Book III to be an expression of his real considered opinion.
The fact of the matter appears to be that Hume is here using
an 'argumentum ad hominem'. If you can admit that colours
and sounds are nothing but perceptions in the mind, there is
certainly no obi action in principle to considering virtue and
vice to be in the same boat. He may here have Locke's doctrine
in mind. But the cases are not really parallel, for Hume is
arguing that virtue and vice are 'mind dependent' in a sense in
which the secondary oualities are not.
For when you. approve or disapprove of an agent you take
his actions as signs of certain motives or dispositions. among
these signs there certainly are very often secondary qualities.
These are qualities you can discover by scrutinising the object.
They are discoverable by observation. Virtue and vice, on the
other hand, are not natural oualities like colours that can be
discovered by observation. Ho scrutiny of external objects will
reveal such qualities. Even the mental qualities we infer will
not contain the ouality virtue or the quality vice.
"in whichever way you take 1t, you find
only certain passions, motives, volitions
and thoughts" (T.H.N. Ill, p.177; p.468).
But would this really be the case if we take Hume to think
virtue and vice are qualities? For he thinks that evaluations
can move us to action:
"Men are often governed by their duties,
and are deterred from some actions by
the opinion of injustice, and impelled
to others by that of obligation"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.167j p.457).
If, therefore, one of the motives we may infer from the outward
signs can in certain cases be an evaluation, it seems we must be
able to discover virtue and vice by contempls tins: an action
if we take these words to be names for the feelings of
approval and disapproval. This is, however, the very thing
Hume seems to be vigorously denying and it seems we must take
hin seriously when he says that morality is 'more properly felt
than judged of. If 'X is good' means the same as 'I have a
feeling of approval when I contemplate X', it seems we must
conclude that A and B agree that X is good when A judges that
he ha3 this feeling and B judges that A has this feeling. The
only alternative to this paradoxical conclusion is that 'X is
good' cannot have the same meaninrr when used by two different
speakers because this is always a judgment about the speaker.
There is a way out of the difficulties mentioned above if
we take Hume to be maintaining that an evaluation is not a
judgment at all. Is this view too sophisticated for a writer
in the 18th century? a consideration of the way in which a
contemporary understood Hume may throw some light upon this
question. Let us therefore turn our attention to the
interpretation given by Thomas Beid of Hume's view on this point.
In his Assays on the Active Powers of Man, Reid criticises
Hume's moral theory at length. That part of his discussion
which concerns us here is contained in a chapter headed "That
Moral Approbation Implies a Real Judgment". Reid emphasises
that Hume holds that moral approbation and disapprobation are
not Judgments but feelings:
"... moral approbation and disapprobation
are not judgments, which rau3t be true or
false, but barely agreeable and uneasy
Feelings or Sensations" (R.E., p.^71).
The most important point at issue seems to be whether
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approvals and disapprovals can be said to be true or false.
It is obvious that Reid takes Hume to be denying that
evaluations are either true or false, that they are judgments
that would be expressed in a proposition.
"For it (feeling) implies neither
affirmation nor negation; and
therefore cannot have the qualities
of true or false, which distinguish
propositions from all other forms of
speech and judgment3 from all other
acts of the mind" (R.E., p.«7l).
In language we express a feeling either by a word or by an
expression which can be the sublect or the predicate of a
proposition, but since a feeling implies as such neither
affirmation nor negation it cannot be expressed by a proposition.
From this it seems to follow that we must distinguish approval
and disapproval which are feelings from the Judgment that we
have this feeling, for this can be either true or false, is the
affirmation of the truth of a proposition.
Words may express a feeling but not a proposition, and an
instance of this is given by the terms 'toothache' and 'headache'.
Though Reid says it would be ridiculous to suggest that these
words express a proposition, this is plainly not the case,and it
was indeed well known in the 18th century that one word could
express a proposition. Forgetting the rather curious
identification of a sentence with a proposition, it certainly
is the case that a single word or even a single letter may on
certain occasions express a proposition. This point is made
by Beattie in his "The Theory of Language" . He says:
"A single word mar stand for a sentence,
and imply an affirmation. One asks,
•Is Virgil or Lucen the better poet?'.
I answer 'Virgil'. And this word
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"thu3 connected comprehends an entire
affirmative sentence: 'Virgil is
the better poet'." (B.T.L., p.3^5).
Many other instances are given and it is pointed out that
when a question is asked about letters, such as which letter
in English is most offensive to foreigners, the answer may
take the form of uttering .lust one letter, such as S or A or
B, etc. In the same way one may ask a person 'What do you
feel about X?1. The answer might be 'approval' and this
would be a prooer answer, indicating that the assertion 'I
feel approval of X' is true. But Reid ignores this sense
for he seems concerned to show that Hume cannot hold, both that
an approval is a Judgment and that it is a feeling, and that if
it is a feeling it cannot be properly expressed in s proposition.
The foregoing is perhaps too onesided an interpretation of
Reid's words, for he seems to be confused on this issue when
he takes the two following expressions to be identical in
meaning according to Hume's doctrine:
1) "Such a man did well and worthily, his conduct is highly
approvable", and
2) "The man's conduct gave me a very agreeable feeling"
(R.E., p.«73) .
In both cases we have a Judgment, a proposition, which can be
true or false and Reid consequently points out that the
propositions expressed in the two ^ases are not the same.
"if we suppose, on the other hand, that
moral approbation is nothing more than
an agreeable feeling, occasioned hy
the contemplation of an action, the
second speech, above mentioned, has a
distinct meaning and expresses all
that is meant by moral approbation"
(R.E., p.673).
It is not absolutely clear what is to be understood by
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'expresses all that Is meant by moral approbation'. Is the
analysis attributed to Hume a way of morally approving or a
statement as to what moral approval la? If the former, then
Hume does indeed think that moral approval i3 a judgment. If
the latter, then it is not a statement which can be equivalent
to 'X is good' when this is used to express approval by a man
who is morally approving of X.
We may answer the question 'Why do you call him good?' by
enumerating all those characteristics he possesses which gave
us the feeling of approval. But we may also answer by saying
that his conduct gat*e us a feeling of approval. The first
would be a justification of the evaluation, whereas the second
would lustify our use of the word 'good' or another term of
moral praise of the case. The question of Justification must
be distinguished from the question of analysis. The predicative
phrase 'is good' may have come to be associated in my mind with
a certain feeling aroused in me in a special manner, and indeed
the concept of the purely descriptive qualities of the agent
evaluated may call forth the appropriate expression in the
absence of a noticeable feeling. But it is sheer prejudice to
suppose that 'is good* must therefore be attributing a special
characteristic to me, or indeed to anything. To agree about the
goodness of X is to agree in feeling the same way about him, and
not to accept the truth of a proposition about the feelings of
the person judging. Ilurae unfortunately is not clear in this
very important issue about the proper analysis of statements
expressing evaluations. Nor 13 Reid clear on this point, for
as I have tried to show, he sometimes speaks as if Hume
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illegitimately contends that evaluations are neither true
nor false, are not Judgments, and hence not expressed in
propositions, whereas at other time3 he seems to be contending
that Hume is wrong because he confuses two different Judgments,
mistakenly thinks that an evaluation is a Judgment about one's
own feelings. In so far as this latter interpretation of Hume's
doctrine is accepted, one has little difficulty in finding
faults with it, for If an evaluation is a Judgment, its truth
or falsity is most certainly not ascertained by introspection
as I have tried to point out.
HUME'S EGOISM
It may perhaps he permissible to use the expression
•psychological egoism' for the hedonistic variety of that
doctrine and 'ethical egoism' for the hedonistic type of
the corresponding ethical doctrine. This would enable us
to avoid the repetition of a somewhat clumsy and inelegant
expression and should lead to no confusion. Let us begin
by confining our attention to the psychological doctrine.
It has been a bone of contention among commentators
whether Hume is or i3 not a psychological egoist. T.H.Green
attributes this doctrine to Hume in no uncertain terms
(Introduction to the Moral Part of the Treatise). F.C.Sharp
(Mind, Vol. XXX, 1921), E.B. MeOllvary (P.R., Vol.12, 1903)
and M.E. Smith (The Philosophy of David Iiume) have been
equally emphatic in denying the legitimacy of this interpretation
of Hume'3 work. It must be obvious to readers of Hume that an
Interpretation of him as a psychological egoist must be primarily
based on the Treatise. It is possible tc take the view that
this is one of the issues on which the two works differ. But
if we can defend Hume against the charge that he is a
,\\, - •
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psychological egoist by consideration of his views in the
Treatise this will, it must be admitted, strengthen our case.
fcy 'psychological egoism1 will be understood the doctrine
N O.S V
that all human actions are motivated by a desire for the
agent's own future pleasure or a desire for the continuation
of a pleasurable experience the agent is experiencing.
Another form of egoistic motivation would be the desire to
get rid of an unoleasant experience. Thus we might hold that
desire is an uneasiness and the motive is correctly analysed
as the tendency to get rid of this unpleasant experience.
The ultimate end would, in the latter case, be the elimination
of an unpleasant experience in the agent. If Hume can be
shown to have held one or the other of those views we could
say he was a psychological egoist.
A distinction must be drawn between the cause of a
desire and the object of a desire. We have seen that
psychological egoism is a doctrine about the object of a
desire. Although we may come to the conclusion that Hume
believes that pleasure or pain are always the cause or the
part-cause of a desire, we will not thereby have shown that he
is a psychological hedonist. (The distinction drawn here is
a well-known one. It is to he found in N .K,S.; McGilvary,
(I.E. Moore and others.) Lot us first consider whether Hume
thinks pleasure or the avoidance of pain are always the
ultimate objects of a desire. We might perhaps state the
ruestion more simply as 'Are all objects desired merely as
means to the agent's own pleasure or the avoidance of his pain?'
We may recall, that Hume's discussion of the passions is an
attempt to account for their origin. He seeks a causal
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explanation and since each passion is a simple impression,
there is a sense in which we cannot expect from him an analysis
of it. Some passions arise from pleasure and pain in
conjunction with other qualities, whereas others arise
immediately from pleasure or pain. Since the first of these
have a more complex origin Hume obviously devotes more
attention to them. The passions are in this book not
differentiated 30 much according to their importance in the
explanation of morality as according to the difficulty of
accounting for their origin. fte can admit this without
abandoning the view already stated that these passions are not
entirely irrelevant to the explanation of morality. We have
already 3een that 'I em proud of X* may be construed as a form
of self valuing, and emphasised the close connection between
the indirect passions and evaluations.
It need not, therefore, occasion any surprise that so much
space is allotted to pride and humility, though these passions
are not properly speaking motives, but "pure emotions in the
soul". For even love and hatred are perhaps not motives, for
one of Hume's reasons for distinguishing these passions from
pride and humility as 'pure emotions' is the fact that
"The passions of love and hatred are
followed by, or rather conjoined
with, benevolence and anger. It is
this conjunction which chiefly
distinguishes these affections from
pride and humility" (T.H.N. II, p.84;
p .367) .
Hume in fact criticises those who consider:
"that love and hatred have not only
a cause which eAcites them, viz.
pleasure and pain, and an object
to which they are directed, viz. a
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"person or thinking being, but like¬
wise an end, which thev endeavour to
attain, viz. the happiness or misery
of the person beloved or hated; all
which views, mixed together, make
only one passion. According to this
system, love is nothing but the
desire of happiness to another person,
and hatred that of misery. The
desire and aversion constitute the
very nature of love and hatred. They
are not only inseparable, but the same"
(T.H.N. II, p.85; p.3*7).
Hume thinks this view "contrary to experience". We may
love or hate persons without thinking of their happiness or
unhappiness, though in most cases we do desire the happiness of
those we love and the unhappiness of those we hate, the passion
and the desire are not inseparable, end there is no logical
connection between them, but only a de facto connection.
"vie may therefore infer, that
benevolence and anger are passions
different from love and hatred, and
only conjoined with them by the
original constitution of the mind"
(T.H.N. II, p.85; p.3*8).
These impressions are loose and separable, and we ere told
"Love and hatred might have been
unattended with any such desires, or
their particular connection might
have been entirely reversed" (Ibid.).
Thus the emotion of love might have been connected with a
desire for the misery of the person loved. We here again see
the tendency in Hume of treating of the passions as simple
impressions and it is only a contingent fact that certain
desires for the most part follow from any particular passion.
It is, I think, fairly obvious that this is contrarv to
our normal way of looking at these emotions. Let us imagine
we found people sincerely claiming to love someone and yet
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having, on this and other occasions when they make such a
claim, shown a propensity to harm the people they love.
Let us further assume that the contrary is the case when they
claim to hate someone, Whenever they say they hate 3omeone
they have the same tendency to be kind to them as we have now
to be kind to those we love, I think in a case of this kind
we should feel inclined to say that these people were using
•love* and 'hate' in a different way from the way we use these
terms, Hume, however, is using the terms 'love* and 'hate1
in such a way as to make it impossible to decide by consider¬
ation of any behavioural signs whether the emotion which is
Pi I ' ^
followed by benevolence is really 'love' or not. Only the
presumption that human nature is more or less the same makes
us infer that other people are really having the emotion we
should have if we claimed to love someone. There is thus a
sense in which we cannot in the nature of the case know whether
some people are not constituted in such a way that their
j <AaAJH ^
benevolence follows upon their hatred.
Confining our attention to love and benevolence, we might
perhaps notice the following points in the account given above.
1) Hume differentiates between the object of a passion and
the end of a desire. Only the latter is something we
endeavour to attain.
2) The end of benevolence is said to be the happiness of
another person.
3) The desire arises from love but there is no suggestion at
all that the end of this desire is not the ultimate end of the
desire, that it can be further analysed.
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The account gives us no reason to believe that the
desire for the happiness of another Is not ultimate, that It
can he shown to be desired only as a means to your own
happiness or pleasure. We can only say that human nature is
such that desire for another's happiness is on most occasions
the accompaniment of love.
It is clear that Hume distinguishes quite clearly between
the cause of a passion and the end of a desire. Let us now
inquire whether the causes of a passion may be such that Hume
is committed to saying that only the agent's own pleasure is
ever desired as an ultimate end.
In tackling this question we may perhaps be allowed to
refer to the interpretation given by MacNabb, a recent
commentator on Hume, who seems to accept the view that the
mechanism of sympathy is such that it makes Hume's account
egoistic. It is true that MacNabb is dealing with Hume's
account of the origin of approval and disapproval, but it seems
plain that he is guilty of a confusion between the end of a
desire and the cause of a desire. He says:
"My second criticism is that Hume Is
unnecessarily egoistic. Let us allow
that pleasure and pain form 'the chief
spring or actuating principle of the
human mind'. Very well, then it must
be pleasure and pain, or the thought of
pleasure and pain, which produce moral
approval and disapproval, .lust as they
produce desire and aversion, hope and
Joy, grief and fear. But why should it
be ohly my own pleasure or the thought
of it which can arouse a direct passion?
Why should not Hume say that pleasure
and pain when thought of, not as our own,
but as anybody's, arouse direct feelings
of approbation and disapprobation?
Plainly he thought that this was not
true. It seems to him self-evident that
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"only what is pleasant or painful to me
can arouse in me a passion for or
against lt^-. Therefore it seemed to
him that the thought of another's
pleasure or pain must he converted in
my mind by the mechanism of sympathy
into an actual pleasure or nain of
mine, before it can move my passions
and actuate my will" (MacNabb, pp.187-188).
MacNabb appears to think that Hume's view that desire and
aversion, approval and disapproval may he eroused through the
conversion of another's pain into our own somehow makes Hume's
account egoistic. This would only be the case i^" the
aversion was made an aversion to my pain, the desire a desire
for my pleasure, the approval not justified unless my pleasure
was aroused and justified in direct proportion to the pleasure
involved. MacNabb's statement suffers somewhat from the fact
that he does not make clear whether Hume is being charged with
psychological or ethical egoism. It seems that in so far as
the causal explanation of approval and disapproval through
sympathy is thereby made egoistic, the charge is one of ethical
egoism. On the other hand, the reference to the necessity of
my own pleasure being aroused in order to determine the will at
all, seems to be an indication that Hume is a psychological
egoist.
It Is possible that MacNabb may have thought that we
could by the same argument decide that sympathy is 'egoistic'
in that pain and pleasure must be aroused in us to determine
approval and disapproval and that there is no disinterested
benevolence. One is led to believe this by the fact that he
tends to talk as if benevolence (a passion which ha3 an end)
and sympathy are the same. But we must remember that when
My underlining.
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sympathy arouses approval and disapproval, these passions
are not motives as such, though naturally attached, to
benevolence and anger.
But let us reflect upon these charges. Let us assume
that A and B both want to alleviate the suffering of C, but
whereas A sympathises with C in the sense that he is brought
to feel with him, C's sadness is communicated to him, B only
knows that C is suffering, but is in no way distressed. Who
would want to say that A's desire to help G was more egoistic
than B's? This would of course only be the case if he wanted
to alleviate C's sufferine in order to alleviate his own.
The fact of the matter is that it is only in so far as the
end of the desire is changed by the mechanism which brings it
about that this mechanism is relevant in deciding whether the
desire is egoistic or not. MacNabb simply 3earns to be
assuming that the causal conditions laid down by Hume do have
such an effect though he does not support this interpretation
by any quotation from the text. It seems rather that Hume
believes that people's capacity for literally feeling with one
another is much greater than MacNabb thinks, but to say that
he is committed to any form of egoism on that account seems
unjustifiable.
In spite of the fact that I am not convinced that MacNabb
has shown Hume's account to imply some sort of egoistic
doctrine, there is real point in his criticism. Hume here
depends upon his doctrine that ideas - as opoosed to
inpressions - never determine the will directly, and that moral
distinctions are derived from impressions. He therefore
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considers it incomprehensible that a man should be determined
to act by having simply the idea of another's misery. The
idea i3 too faint, has too little force to affect the will.
But what if the idea amounts to a belief? If one takes
seriously his doctrine that belief is .lust a more lively or
powerful idea, why 3hould we not be determined by the belief
that another is in pain, though the belief has not achieved
the vividness of a real pain?
But there is a problem here which would still make
reference to the self necessary. I never have an experience
of the conjunction of the outward sicrns of pain and the pain of
another. These two impressions cannot in the nature of the
case succeed each other in my experience. The Idea of pain of
another I have must be derived from the impression of my own pain.
There must thus be some impression in me that gives the mere
thought of, or conception of, another's pain the added liveliness
that raises it to the status of belief. There does not in the
nature of the case seem to be any reason at all why Hume, with
his mechanical conception of the origination of belief, should
not have conceived it to be possible to be determined by belief,
if the difference between this and an impression is one of
degree only. Yet the fundamental aspect of belief as he
conceives it is expectation when he talks o* it as involving
an attitude of mind, and an expectation is different from a
practical determination. If, as Hume tends to think, practice!
determination is causal determinetion, it is naturally thought
of as a determination by antecedents, and the expectation must
thus lead to some further occurrence which will push us into
action, since expectation is entirely consistent with passively
waiting for something to occur. We should thus still have
to account for the step between belief and the practical
determination. If this must be a passion, one has to see
how the less lively (belief) comes to raise in us a rea1
impression. It is in order to account for this that Hume
postulates a principle of sympathy. This would not be
necessary if we could admit that reason can determine action
directly. Hume is unwilling to do this even though reason
be conceived only as the belief that something is the case,
or will be the case.
One might want to admit that nothing could convince us
that pain was bad if we have never experienced pain, simply
because we could not understand what pain was, but admitting
this, one still finds it paradoxical to argue that on no
occasion may one abstain from something simply because one
believes that doing it would involve pain for another. The
belief and the practical attitude are distinguished, but for
Hume they must be distinguished as two experiences because of
his tendency to think of all passions and all motives as
occurrences in a similar way to the occurrence of a particular
pain. No passions, approval and disapproval included, are
therefore to be thought of as simply attitudes. To approve is
n°t to express an attitude.
It must further be remembered that sympathetic pleasure and
pain in Hume's account are efficient causes in arousing certain
passions, but are never referred to as the objects or the end of
the passions aroused. Let us see how sympathetic pleasure and
pain may function in the causal account of benevolence, the
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desire for the happiness of another. John possesses
certain qualities that pleese me through sympathy with the
pleasures of those affected by these qualities. This arouses
in me love which has John as its object. But so far is it
from being the case that any motive which may lead from this
love would be conditioned by the continuation of my pleasure
as its ultimate end, that it leads me to feel benevolence
towards John, a desire to make him happy. Similarly we must
remember that the enlivening by the impression of the 3elf
which accounts for the thought of John's pleasure being
converted into the pleasure itself in no way changes its
content. The thought of John's pleasure is merely enlivened.
It becomes in no way more closely connected with me than the
thought was. Thus there is no suggestion that sympathy with
John is the conversion of the thought of his pleasure as a
means to my own, and a conseouent approval or love or benevolence
arising therefrom. The causal conditions of love or benevolence
neither determine the object of love which is determined by an
inexplicable natural connection nor the end of benevolence, which
is equally ultimate as far as Hume is concerned. MacNabb may
have been influenced by the tendency to think of Hume as a
reductive analyst, the tendency to think, in this case, that
since sympathy i3 the conversion of another's pain into our own,
any passion arising as a result has thereby been reduced to
self-love.
It must be emphasised once again that Hume considers
himself to ho primarily glvinc an account of the causes of
passions. He does not claim to be able to explain why pride
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has self as object, nor why love leads to a desire whieh has
the happiness of another as its end. These for him are just
ultimate facts inexplicable by association.
There is little reason to believe that the Influence of
sympathy upon approval and disapproval commit Hume to ethical
egoism, for Hume appeals to this principle in order to account
for the fact that we approve of valuable qualities in others,
even though we know that we shall never benefit from them.
In taking up an objective point of view we are looking
upon a situation as if we were any other human being# In such
a situation our approval would be determined only through
sympathy with the pleasant or painful tendencies of the
qualities of character determining our approval or disapproval,
as the case may be. Hume thinks that unless in this case we
were pleasantly or painfully affected we should not take up any
special attitude but any change this may involve in our emotional
state does not involve that the resultant benevolence or anger
are directed at the object of this only as means to the
continuation of my pleasant consciousness (approval) or
avoidance of the oainful consciousness (disapproval). It seems
that if we genuinely take up an objective point of view, our
being pleased (approving) and our being pained (disapproving) are
both purely disinterested.
But one might feel inclined to say: How then are we to
understand Hume*s view that pleasure and pain are "the chief
actuating principles of the mind"? The first tMng to notice
is that Hume's statement is a qualified one and as far as I have
been able to ascertain the Treatise contains no passages which
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lead one to believe that the qualification was not intended.
In dealing with the direct passions that arise immediately
from pleasure or pain according to Hume's classification in
the introduction to Book II, Hume makes the following
statement:
"Besides good and evil, or, in other
words, pain and pleasure, the direct
passions frequently arise from a
natural impulse or instinct, which is
perfectly unaccountable. Of this
kind is the desire of punishment to
our enemies, and of happiness to our
friends; hunger, lust, and a few
other bodily appetites. These
passions, properly speaking, produce
good and evil, and proceed not from
them, like the other affections."
(T.H.N. II, pp.148-149; p.439).
This statement is at first a little curious, for has Hume
not already said that the desire o^ happiness to our friends
and of unhappiness to our enemies is connected, with love and
hatred in the shape of anger and benevolence? Do not love
and hatred proceed from pleasure and pain like the other
indirect passions? This is, I consider, perfectly correct.
Why then does Hume single these particular passions out as
productive of pleasure and pain, though they do not proceed
from them? The answer is, I think, as follows. The desires
in question are both equally pleasant or equally painful as the
case may he, whereas love, he considers, is pleasant and hatred
painful. The association of passions only takes place through
resemblance, and therefore Hume can only notice the
coincidence of love with benevolence and hatred with anger.
There is no general principle to which we can appeal to account
for this coincidence.
It is a mistake to quote this passage in order to show that
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these passions are disinterested in a way in which the
passions arising from pleasure and pain are not. The
question of the disinterestedness of passions or otherwise
is not at issue here at all, but their causal explanation.
But we can still appeal to Hume's account here in support
of our Interpretation of him as an opponent of psychological
egoism. Hume's statement quote! sho¥?s, it is true, that
there are motives to action that do not depend in any way
for their occurrence upon the thought of or occurrence of
pleasure and pain. But it does not follow that the direct
passions that depend upon the thought or impression of
pleasure and pain for their occurrence are necessarily
interested or selfish. Hume's words could only give this
impression if we forget all he has said about sympathy.
Describing the object of the direct passions in the chapter we
are considering he says:
"The mind, by an original instinct, tends
to unite itself with the good, and to
avoid the evil, though they be conceived
merely in idea, and be considered as to
exist in any future period of time"
(T.H.N. II, p.148; p.438).
The direct passions mentioned are not all motives
directed to a future object. Desire, aversion, hope, fear
and volition might be thus considered, hut grief and 'oy do
not seem to have a reference to a future pleasure. Joy may
arise from the anticipation of a certain pleasure, but grief
seems to be caused, by a present or a past misfortune. But
notice the very general way in which Hume states the object
of direct passions and the complete absence of any specific
reference to the pleasure or pain of the person who is actuated
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by one or the other of these passions. The reason for this
is that any other human being's pleasure or pain may arouse in
us these passions through the operation of sympathy. Another's
pain may arouse my sorrow, his pleasure my ,1oy.
Though all the direct passions which have as their object
an anticipated pleasure may be said to imply the obvious fact
that we may desire pleasure, sympathy makes it possible for
this pleasure to be that of any other human being. The object
or end of those passions that proceed not ^rom good or evil is
not necessarily essentially different from the oblect or end of
the direct passions that proceed from pleasure and pain, since
private benevolence and anger are a desire for pain and a
desire for pleasure respectively. But they produce rather than
proceed from pleasure in this sense, that sympathy is not
needed to account for the fact that it is not the agent's own
pleasure, but someone else's which is the ob.lect. The agent's
own pleasure is produced by their satisfaction, but cannot in
the nature of the case be their original oblect.
As regards hunger, lust and a few other bodily appetites,
we need only stress that the existence of these makes it quite
obvious that Hume already in the Treatise would have accepted
Butler's refutation of psychological hedonism, a theory of
motivation, though this doctrine is much more thoroughly
discussed in the Enquiry.
APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL ARE NOT A SPFCIFS OF SYMPATHY
I hope to show how my interpretation of the nature of
approval and disapproval and the way Hume thinks he can account
for their occurrence help to make it intelligible how sympathy
can assist in the explanation of our approval of the useful
virtues. It is curious that one of the accepted versions of
Hume's view of the nature of approval ani disapproval completely
fail to give a satisfactory account of this.
Let us remember that the indirect passions have an object
which is not en end to be achieved. The object Is that which I
am proud of or what I love because of certain qualities belonging
to or closely related to that object. In a similar way I approve
of a person possessed, of certain Dualities of character when these
please me in a special way. It is requisite that I should have
the capacity for taking this pleasure in the contemplation of a
character. The pleasures thus derived may differ, and this
difference gives rise to differences in our approval. This is
indicated by the different terms, 'love', 'respect', 'esteem'.
Though these arise according to the same principles and may in a
sense involve the approval of a character, their feeling is yet
different. Sympathy enters in here In our explanation of the way
in which qualities of character come to please us or displease us.
My sympathy with the pleasure or pain of those affected by
a quality of character is not my approval or disapproval but
enters in as a causal element. In the same way my sympathy
with the pleasure a rich man derives from his wealth is not my
esteem of him. But commentators seem to find it difficult to
see this obvious fact because they think that Hume is reducing
the moral sense to a species of sympathy, and get troubled by
the obvious fact that Hume's account of the function of sympathy
as a principle of communication, and his appeal to the imagination
make this reduction impossible.
Hedenlus insists that Hume's attempt to "redrice the moral
sense to a more general principle, that of sympathy, inevitably
leads to an interpretation of all sympathy as moral approval end.
disapproval" (Hed., p.441). This is repeated again and again
as an indubitable Humean doctrine. We are told that "he is not
unfamiliar with the idea that sympathy is the same as moral
consciousness, and that sympathy as such is moral approval and
censure" (Hed., p.4^0) . And again we are told that not only is
ho committed to the view "that consciousness of something as a
virtue or a vice is a sympathetic consciousness of the pleasure
or pain of others, but that the sympathetic consciousness
constitutes also necessarily moral approval or censure" (Hed., p.441
It is not to he wondered at that he goes on to complain "that
the valuation of the majority of virtues, and indeed the most
imnortant ones, cannot be a sympathetic consciousness at all" (Ibid.
What is Hedenius* evidence for his view that Hume identifies
approval and disapproval with 'sympathetic consciousness'?
Needless to say he draws all his evidence from passages in the
Enquiry. This is unfortunate for several reasons. 1) It could
only claim to be an authoritative account of Hume's view in
his later work and it may well be that the term 'sympathy1
does not always bear the same sense In the Enquiry as in the
Treatise. 2) Hume omits in the Enquiry to explain in any
detail the causes of our passions including approval and
disapproval. 3) All the same it is obvicus that his doctrine
in the Enquiry is that we approve or disapprove of persons on
account of their qualities of mind. 4) Pleasure is the cause
of approval and disapproval according to the Enquiry, and is
distinguished from the object, which is a person approved of
because of a certain quality of mind, 5) If therefore approval
is sympathy with the pleasures of others and disapproval the
contrary, it seems we would be at a loss to explain how we could
approve of anything but pleasure itself, since to approve is to
feel a sympathetic pleasure. Is it possible that Hume could
have been guilty of accepting such a highly paradoxical view?
Let us look at the passages that are taken to justify the
doctrine that to morally approve is 'to sympathise'.
Let us consider Hedenius' evidence taken from the Enquiry.
He first of all refers to a passage in the chapter entitled
"Why Utility Pleases". Here, according to him, Hume is anxious
to "identify sympathy and moral valuation", that he wishes to
say that "humanity is the same thing as moral consciousness".
Hume's words make it perfectly clear that the conclusion
Hedenius draws from them Is inadmissible. Hume says: "If any
man from a cold insensibility, or narrow selfishness of temper,
is unaffected with the images of humpn happiness or misery, he
must be eoually indifferent to the Images of vice and virtue" .
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It is not clear that the images of human happiness or misery,
communicated by sympathy, are not identical with the images of
virtue or vice which are 'images1 of qualities of character
causally related to human happiness or misery, Hume's words
only justify the interpretation that a man devoid of the
capacity for sympathy would neither approve nor disapprove of
the useful virtues, that the possession of the sense of the
morality of these virtues is causally dependent upon sympathy.
This Is undoubtedly Hume's doctrine both in the Treatise and in
the Enquiry, whereas an identification of sympathising with
approving, or disapproving could only be accepted as an
interpretation of Hume's pronouncements if no other construction
could be put upon hi3 words. If the writer does not state a
doctrine unambiguously or clearly, his words should he understood
in the light of his pronouncements elsewhere.
But Hedenius claims that Hume does, indeed, state the view
he attributes to him in an explicit and unambiguous fashion.
Here again I do not think his Inference from Hume's words is the
most obvious one. Hume Is emphasising that morality is not
based on self-love. He points out that however selfish a man
may be, there must still be a basis for a choice between what is
useful and what is pernicious, even though his interests are in
no way involved. And he goes on to say:
"Now this distinction i3 the same in all
its parts, with the moral distinction,
whose foundation has been so often, and
so much in vain, enquired after. The
same endowments of the mind, in every
circumstance, are agreeable to the
sentiments of morals and to that of
humanity; the same temper is susceptible
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"of high degrees of the one sentiment and
of the other; and the same alteration in
the objects by their nearer approach or
by connexions, enlivens the one and the
other. By all the rules of philosophy,
therefore, we must conclude that these
sentiments are originally the same; since
in each particular, even the most minute,
they are governed by the same laws, and
are moved by the same oblects" (E.P.M.,
pp.235-236).
It is to be noticed that the word 'sympathy' is not used
by Hume in this quotation. The question inevitably arises
whether Hume uses the term 'humanity' in exactly the same sense
in which he uses the term 'sympathy'. In very many places in
the Enquiry 'sympathy' is used, in the sense it bears in the
Treatise for the communication of sentiments, though we must
remember that the mere thought of the pleasures or pains that
tend to follow from a quality of character may arouse in us
painful or pleasant feelincs by sympathy. But whereas in the
Treatise this capacity of the human mind is sharply distinguished
from love and hatred, and these again from benevolence, this
terminological distinction is not so consistently observed in the
Enquiry, perhaps because Hume did not want to become involved in
the somewhat complicated, psychological enquiry upon which these
distinctions depend in the earlier work.
In the sense in which sympathy is "the sympathetic
consciousness of the pleasures or pains of others" it is not a
special kind of sentiment. In the quotation before us there is
a reference to degrees of the two sentiments in question, that of
humanity and that of morality. This Siould make us suspicious,
not least because on the previous page Hume seems to be
distinguishing sympathy from humanity, though perhaps not as
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clearly as one might wish. "The ideas of happiness, ,1oy,
triumph, prosperity, are connected with every circumstance
of his character, and diffuse over our minds a pleasing
sentiment of sympathy and humanity" (E.P.M., p.234). This
quotation might be taken to go against my interpretation
because the word 'sentiment' is used in the singular. But
then again Hume does not say 'sympathy or humanity' but 'sympathy
and humanity' .
I believe that he is really referring to two distinct
concepts. Just before the passage quoted he points out that
when we contemplate the character of a man whose "natural talents
and acquired abilities give us the prospect of elevation,
advancement, a figure in life, prosperous success, a steady
command over fortune, and the execution of great or advantageous
undertaking, we are struck with such agreeable images, and feel
a complacency and regard immediately arise towards him". Here
the feeling of 'complacency and regard' is distinguished from
the agreeable images and arises as a consequence of those images,
communicated to us by sympathy. And in a footnote to this page
Hume talks about the way in which sympathy, "a feeling of the
imagination" serves to excite sentiments of complaaency or
cen3ure.
Though the appearance of happiness does give pleasxjre
(presumably by sympathy) this need not arouse any active
benevolence though it may arouse approval. It seems to me
clear that Hume is not using the term 'sympathy' here in any such
sense as might make it equivalent to 'approval or disapproval'.
'Humanity', on the other hand, is often used by Hume to include
more than the mere consciousness of happiness or misery.
In the passage we are discussing it seems obvious that this
term is used to cover more, ^or Hume talks of "endowments of
the mind" as being agreeable to humanity and the sentiment of
morals. It seems fairly clear that the term is used in a sense
much nearer to the sense in which 'love1 is used in the
Treatise. We seem to be dealing with a specific sentiment
which varies according to the closeness of relations. This
interpretation would have the merit of removing the paradoxical
result which the identification of 'sympathetic consciousness'
with approval and disapproval would Involve, for love and hatred
are directed towards the cause of happiness or misery in a sense
in which sympathy is not, since it consists in the mere
consciousness of the happiness or misery of another. This
would also be in complete harmony with the passage quoted from
the Treatise where 'approbation and blame' are taken to be
ultimately a species of love and hatred.
It must he admitted that the suggested interpretation of
the passage that is taken to prove that Hume identifies
sympathetic consciousness with approval and disapproval is by
no means obviously implied by Hume's words. But if we can show
that in the chapter from which the quotation is taken there are
repeated utterances which distinguish sympathy from approval
and disapproval, this must make it more likely that in this
isolated passage humanity refers to a sentiment which arises as
the result of sympathising with the pleasures and pains of
others, and is not taken to refer to lust this 'sympathetic
consciousness'.
At the very beginning of the chapter wWhv Utility Pleases"
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Hume points out how the utility of objects, their "fitness
for a useful purpose" Is commonly appealed to in justification
of ascribing beauty to them. He goes on to ssy:
% hat wonder then, that a man, whose
habits and conduct, are hurtful to
society, and dangerous or pernicious to
every one who has an intercourse with
him, should, on that account be an
object of disapprobation, and communicate
to every spectator the strongest sentiment
of disgust and hatred" (E.P.M., p.213,
footnote).
It seems obvious that it is only in so ^ar as the
sentiments communicated by sympathy are disrust and hatred of
the person in question that an identification of sympathy with
the moral disapproval and hatred is plausible. In so far as
the man's character causes other painful feelings In those who
are affected by his actions, our sympathy with those is not
Identical with, but gives rise to our 'disgust and hatred'.
The footnote appended to the passage we are considering
puts this beyond doubt. It is obvious that we may sympathise
with the pleasures or pains of others whatever the cause of
these pleasures or pains may be. But Hume warns us that we
must not draw from this the conclusion that any object which is
the source of pleasure or pain is therefore virtuous or vicious.
His reason for holding this is instructive. He points out that
"there are a numerous set of passions and sentiments, of which
thinking rational beings are, by the original constitiition of
nature, the only proper objects". Unless the qualities which
are the cause of pleasure or pain are nlaced. upon an object
which is a proper object of the passion, the passion is not
aroused. We are familiar with this view from the account of
the indirect passions in the Treatise, and a clearer
distinction between sympathetic consciousness and the
resultant passions could hardly be drawn.
The parallel #ith the Indirect passion of love becomes
still more explicit when flume refers in the following manner
to the distinguishing characteristics of that sentiment which
is aroused by utility when the cause of pleasure and pain is
some characteristic o** a person:
"The sentiments, excited by utility, are,
in the two eases, very different; end
the one is mixed with affection, esteem,
approbation, etc., and not the other.
In like manner, an inanimate oblect may
have good colour and proportions as well
as a human figure. But can we ever he
in love with the former?" (E.P.K., p.
213, footnote).
Thus we see that the pleasures or oains sympathised with
might be the same although the passions aroused thereby may be
different. The difference is due to the different objects
upon which the qualities causing pleasure or pain are placed.
Only in those cases where this oblect is a proper object of
love or hatred are the special sentiments of approval or
disapproval aroused. hen the object is inanimate we would
still approve of it beceuse of its utility. Perhaps we should
call itheautiful i** it 3eems peculiarly well fitted to serve as
an instrument which might lead to pleasant experiences. But
here the sentiment would be different and could not be approval
or disapproval, love or hatred, for these passions have by nature
human beings as their oblect. This doctrine, that passions have
by nature special objects, we have repeatedly insisted upon and
may remind ourselves that, talking of pride and humility in Book
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II, Hume says:
"it is evident, in the first place, that
these passions are determined to have
self for their oblect, not only by a
natural but also by an original
property" (T.R.N. II, pp.7-8).
There is something missing in the situation where we
sympathise with the pleasures or pains of others caused by
inanimate ob.lects which makes it impossible for moral approval
and disapproval to arise, "A very small variation of the
ob.iect, even when the same qualities are preserved, will
destroy a sentiment" (E.P.M., p,213, footnote).
There are several other passages in the chapter "Why
Utility Pleases" which indicate that sympathy is appealed to
as the principle which helps to explain the origin of approval
or disapproval. The horror at the prospect of misery is
distinguished from "antipathy against its author" (E.P.M,, p#221).
n 1
The principles of sympathy and humanity are said to excite the
strongest censure and applause" (E.P.M., p,23l), Our sympathy
with the characters in a play is shown In "anxiety and concern"
when they are made unhappy. "But where their sufferings proceed
from the treachery, cruelty, or tyranny of an enemy, our breasts
are affected with the liveliest resentment aralnst the author of
these calamities'1-" (E.P.M., p.222). Here our sympathy is
clearly distinguished from the resultant approval or disapproval.
This need in no way surprise us, for the doctrine of the Treatise
undoubtedly is that approval and disapproval are passions "founded
In
on pleasure and pain .
1. My underlining.
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The approval of virtue merely as such mav be a direct
passion arising from the sympathy which results from contempl¬
ating the tendencies of certain qualities of character in
general. When these qualities belong to a definite person,
the approval or disapproval appear to be indirect passions with
a person as their object. If ¥/e do not accept this interpret¬
ation, our account of the way in which Hume comes to think of
the various sources of virtue becomes unintelligible, for it Is
only in the case of virtues immediately pleasing to the person
himself that we could, with any degree of plausibility, identify
the sympathy with pleasure with approval, for here a person's
mirth, for example, seems to be the quality sympathised with and
also the object approved of. But even this would not do, for it
is the durable quality of mind we approve of, the man's tendency
to be cheerful and not his actual cheerfulness, though our
sentiments would be strengthened if we had a close relation to a
cheerful person and associated directly with him on many
occasions of his cheerful moods.
But Hume cannot be wholly absolved from responsibility for
the misrepresentation of his doctrine hy some commentators.
The way in which he uses such terms as 'humanity' in the
Enquiry is certainly not quite as consistent ss those might wish
who expect a philosopher to have a clearly defined terminology
strictly adhered to. 'Humanity' is sometimes used as
equivalent to 'sympathy' in the sense in which sympathy is a
principle of communication, hut at other times it seems to he
made to cover benevolence or concern for another person's
welfare. Thus we get a reference to a person's "generous
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humanity" where 'benevolence' could apparently be substituted
without loss of meaning. In another place it is enumerated
as one of the social virtues in a list which mentions
generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy and moderation
but not benevolence. In yet another place we get a vague
reference to the "benevolent principle" and "the natural
sentiment of benevolence" where 'humanity' could apparently
serve equally well. In a similar way Hume sometimes uses
'sympathy' in a manner which seems to make it inclusive of
benevolence. Thus the fact that Hume says the sentiment of
humanity is originally the same as the sentiment of morals
need not mean that to approve or disapprove is identical with
the "consciousness of the happiness or misery of another".
All Hume need mean is that our capacity for being sympathetically
conscious of the pleasures or pains of another arouses in us
approval and disapproval and benevolence towards those approved
or disapproved of, and since these are always livelier and
fainter pari passu with change in qualities or with a change in
the closeness of relations we may say that these two sentiments
are at bottom the same. But Hume does not even say they are
•at bottom the same1, but that they are 'originally the same'.
This leaves open the possibility that the sentiments talked of
are not identical as they apnear in our consciousness, but that
the same principle or characteristic of our nature gives rise to
both. This interpretation may he strengthened by the analogy
Hume draws with the explanation of bodies falling and the fact
that the stars are kept in their orbit in terms of "the same
force of gravity". Here there is no suggestion that bodies
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falling and the stars are identical, but the principle
which explains the two occurrences is identical. Thus we
might think that he i3 merely pointing out that the capacity
for sympathising with the pleasures and. pains of others and.
the variations in the intensity of this sympathetic conscious¬
ness equally explains our benevolence or concern for the
welfare of others and our approval and disapproval of qualities
of character.
All I have wanted to establish is that the interpretation
Hedenius considers an inevitable consequence of Hume's words is
by no means inevitable and must be considered somewhat
unplausible since it makes it difficult to make sense of Hume's
account of sympathy with the pleasure or pain which tend to
result from qualities of character as the source of our approval
of those qualities. One must most emphatically reject the
view that the main conclusion of Hume's philosophy is "that moral
consciousness is a form of sympathy".
Hedenius considers that Vaughan's interpretation of Hume's
view as to the object of approval and. disapproval follows
logically from Hume's view that approval and disapproval "are
sympathy" and that the object of approval and disapproval is
always a motive. Prom this Vaughan seems to drew the
conclusion that Hume is in no sense a utilitarian, for
reflection upon the hedonic consequences of actions does not
determine our approval or disapproval. It seems that in
judging of our own actions our approval or disapproval simply
is sympathy with the feelings of others about us, whereas in
judging of others our approval or disapproval consist in
sympathising with their motives.
- 1B1 -
Hedenius points out that Vaughan's interpretation seems
to fit Adam Smith's theory "better than Hume's, and in this he
seems to be perfectly correct. Vaughan refers a great deal to
the Treatise, but it seems that according to the concept of
sympathy as it functions in that work we could only call appro%'al
or disapproval sympathy with motives if the motives in question
were in fact these passions. This would, however, only account
for the fact that we might agree with another in approving of
something, but would not account for our approval of that other
person. If we think of approval and disapproval as any pleasant
motive communicated by sympathy, we should not he much better off
for the pleasantness of such a motive as benevolence is only one
of the sources of the approval of this virtue and not the most
potent one. It is very difficult to make out what exactly
Vaughan's interpretation amounts to, but it seems that he makes
far too much of Hume's doctrine that approval and disapproval are
always of motives.
It is perfectly true that "we are never to consider any
single action in our Inquiries concerning the origin of morals,
but only the quality of character from which the action proceeded"
But Hume's reason for holding this to be the case is not that the
motive considered as occurring in consciousness, a desire or a
passion, is the man's conscious motivation we either approve of
or sympathise with, but rather that the quality of character from
which the action proceeded is durable enough to affect our
sentiments concerning the person. An action considered merely
as such is not closely enough related to the person acting unless
it is seen to be a legitimate sign of a motive or quality of
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character in him. The character or qualities of mind of
another person are only known from experience and thus we would
say of a person who had shown consistent benevolence in his past
actions that an action which l.ed to an increase in unhappiness
performed by such a person did not Justify the inference that
malice was the motive. ns a conseouence of this, such
incidental actions out of character do not determine our love
or hatred, approval or disapproval of the person.
In showing why intentionality is important in determining
love and hatred Hume's arguments follow a similar course. "By
the intention we judge of the actions; and, according as that
is good or bad, they become causes of love or hatred" (T.H.N. II,
p.68). Now It is not the intentionality as such which causes
love or hatred, for in many cases where the quality in a person
which pleases or displeases us is very constant, love may he
aroused though there is no Intention. The intention becomes
important in dealing with individual actions because "an intention
shows certain qualities, remaining after the action is performed".
It Is a3 a sign of some qualities of character that the
Intentionality becomes important for it gives a closer relation
between the agent and his actions. If we look upon a motive as
something occurring in an agent's mind, some state of his
consciousness, we might with equal justice say that Hume tt'ought
actions always judged by the intention as that the motive
decided the merit of an agent.
Hume makes it quite clear that when an action is
accidental the relation between the person as its 'Immediate'
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cause is too loose. But he is equally clear that no conscious
design or purpose need be present in the person's mind in order
that love or hatred may be aroused as a result of an action.
It is not sympathy with the agent's conscious state in acting
which constitutes our approval or disapproval, whether this is
concerned a3 a motive or an intention, thouvh sympathy with the
pleasure or pain arising in an agent from a quality of character
may contribute to the creation of love or hatred, approval or
disapproval. But it is perhaps sufficient to mention that
motives that are unpleasant may be approved of in order to refute
the notion that Hume thinks approval constituted by a sympathy
with a motive. "Anger and hatred are passions inherent in our
very frame or constitution. The want of them on some occasions
may even be a proof of weakness and imbecility" (T.H.N. Ill, p,299) .
It is clear that here we may disapprove of a character because the
absence of an essentially unpleasant motive may be an indication
of a characteristic which tends not to have felicific results.
We are most certainly not committed, to disapproving of other
people's disapprovals, though this passion is an unpleasant one.
This is easily intelligible when we remember that such disapprovals
may be signs of a quality of mind or character which tends to
have beneficial results.
THE NATURAL VIRTUES AND SYMPATHY
In our treatment of all virtues, natural and artificial,
we must keep firmly in mind that "the imagination adheres to
the general views of things, end distinguishes the feelings
they produce from those which arise from our particular and
momentary situation" (T.H.N. Ill, p.282; p.587).
When people sing the praises of "great men" it is, Hume
thinks, found that most of the qualities in virtue of which
we approve of them are either such that they benefit society
or the person possessed of the virtue. To the first class
belong generosity and humanity, and to the second prudence,
temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity, enterprise,
dexterity. All the virtues here enumerated are natural virtues
and we shall reserve the artificial virtues for separate treat¬
ment. Let us call the two classes of natural virtues we have
distinguished social and self-regarding.
It must not be forgotten that Hume thinks the self-
regarding virtues furnish the best evidence for his contention
that sympathy is needed to explain evaluations. In the case
of social virtues there is always the possibility we might be
taken to approve of them because of the benefit we derive from
society. In cases where the person we iudge of is the member
of another society or belongs to a past age, we might be taken
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to approve of him because of the benefit we imagine we should
have received if we had been members of that society. Although
we may here have to appeal to the imagination it is not
absolutely clear that we need to appeal to a principle of
sympathy, though Hume is confident that
" "were nothing esteemed virtue but what
were beneficial to society, I am
persuaded that the foregoing explication
of the moral sense ought still to be
received, and that upon sufficient
evidence" (T.H.N. Ill, p.283; p.588) .
But when we consider that we approve of a person because
he possesses qualities that "have a tendency to promote hi3
interest and satisfaction" it seems the end these qualities are
"fit to produce" must somehow "be agreeable to me". How can
this be the case if the man is to me "a total, stranger" to whom
I am under no obligation and who is not likely to be of any
service to me in virtue of those cualities that have a tendency
to serve his interests? It seems to Hume obvious that only
sympathy with the happiness of the person in question could
explain why I approve of him because of his possession of self-
regarding virtues. It is for this reason alone that the
tendency these virtues have to serve the possessor of them "have
an agreeable effect upon my Imagination and command my love and
esteem" (T.H.N. Ill, p.284; p.589).
It is not only that cool self-love or enlightened, self-
interest would be unable to account for our approval of these
self-regarding virtues. We are now also in a position to see
why the same qualities of mind give rise to pride and love on
the one hand, humility and hatred on the other. a man will have
a high opinion of himself in virtue of possessing the very same
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qualities that would lead him to have a high opinion of
another if they belonged to that other person. Without the
appeal to sympathy one mirht perhaps understand, why a man
could be proud of qualities that serve his own purposes, but
it would be more difficult to see why others should love him
because of them. Though the objects of love and pride are
different the qualities that determine our 'evaluation' are
the same:
"This theory may serve to explain why the
same qualities, in all cases, produce
both pride and love, humility and hatred:
and the same man is always virtuous or
vicious, accomplished or despicable to
others, who i3 so to himself.'1 (T.H.N.
Ill, p.284; p.589)
It seems that Hume is making a false factual claim at
this point. Surely a man may have a low opinion of himself
though others have a high opinion of him. Many a proud man
i3 surely disapproved of by others. Hume certainly does not
overlook this obvious fact, for the next section of the
Treatise, "Of Greatness of Mind", is among other things
concerned with explaining how pride comes to be disapproved of
by others. Pride is often a vice. There must thus be
another explanation for the way Hume expresses himself in the
quotation we are considering.
Hume is, I believe, mainly concerned to show how the self-
regarding virtues can only he made intelligible if we appeal to
the principle of sympathy. When he talks of the indirect
passions in this connection he is referring to the unbiased
variety of these passions, proper evaluations. This becomes
I think clear when we notice that he maintains that a man
"whose character is only dangerous and disagreeable to others,
- 187 -
can never be satisfied with himself, as lone as bo la sensible
of that disadvantage" (T.H.N. Ill, p.284; p.589).
The trouble with the man whose pride is greater than his
qualities merit lies .lust in this, that he is insensitive to
the fact that his pride is disagreeable to others. When
♦
pride is a vice it comes under the heading of those qualities
immediately disagreeable to others. The fact that qualities
of mind are immediately disagreeable to others when known to
us may make us "displeased with a quality commodious to us,
merely because it displeases others: though perhaps we can
never have any interest in rendering ourselves agreeable to
them" (T.H.N. Ill, p.284; p.589).
To be displeased with yourself because you cause others
displeasure is one thing. To be disnloased with yourself
because other people's displeasure will hinder you in your own
designs and purposes is another.
Hume insists in the Treatise that our approval of the
qualities of mind immediately pleasing to the person himself
or to others can only be explained if we appeal to sympathy.
We tend to approve of a man who is prone to the pleasant
rather than the unpleasant passions. This we could only do
if we were not entirely unaffected by the man's pains and
pleasures. Hume's distinction into four categories of virtues
depends upon the fact that in each case we should approve of
the virtue even though the three other sources of pleasure were
absent. This is not meant to imply that if a man's pleasant
passions had undesirable consequences we should still approve
of the man.
In the case of qualities immediately agreeable to others
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we must appeal to sympathy because we judge these virtues
by their seeming tendencies. The following quotation makes
Hume's meaning perfectly clear:
"But, however, directly the distinction of
vice and virtue may seem to flow from the
immediate pleasure and uneasiness, which
particxjlar qualities cause to ourselves
and others, it is easy to observe thst it
has also a considerable dependence on the
principle of sympathy so often insisted
on. We approve of a person possessed of
qualities immediately agreeable to those
with whom he has any commerce, though
perhaps we our.3plve3 never reap any
pleasure from them" »> e also approve of
one who Is possessed of qualities that
are Immediately agreeable to himself,
though they be of no service to any mortal.
To account for this, we must have recourse
to the foregoing principles" (T.H.N, III,
p.285; p.590).
It is, as Hume points out, only those qualities that
give pleasure and pain "from the mere survey" that are
denominated virtues and vices, and this we can only explain
if we have recourse to the function of the imagination and.
that sympathy which is operative when men fix on a "common
point of view, from which they might survey their object, and
which might cause it to appear the same to all of them" (T.H.N.
Ill, p.28R; p.591).
It is very important to remind ourselves that approval
and disapproval cannot be equated with just any pleasure and
pain. The feelings or sentiment upon which moral distinctions
depend are of a particular kind. Only those Interests and
pleasures that arise from our adopting the standpoint of an
impartial spectator counterbalance those that naturally arise
in us in our particular situation in life:
"And, though such interests and pleasures
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"touch us more faintly than our own,
yet, being more constant and universal,
they counterbalance the latter even in
practice, and are alone admitted in
speculation as the standard of virtue
and morality. They alone produce that
particular feeling or sentiment on
which moral distinctions depend".
(T.H.N. Ill, p.28P: p.591)
It is thus obvious that Hume claims in the Treatise
that the approval of all virtues depends upon our taking up
an objective standpoint, that the imagination is involved and
thus sympathy with the effect the quality of mind In question
would tend to have.
It has been argued that sympathy need only be appealed to
in explaining some of the virtues. I shall try to show that
from Hume's standpoint and his insistence that approval and
disapproval are passions of a special kind one can avoid the
conclusion that his system involves a radical incoherence.
Both in the Treatise and in the Enquiry Hume distinguishes
four sources of the merit of qualities of mind. Such Dualities
may be deemed virtuous because they are immediately agreeable
to the person himself, immediately agreeable to others, useful
to the person himself or useful to others. It is to be
remembered, however, that although we thus get four different
classes of virtuous qualities these classes are not mutually
exclusive. The same quality of mind may be both agreeable
and useful and an explanation of its virtue would have to
mention both these characteristics.
(1) Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves. There
are certain passions which are Inherently disagreeable. Hume
mentions the following in a footnote in the Enquiry: fear,
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anger, dejection, grief, melancholy, anxiety. These are
all 'passions' which most human beings will have experienced
from time to time, A man is not vicious lust because he is
stricken with grief at the I033 of a close friend, nor is an
angry person necessarily bad. It is in fact not the
disagreeable passions themselves which are vicious but rather
the propensity to these passions. A person's character
becomes disagreeable to us if he has a propensity to these
passions simply because these passions are communicated, to us
by sympathy. It is possible to suggest that the list of
• ty--.ii ■■
passions given above could be regarded as a list of motives.
Moods and emotions are sometimes regarded as motives. But the
important point about this class of virtuous Qualities is that
they are not approved of as motives. The word 'motive'
belongs to the vocabulary of explanation of actions. When
we say "He beat his wife because he was angry" we are explaining
a person's actions and only in so far as this is my purpose can
this be counted as an explanation in terms of motive. If I
condemn this motive and say that a person ought not to be
motivated by anger I am not condemning the feeling as such but
only claiming that he should control himself, should not let
anger lead him into beating his wife and other undesirable
behaviour. But Hume's main point is that this is not our only
reason for condemning or disapproving of an irascible man. We
do not only disapprove of him because he is prone to act in a
mischievous way but also simply because it is disagreeable for
the man himself to be angry. We disapprove because the
emotion or mood, is disagreeable as such and. not just because it
- 191 -
is a bad motive*-. This is because we may sympathise with
the feelings of the man whose character we are fudging as
well as with the feelings of those who are affected by his
actions. It may be the case that there is no virtue
approved of merely because it is agreeable to the possessor,
but this is one of the causes of approval even of 3uch virtues
as benevolence, which undoubtedly derives much of its merit
fr oai the fact that it leads to behaviour which on the whole
increases the pleasure of others.
(2) In the case of qualities immediately agreeable to others
it seems that these are approved of immediately and do not
seem to need sympathy to be perfectly intelligible to us.
Among the chief of these virtues we may mention good manners,
wit and ingenuity. The witty person pleases us immediately
and the reason why is not that he is pleased himself. It Is
not through sympathy with hi3 pleasure that we come to approve
in so far as this is a virtue immediately pleasing to others.
But part of our approval Is surely derived from the consideration
that this quality causes pleasure in other people than the
person judging. This is perfectly true. But wit would still
be immediately pleasing to an individual without this
consideration and would thus be valued.
But there is an ambiguity in the term 'value1 here, for
even though we may not need sympathy to explain the fact that
we value a witty acquaintance, seek his company on account of
his wit and would not want to he deprived of It, we do need
1. It must be stressed that I am not myself willing to
subscribe to the view that moods are motives.
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sympathy in order to explain that in pnother sense of
•value* we count as equally valuable the wit of an
acquaintance and the wit of a person wholly unknown to us.
But as regards this source of value we can see again that
we do not lust value persons on account of their motives,
for neither wit nor politeness would normally be classified
as motives.
(3) When we come to the class of virtues useful to the
possessor ttume is again quite explicit that we are not
talking specifically about motives but hebits and qualities
of character.
"it seems evident, that where a quality or
habit is subjected to our examination, if
it appear in any respect prejudicial to
the person possessed of it, or such as
incapacitates him for business and action,
it is instantly blamed, and ranked among
his faults and imperfections" (E.P.M., p.233).
Thus even intelligence is esteemed a virtue on this
account and no-one would suggest that intelligence is a
motive.
(4) In the case of virtues useful to others Hume emphasises
that this usefulness to others is a very common source of
merit. Many of those virtues which are useful to the agent
or immediately pleasing to the agent may also be useful to
others. The merit of virtues may be drawn from more than
one source. There is, however, one class of virtues that
are peculiar in that they derive all their merit from their
usefulness to others. This is the class of artificial virtues,
such as justice and chastity. A person may form a settled
disposition to be just or chaste from more than one motive,
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but whichever the motive such a disposition la approved. We
shall have to discuss the artificial virtues with some
thoroughness in a separate chapter, but we may notice here
that the source of the value of these virtues Is obviously to
be explained by an appeal to the principle of sympathy, for
unless we were affected through this principle by the happiness
or unhappiness of others considerations of utility would in no
way affect us. It is because of our sympathy with the
happiness of others that we approve.
It has been suggested that Hume is inconsistent in his
appeal to sympathy in order to furnish a common principle which
will explain our valuations based on the various sources of merit
already mentioned. I believe this criticism to be mistaken.
Hedenius claims that "... those virtues which are immediately
agreeable to other persons are outside the general scheme of
Hume's ethics" (Hed., p.398). His reasons for this are simple
for he claims that
"the definition implies that they are virtues,
because they are qualities that are approved
of, but such a definition must for Hume imply
pure tautology: they are virtues because
they are virtues, qualities approved of
because they are qualities that are approved
of" (Hed., p.398).
If Hedenius is right it i3 obviously superfluous to appeal
to sympathy in order to explain why the presence of these
qualities elicits approval and this would be the same as to
explain why they are virtues. The assumption upon which this
criticism is based. Is simply that to be pleased by the wit of a
*!
person is to consider the wit a virtue, to 'morally* approve of
It. This Is 3c because Hume is alleged to teach that a
pleasurable consciousness of X la the approval of X. But
a careful reading of the chapter in which Ilume discusses this
topic reveals that he distinguishes between the explanation of
why the qualities under consideration are immediately agreeable
to others and the explanation of our approval of those qualities.
In the case of wit it might be impossible to explain by
the help of psychological concepts why the behaviour or
conversation of the witty person gives Immediate pleasure to
others. But when we come to explain the fact that wit is
counted a virtue and not lust liked by those who en.loy the
company of the witty person we mu.3t appeal to the principle of
sympathy. The final paragraph of the chapter makes this clear:
nWe approve of another, because of his wit,
politeness, modesty, decency, or any
agreeable quality he possesses; although
he be not of our acquaintance, nor has
ever given us any entertainment by means
of these accomplishments. The idea,
which we form of their effect on his
acquaintance has an agreeable influence
on our imagination and gives U3 the
sentiment of approbation. This principle
enters into all! the ludgments which we
form concerning manners and characters"
(E.P.M., p.267).
Is it not obvious that the words 'this principle' refer
to sympathy and could Hume be more explicit than he is when
he says that this enters into all our approvals of the
qualities under consideration? Hedenius1 confusion is
perhaps caused by a failure to see that we may be 'spectators'
in two different ways. We may be pleased as spectators of
the antics of a clown or when we see a polite person's
behaviour. But when Hume talks of our taking up the position
1. My underlining.
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of a spectator he is thinking of a judgment of a particular
quality as a source of pleasure generally. YYe have not
taken up an unbiased view unless we do this. Here sympathy
with the pleasure of others inevitably comes into the picture
and influences our feelings of approval or disapproval. Thus
although the immediate pleasures derived the company of
the witty and the polite are undoubtedly the source of the
virtuous character of wit and politeness we must understand the
term "source' in the sense in which a causal factor is a source
of its effect.
When Hume just before the passage quoted above mentions the
fact that certain people seem to possess a certain indefinable
something which "catches our affection" in an inexplicable
manner, it is to be noticed that he does not say "commands our
approval*. Sympathy cannot explain why these characteristics
catch our affection but this is very different from saying that
we may com© to approve of this characteristic without the
assistance of the principle of sympathy.
Hume thinks that pride, when justified, Is a most valuable
asset. It helps us to achieve our purposes and is generally
found in people we call great men. In spite of t^ls it is the
case that expressions of pride are thought to indicate bad
breeding. In order to explain this we must refer to the fact
that people generally have a tendency to think more highly of
themselves than seems to be justified. An expression of
pride operates upon others through the principle of comparison,
and this has an effect opposite to that of sympathy. Our
knowledge of the high opinion someone else has of himself makes
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us see ourselves as more insignificant by contrast. This
pains us end it is for this reason that the general rule is
formed that pride, even when justified, is not to be allowed
full and unhindered expression.
"
... we establish the rules of good
breeding, in order to prevent the
opposition of men's pride, and render
conversation agreeable and Inoffensive"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.292; p.507) .
There is no doubt that the explanation Hume gives of the fact
that we dislike a boastful man hps a lot of truth in it. He
also makes some rather interesting observations on the
difference between occasions where sympathy operates from the
occasions where we are affected by comparison. Let us imagine
our feelings during a bad storm when we come to know of a boat
in distress. If we are at a relatively safe distance this may
raise in us a feeling of satisfaction with our own lot by
comparison. If on the other hand we are on the sea shore
actually seeing the men falling overboard and the panic on their
faces, we are likely to be affected by sympathy with their
plight and grinped by pity or comoassion. This observation may
be sound, but it raises the ouestlon whether it is possible to
give any general rule for deciding when our knowledge of others'
suffering would Influence us by comparison as opposed to sympathy.
When we remember that specifically moral approvals arise when we
take up a relatively detached attitude one should perhaps have
expected that our knowledge of the suffering of others would make
us more satisfied with our lot rather than that it should pain us
through sympathy. But perhaps one ought not to talk here in
terms of exclusive alternatives. Perhaps our satisfaction
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with our own situation as contrasted with the lot of the
unfortunate people affected by the deeds of an evildoer
strengthens still more our disapproval of him.
Hume makes it quite clear that certain virtues only
achieve this status by being combined with benevolence. Such
things as courage and ambition, judgment and other such virtues
are only valuable when combined with benevolence:
"Courage and ambition when not regulated
by benevolence, are fit only to make a
tyrant and public robber. It is the
same case with judgment and capacity,
and all the qualities of that kind.
They are indifferent in themselves to
the interests of society, and have a
tendency to the good or ill of mankind,
according as they are directed by these
other passions" (T.H.N., III, p.297;
p.604).
Thus for Hume the benevolent and tender passions are of
peculiar importance. It is indeed the case that there is
nothing which is more lovable than "any Instance of extra¬
ordinary delicacy in love or friendship". This is not because
of the general public utility of these passions. It is rather
that the passion communicated by sympathy is love itself and
this need only change its object, so to speak, and it comes to
be directed to the loving people. Since any mental quality
which excites love is a virtue, we need thu3 not be surprised
that the tendency to this passion should be much admired. Hume
does not always distinguish between valuing in the sense in which
to love a man is to value him and the valuing which would be
1 fVi
properly expressed by saying he is a good or a virtuous man.
The reason no doubt is that since approval is only a more
imperceptible love thi9 is made more violent and becomes what
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we normally call love when you are in fact acquainted with the
loved one. In these cases you are quite often also conscious
that your love is determined by merit and not by the fact that
you are closely related to the people whose propensity to the
tender passions you so much admire.
Though Hume rates the 'tender passions' so highly we must
never forget that all 'angry passions' are vicious:
"Anger and hatred are passions inherent
in our very frame and constitution.
The want of them, on some occasions, may
even be a proof of weakness and imbecility"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.299; p.605).
It must all the same not be forgotten that when these passions
rise to cruelty we have an example of the most abominable of
vices.
Though Htime places main emphasis on the tender virtues and
the artificial virtues, we must not forget that he is willing to
count as a virtue such a thing as a good judgment or wit. These
do not excite approval of quite the same kind, however.
"Good sense and genius beget esteem; wit
and humour excite love" (T.H.N. Ill, p.301;
p.603).
Apart from the strangeness of calling these qualities virtues
it is important to note that Hume realises that we feel
dlfferently about the various things we value under the name
virtue. Different qualities affect our emotions differently.
The following footnote shows what is common and what is different
in the evaluations implied in loving and esteeming:
"Love and esteem are at the bottom the
same passions, and arise from like
causes. The qualities that produce
both are agreeable and give pleasure.
But when this pleasure is severe and
serious; or where its object is great,
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"and makes a strong impression; or
where it produces any degree of
humility or awe; in all these
cases, the passion which arises
from the pleasure is more properly
denominated esteem than love.
Benevolence attends both; hut is
connected with love in a more
eminent degree" (T.H.N. Ill, p.301;
footnote; p.f08).
Since there can only be four indirect passions according to
Hume's psychological story, it should be obvious to us why love
and esteem must be thought at bottom the same. What is
interesting here is the relation between awe or humility and
esteem or respect. In a case where by contrast we tend to
feel small and insignificant in relation to the object, it
would be proper to 3ay we esteem or respect the ob,1ect. Love
does not seem to have in it this element of 'looking up to',
though as Hume points out, it tends to be more closely connected
with benevolence. We tend to be more solicitous for the
welfare of persons we love than for those we esteem or respect.
We tend to call groat what commands our esteem and (rood what
c ommand s our 1ove.
But is Hume not guilty of a gross confusion between the
moral and non-moral qualities a man may have? He is well aware
of the fact that he is extending the scope of the term 'virtue'
but he thinks he can show that there are good grounds for
emphasising the similarities between virtues and talents, moral
and non-moral qualities in general. Hume points out that people
in fact seem to value their intellectual capacities as much as
what we normally call their moral virtues. They might become
more angry if called fools than if they were called, knaves. It
is furthermore undeniable that natural abilities
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"give a new lustre to the other virtues;
and that a man possessed of them is much
more entitled to our good will and
services than one entirely void of them"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.300: p.*07) .
It is, I think, undeniable that we do not estimate a man's
virtue simply by his intention. A man who forms his intentions,
however benevolent, on the basis of unrealistic assessment of his
abilities would perhaps be described as kind but foolish. The
'but' may be taken to indicate a reservation in our praise.
But this is not the only way in which the possession of natural
abilities may increase our admiration for a man's moral stature.
Who would want to claim that we could count Albert Schweizer's
intellectual abilities as irrelevant in assessing the value of
his life as a moral agent?
We have already seen that different virtues inspire different
kinds of feeling. It would thus be quite possible that what we
call natural abilities may inspire different kinds of emotions
from other virtues, we might feel differently about them. This
is not, however, sufficient to iustlfy us in thinking them of an
entirely different kind, since the same holds for different
qualities admitted to be virtues, e.g. the awe-inspiring and the
lovable.
Since it is the pleasurable characteristics that arise from
the contemplation of personal characteristics that determine
approval and disapproval, we can easily see that 3uch consequences
may result from non-voluntary characteristics. This would thus
not furnish an aderuate criterion for distinguishing virtues
from talents. As regards the criterion that virtues are the
result of free activities whereas talents are not, Hume points
to his discussion of freedom, according to which the
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'voluntary' is not necessarily 'free' .
Hume does all the same recognise that the distinction
between the voluntary and the involuntary can explain to us
why moralists have invented the notion of moral virtue:
"Men have observed, that, though natural
abilities and moral qualities be in the
main on the same footing, there is,
however, this difference betwixt them,
that the former ere almost Invariable
by any art of Industry; while the
latter, or at least the actions that
proceed from them, may be chanced by
the motives of rewards and punishment,
praise and blame. Hence legislators
and divines and moralists have
principally applied themselves to the
regulating of these voluntary actions,
and have endeavoured to produce
additional motives for being virtuous
in that particular. They knew, that
to punish a man for folly, or exhort
him to be prudent and sagacious would
have but little effect; though the
same punishments and exhortations, with
regard to justice and injustice, might
have a considerable influence" (T.H.N.
Ill, p.302; p.*09).
Nowell-Smith tries to distinguish moral from non-moral
qualities or characteristics in terms of amenability to praise
and blame;
"Both he (the weak-willed) and the
wicked man differ rrom the addict or
compulsive in that the latter will
respond neither to threats nor to
encouragement" (Ethics, p.30*).
The trouble with this is that the really hardened criminal,
the person who is beyond redemption, does no more respond to
threats or oncourage-nents than the addict. We yet distinguish
between them, but on this theory there seems no ground for this.
Hume is entirely clear about the difference between the
sense in which you can decide to approve or disapprove with a
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view to altering people's behaviour and the other more
fundamental sense in which you find yourself approving or
disapproving as you find yourself loving or hetini? someone.
This latter sense is for him the primary sense of moral
evaluation and is to bo distinguished from the use moral
language can be put to in encouraging or discouraging behaviour.
The following quotation from Nowell-Smith. can only he defended
if by 'appraising', 'praising' and 'blaming' we mean doing
something overtly.
"Appraising, praising, and blaming are
things that men do and can only be
understood on the assumption that
they do them for a purpose and use
means adapted to their purpose"
(Ethics, p.301) .
According to Hume, and in this I think he is right, we
cannot choose to valuate in ohe way rather than another, though
we may choose to use evaluative language for the purpose of
encouraging certain behaviour and discouraging other. It is
for the above reason that I think Nowell-Smith is misleading in
his account of this matter in a way in which Hume is not*
He says:
"Moral approval and disapproval play
the same role (as rewards and punishments).
It is not just an accident that they please
and hurt and, that they are used only in
cases in which something Is to be gained
by pleasing or hurting" (Ethics, p.304).
In the basic sense of 'approve' or 'disapprove' we cannot
use our approvals or disapprovals in the sense in which we may
use bad language. If we want to express in language our
approval or disapproval we need have no special reason for
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dot rip, so other than the fact that we approve or disapprove.
Thi3 is not to deny the fact that we may also express our
approval or disapproval in order to modify people's conduct.
Hume widens the concept of virtue but not in such a way
as to want to justify punishments for lack in certain abilities
or talents. He ia primarily interested in the ways in which
we evaluate human character and he is perhaps right in thinking
that no clear-cut criterion to distinguish the specifically
moral i3 in use by ordinary people. V¥e do not, for example,
enquire whether a man's courage is native to him before we
call it a virtue. This is not at all to deny that it is
only reasonable to use moral language for exhortations where
we think they may modify conduct.
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THE ARTIFICIALITY OF JUSTICE
The word 'artificial' is often used in opposition to
•real' although 'real' has of course many other opposites.
Thus we talk ahout the real and the imaginary, and the
distinction between the real and the apparent, appearance and
reality, is perhaps the best known distinction to be found in
the history of philosophy. But when Hume calls lustice an
artificial virtue, he is not distinguishing it from resl virtue.
Pie Is certainly not saying that it appears to be a virtue but
really is no virtue at all, nor Is he even wanting to imply that
it is an inferior kind of virtue. It is important to remember
this, for sometimes the word 'artificial' is used in such a way
as to throw doubt upon the value of an ob.leet. It is used as
the opposite to 'genuine' . "The stone in her ring is merely
artificial."' This the ladies at the party whisper to one
another. They take care she does not hear this unless they
deliberately intend to insult her.
as used by Plume, 'artificial' has neither 'real' nor
•genuine' as its opposite. It is not a value term at all, hut
has a purely descriptive force. An 'artificial' virtue is
contrasted with 'natural' virtue, both these terms to he taken
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in a strictly descriptive sense. Thus we must not confuse
this contrast with that between natural and unnatural. For
to describe a passion as unnatural would, I thin*, involve a
condemnation or a disapproval of it. Hume's use of 'artificial1
in the context we are considering is not unlike the use of this
term in 'artificial silk', where the word is used to indicate
that the silk is not a natural product but is produced by human
inventiveness. But the analogy is perhaps not as close as it
may seem, for 'artificial silk' is sometimes distinguished from
•real silk' and here the use of 'real' indicates that this kind
of silk is somehow better or at least more truly entitled to be
called silk than the artificial variety, which is not really silk
though it masquerades as such. We must at the outset rid
ourselves of the inclination to think that Hume, by calling some
virtues artificial, wanted to indicate that they were less
valuable or less entitled to the name 'virtue' than the natural
variety.
Hume entitles the second part of Book III of the Treatise
"Of Justice and injustice". This is slightly misleading, for
he treats under this general heading other virtues such as
allegiance and chastity and modesty. In general one might say
that this part of the Treatise is concerned with artificial
virtues as distinct from natural virtues, but of these justice
is considered by Hume to be the most important. It is further
to be remembered that the second part of the book is the longest
j
and the third part is entitled "Of the Other Virtues and Vices"
and contains only a relatively short chapter on the origin of
the natural virtues. This may serve to indicate that Hume
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considered his discussion of justice and injustice of great
Importance. This chapter will only contain some observations
about Hume's general arguments for the artificiality of justice.
A representation of the subtlety of the detail of Hume's
arguments would take too long. It must in particular be
remembered that I do not intend to discuss the bearing of his
doctrine of the artificiality of justice upon his political
theory.
Hume rejects, without reservation, the view that we can
explain why any particular conduct is a sign of virtue by simply
appealing to a moral sense. Tnls would hardly be an explanation.
It is rather an expression of our inability to explain. A simple
appeal to an original instinct
"is not conformable to the usual maxims
by which nature is conducted, where a
few principles produce all that variety
we observe in the universe, and everything
is carried on in the easiest and most
simple manner".
We explain by showing how various apparently diverse
occurrences were to be expected because of the presence of one
property In all. The model is that of scientific explanation or
a special kind of scientific explanation. Hume would have
endorsed completely the following remarks made by Bent ham:
"One man says he has a thing made on
purpose to tell him what is right and
what Is wrong; and that it is called
a OTP**8-! sense: and then he goes to
work at his ease, and says, 'such a thing
Is right, and such a thing is wrong - why?
because my moral sense tells me it is"
(P.M.L., p.17, footnote).
Such an explanation would, indeed, be like saying that a drug
puts you to sleep because It possesses a 'virtus dormitiva'.
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Where are we to look for the common principle which
would explain particular approvals and disapprovals? Are
these principles to be found in nature? Hume's answer to
this question is instructive. He distinguishes various
senses of 'natural' and considers the answer in terms of each.
In so far as we oppose the natural to the miraculous, we can
anticipate his answer,for everything that happens is natural,
Hume contends, though he adds with the tongue in his cheek
"excepting those miracles on which our rellrlon is founded"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.181; p.474). In the sense in which we contrast
the natural and the unusual we find that the boundary between
these concepts is not very sharply defined. We may all the
same affirm that the 'sentiments of morality' are in this sense
natural, for
"there never was any nation of the world,
nor any single person in any nation,
who was utterly deprived of them, and
who never, in any instance, showed the
least approbation or dislike of manners"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.182; p.474).
Here the mere fact that people approve and. disapprove of actions
is taken as evidence that they have a moral sense. It seems we
can know that a man possesses moral sense without knowing what he
approves and disapproves of. It is a contingent fact about
human nature that the passions we call approval and. disapproval
have the 'causes' Hume ascribes to them.
Prom one point of view things that arise from 'artifice'
are entirely natural;
readily forget that the designs, and
projects,and views of men are principles
as necessary in their operation as heat
and cold, moist and dry; but, taking them
to be free and entirely our own, it is
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"usual for us to set them In opposition
to the other principles of nature"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.182; p.474).
There is thus a sense in which an artifice is to be
expected from man.
"Mankind is an inventive species; and
where the invention is obvious and
absolutely necessary, it may as
properly be said to be natural as
anything that proceeds immediately
from original principles, without the
intervention of thought and reflection"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.190. p.484).
Hume even thinks there are good grounds for ca] liner the
rules of lustice Laws of Nature, for he thinks some such rules
"inseparable from the species".
One can certainly not distinguish vice from virtue by
3aying that virtue is natural and vice is unnatural. Hume is
decidedly not concerned to advocate that we should follow
nature on the ground that vice is contrary to nature. Vice is
as natural as virtue, and we are as moral philosophers
concerned with the problem oh explaining "why any action or
sentiment, upon the general view or survey, gives a certain
satisfaction or uneasiness".
Hume stresses the view that we always approve of the
•motives that produce' actions ^T.H.N. Ill, p.184: p.477).
The external action has no value or merit unless it is taken as
a 3ign of a motive at work in the agent. His doctrine appears
to be that we always morally evaluate motives, that actions
derive their moral character fbom the motives that give rise to
them. This contention is supported by the argument that in a
situation where we consider a man actuated by a certain motive
we approve of, we do not think any the less of him even though
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external circumstances hinder him from performing the
action.
"if we find, upon inquiry, that the virtuous
motive was still powerful over his breast,
though checked in its operation by some
circumstances unknown to us, we retract
our blame, and have the same esteem for
him, as if he actually performed the
action which we require of him" (T.H.N•
in, p.184; pp.477-478).
It is by no means obvious that the statement quoted
supports Hume's contention. It seems to depend upon the
meaning we ascribe to the terra 'motive'.
The 19th century Utilitarians, such as Bentham and John
Stuart Mill, insisted that any motive could lead to both
right and wrong conduct, although certain motives were more
likely to lead to right conduct than others. Certain motives
are more or less universal throughout the species. Sexual
desire would be an example of these. We do not praise or
blame a man for his sexual desires. But a man may have formed
a disposition to attempt to gratify these in ways and upon
occasions that are considered socially injurious. In the
case of such a man we should be inclined to call his motive
'lust', a word which indicates our disapproval. A man who
has, on the other hand, developed a disposition to attempt to
satisfy his desire in lawful ways, e.g. in marriage only, is
not disapproved of. In his case we might even call his motive
•love' to indicate our approval.
Hume can only claim that his argument is plausible if
'motive' is used in such a way as to indicate an inclination
or a disposition to perform a kind of action which could be
known to be good or bad if the motive is known. This must be
- 210 -
so if we think the same approval due to the person "as if
he had actually performed the action which we require of
him". We must think of the motive as involving an inclination
or a disposition to perforin a special kind of action, for the
value of the motive depends largely upon the pleasurable
consequences the type of action has upon those who are effected
by it.
But motives cannot be identified with a disposition to
act in a particular way. Hume talks about the constant unlon
between certain motives and actions. It is, I think, clear
that he is not merely wanting to emphasise the fairly obvious
point that a disposition to do an action of type A and the
doing of an action of this kind tend to go together. There
is more to a motive than this. I think Hume considers that
there is an occurrent impression of some sort whenever one is
influenced by a certain motive. Some virtues consist in the
tendency to be influenced by certain motives. If different
motives tend to lead to specifically different types of
behaviour, the doctrine as to the nature of virtue is similar
to the view expressed by Howell-Smith when he says "Virtues and
vices are dispositions to behave in certain ways" (Ethics, p.248).
It must be remembered, however, that this would only fit some
virtues according to Hume. If wit is a virtue it could not be
characterised in thi3 way.
Since utility enters into the explanation of the value of
every social virtue, it is odd to find Hume saying "Were not
affection a duty, the care of children could not he a duty"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.185; p.478). He seems here to he indicating
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that we only approve of the care of children becatise the
motive which leads to this conduct is already approved of
for independent reasons, a most un-utilitarlan argument.
This may incline people to think that approval is indeed for
Hume to he equated with an immediate sympathy with the motive
to an action, and that this decides the value of the action.
This would clearly he inconsistent with the account given in
this thesis of the relation between sympathy and moral
approval and disapproval.
Perhaps we can solve this difficulty in the following
manner. Hume thinks that the object of moral approval is
always a quality of mind or character. When therefore we
consider an action to be done in spite of a man's character,
and thus do not consider it a lust or legitimate sign of a
disposition in him, we should not approve of the action 'morally'
however much pleasure results from it for others. It would
not be closely enough related to the agent to arouse love
towards him.
If I have been right in the emr^asis I have placed upon the
analogy between approval and disapproval on the one hand and the
indirect passions on the other, one can understand why Hume
should demand a close connection between the agent and a Quality
that makes us approve of him. 'The point is still more easily
understood if one remembers that agents rather than actions are
the natural ob.1 ects of approval and disapproval in so far as
these passions are analogous to the indirect passions.
Whatever we may think of this view, it has at least the
merit of avoiding the charge that an action could he called
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morally right ,}u3t because it ha3 lucky results. Later
Utilitarians were somewhat embarrassed by this criticism,
for it seemed they had to say an action was right if it
contributed more to happiness than other alternatives open
to the agent. Since,however, we should not morally approve
of these actions where the beneficial consequences were
purely accidental, it was claimed that the Tightness of an
action depended upon the intention rather than the actual-
consequences, The doctrine that pleasure and the absence of
pain are the sole intrinsic good3 seems to imply the first
sense of 'right', if 'right' is to be defined in terms of
'good', and 19th century utilitarian doctrines seem to be
teleological in this way. They were therefore saddled with
two senses of 'right' in their attempts to account for
morality. In Hume's philosophy, on the other hand, actions
are never to be fudged solely by reference to an end. In so
far as they are morally evaluated, they are always conceived as
signs of a quality of mind or character.
It therefore follows from Hume's doctrine that when we
approve of a man's care for his children, we ere only justified
in doing so because we consider his action a sign of a
disposition or inclination in him. In this case we are dealing
with a disposition or inclination which we do not think
dependent upon the agent's concern for the Tightness or
wrongness, goodness or badness of what he is doing. If we
thought that a man's care for his children was dependent upon
his feeling in some way constrained to do it, we should
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consider this a sign of weakness in him, a sign that he
was somewhat lacking in parental abaction and thus not as
virtuous as h< right bo. We cannot therefore say that the
motive to these actions is the sense of their morality. A
natural motive is presupposed, for it is only in virtue of
his possessing such a motive or disposition that we may
attribute the virtue to the man.
But it can hardly be denied, that Hum© seems to be putting
the cart before the horse when he says:
nWe blame a father for neglecting his
child. Why? because it shows a want
of natural affection, which 13 the
duty of every parent^-. Were not
natural affection aduty, the care of
children could not be a duty; and It
were impossible we could have the duty
in our eye in the attention we give to
our offspring. In this case, therefore,
all men suppose a motive to the action
distinct from a sense of duty" (T.H.H.
Ill, p.185; p.478) •
It Is obvious that Hume appears to be maintaining that
1) it is our duty to be moved by certain motives and 2) that
the actions the motive naturally lead to would not be a duty
unless having the tendency or disposition (understanding
motive to involve this) to do that kind of action were also
considered a duty. This view is In sharp contrast with the
doctrine put forward by Sir David Ross, who maintains that it
is always our duty 1) to do something (The Right and The Good)
or 2) to set ourselves to do something (The Foundations of
Ethics), His view mainly depends upon the contention that
whatever is our duty must be sublect to our voluntary control.
This, Indeed, explains his change of doctrine in The Foundations
1. My underlining.
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Cf Ethics, for ho camfi to see that whereas it sometimes is
the case that our actions are hindered by circumstances
beyond our control we can always if we so choose set ourselves
to do an action. It is for this reason as well that he
considers we can never be under an obligation to do an action
from some particular motive. Uur motives are not under our
voluntary control. The motive has nothing to do witb the
rlghtness of an action, nor with whether you have done your
duty. It is only relevant in deciding the action's goodness.
If it is right to give to charity, it is right to do so from
a self-interested motive. 3four action would, however, be
better if your motive wes concern for other people's welfare.
It is possible to attack Roes' views on the relation
between motives and duty in two ways. 1) One can deny that
our motives are beyond our voluntary control and 2) one can
deny that only those things that do lie under our control are
duties. The first of these alternatives may seem initially
the more promising. (We think it makes sense for a mother to
try to love an unwanted child.) Hume, however, takes the
latter. He refuses to talk of the rlghtness of actions in
abstraction from the motive which would, make it legitimate to
take the action as e sign of a quality of mind or character.
He is primarily interested in the value of human character
and in this he is rather like Kent. But we must remember two
things in interpreting this chapter. 1) Hume thinks we
approve as much of a man who is by external circumstances
prevented from doing benevolent deeds as we do of the person
who has the opportunity to exercise his benevolence. So long
as wo t link the motive prevail s the actual corsecuencea do not
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make a difference to our approval. 2) He thinks that when
the presence of X pleases us In a certain way, we say the
thing Is virtuous; when its absence pains us we say it is a
duty. Consider now the contention that love of children is
a duty. It would pain us to know that someone was lacking
in parental affection. Unless this were so, our disapproval
of a man who neglects his children would not he moral. I
might be an emotional person who got enraged because he saw
a father beat up his child. But my anger would not be
righteous indignation unless I would have felt the emotion
because of my mere knowledge that the man had a disposition
to beat the child. If physical restraint of the man would
entirely remove my emotion and leave me unaffected, I cannot
have been disapproving though I may have been palned by seeing
the child beaten. My passion in this situation might have
been pity or compassion.
Hum© would not be much impressed by the contention that
only those things under our direct control could be duties.
The feelings of a spectator determine what is and what 13 not
a duty. Lack in parental affection pains us. That settles
the matter. We must in any case remember Hume's brand of
determinism. We are certainly not compelled to have the
feelings we have. They are thus undoubtedly free in the sense
in which freedom is opposed to compulsion.
Hume's insistence that we can only talk about the virtuous
character of an action if we consider it as determined by e
certain motive which would tie it to human character makes it
absurd to say that regard to the morality of an action can be
the first motive to its performance. There must be a natural
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motive which the action is a sign of and which makes the
action e virtuous one. He therefore takes it as
"an undoubted maxim, that no action can
be virtuous, or moraTTy rood, unless
there is in'human nature some motive
to produce it distinct from the 3ense
of its morality" (T.H.N. III. p.185;
p,479) .
Sir David Ross agrees with Hume in this that he does not
think it can be our duty to act from a sense of duty. Such
a doctrine would, he thinks, lead to an infinite regress.
But since Hume thinks it our duty to act from a motive he draws
the conclusion from this argument that if it is our duty to do
a certain deed, there must be a natural motive to do the deed.
The point can be compared with what Nowell-Smith has to say in
his Ethics, though he seems to distinguish the 'rightness' of
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an action from its goodness in a way which would not have been
acceptable to Hume,
"Now the motive for adopting a rule
cannot have been the sense of duty,
since the sense of duty is the desire
to do whatever is laid down by the
moral rules we have adopted, A man
who acts from a sense of duty pays his
debts because he thinks it right to do
so; he must therefore have some
reason for thinking it right other than
the fact that his sense of duty bids
him do it" (Nowell-Smith, Ethics, p,25ff)#
and
"There must have been some motive for
establishing the rule in the first
place,.," (Ibid., p.25P).
The similarity between the view stated, in these passages and
Hume's doctrine is obvious, and if we are right in thinking
that Hume means here by a 'natural motive' any motive other
than the sense of the morality of an action, he is pressing
home a philosophical point which the adherents of the Kantian
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analysis of moral value will find it difficult to answer.
The doctrine of subjective duty would not have been
accepted by Hume. This lays it down that it is always a
man's duty only to do whet he thinks his duty on the ground
that ought Implies can, and I can only perform a duty as my
duty if 1 think it is my duty. He is of course not
denying that conscientiousness or the sense of duty may be
the motive of an action. He indeed Insists that a person
who finds himself lacking in the inclination (motives) to
virtuous behaviour may still perform actions which the truly
virtuous man would have a natural motive to perform. He may
do this either in order to acquire the virtuous motives
through habit or in order to disguise to himself his own lack
in true virtue. (Compare Nowell•Smith1s Ethics, p.259: "The
sense of duty is a useful device for helping men to do what a
really good man would do without a sense of duty.")
We may even praise such conduct, and quite rightly, for a
large measure of the value of actions is derived from their
consequences, their effect upon the happiness of others. In
these cases we attribute some virtue to conscientious behaviour
because our attention is fixed upon the signs and we approve
those actions which on the whole, on most occasions, are a
sign of a virtuous motive. There is in *act nothing strange
in this doctrine, for although conscientiousness may be a
substitute for natural goodness as a motive, we still don't
think the substitute superior to the original.
If a person were asked, why he should return a sum of
money he has borrowed, the obvious answer wotild be "because it
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is lust to do so". But this answer will only satisfy a
person who uses the term 'lust1 as a term of nraise. It
presupposes that justice is already admitted to be a virtue.
But the problem we are interested in is precisely why it is
a virtue, so the answer begs the question.
Given the accepted sense of 'borrow1 and 'lend' there is
an air of paradox about suggesting that one ought perhaps not
to repay what one has borrowed unless special reasons are
given. But if we do not presuppose a system of rules for
just dealings between people there is no paradox involved.
What now needs reasons is why it would be virtuous to repay
the money. Hume makes this philosophical point hy the use of
a hypothetical case, where this rule has not been accepted as
a moral rule;
"But in his rude and more natura1
condition, if you are pleased to call
such a condition natural, this answer
would be rejected as perfectly
unintelligible and sophistical. For
one in that situation would
immediately ask you, wherein consists
this honesty arid justice, which you
find in restoring a loan, and
abstaining from the property of others?"
(t.H.M. 1*1, p.186? pp.476-480).
Hume's problem is to explain what 'reasons or motives' could
have lead to the acceptance of the rules of justice in the
first place. There would be a natural reason why we act
justly if 1) we behave in this way hy instinct, 2) if this is
in our Interest and 3) if it benefits those connected with us.
It Is extremely implausible to suggest that justice is the
result of instinct. Where we accent such an explanation
there is a general uniformity in the phenomena thus explained..
The rules of .lustier are in contrast to this extremely
varied. They resemble more the effects of reason than the
effects of instinct.
"All birds of the same species in every
age and country, built their nests
alike: in this we see the force of
instinct. Men, in different times
and places, frame their houses
differently: here we perceive the
influence of reason and custom. A
like inference may be drawn from
comparing the instinct of generation
and the institution o*" property"
(E.P.M., p.202).
In the case of 2) and 3) above there would not *ust be
a reason why people act justly, people would have a reason
for so acting.
We undoubtedly approve of .lust conduct, but considering
any particular instance of 'just conduct* abstracting from
the system of justice there does not seem to he any reason at
all why we should engage in it, for just actions sometimes
seem to be contrary to our own interest and even contrary to
the public interest when taken in isolation. But even in
these cases we feel under an obligation to act Justly, but as
we have already seen we cannot apneal to this feeling of
obligation in order to account for the obligatory nature of
justice without circularity. It is absurd to suggest that a
conscientious motive i~ the source of our allegiance to
justice, since it presupposes that just behaviour is
antecedently believed to be virtuous.
We may now consider some possible answers to Hume's
problem. It is tempting to say that the source of justice
is self-love. But this is somewhat paradoxical, for we
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consider self-love a great source of all manner of injustice.
But could it then be that "regard to public interest"
is the reason for lust conduct? This answer 3s also rejected
by Hume on the grounds that the public interest is not
necessarily served by attachment to behaviour in conformity
to the rules of justice. It is only attached to these rules
if we presuppose a convention. The point, really is that unless
there is a general adherence to 'just1 conduct such conduct on
the part of an individual need not be to the advantap-e of the
public at all.
In cases where the transaction between the people is
secret and it3 fulfilment only has effects upon the people
concerned in the transaction, the public has no Interest In the
matter and the obligation ought, according to the hypothesis,
to be removed. This we find not to be the case. It is
furthermore to be observed that people on the whole can hardly
be said to keep the public interest in mind whenever they repay
a loan or keep their promises. This last point does not of
course show that the public interest may not ultimately be the
source of the obligation to be just.
The problem we are concerned with here is this. Why do
people in actual fact adhere to rules of Justice? It is
assumed that the answer must take the form of showing that it
naturally follows from a certain motive. The suggested motives
are rejected as adequate explanations because they would quite
often lead to conduct contrary to justice, would lead to
'unjust* conduct. But could we not say the same of a natural
motive such as benevolence? If? certainly is true that a
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benevolent action does not always lead to consequences that
increase the welfare of the person we intend to benefit. But
it follows all the same that if this were known to the person
before the act he would refrain from performing it if his
motive truly is benevolence. On the other hand, we may know
that a just action does not as such benefit anyone and thus
the motive of benevolence would not prompt us to do it. The
fact remains that we still think it ought to be done and that
in a case where we cannot see any benefit accruing to ourselves
from it either.
The upshot of Hume's argument then is that riven an
established code of justice none of our natural motives can
explain the obligation we find constraining us to act justly
and refrain from injustice. The only explanation we seem to
be able to give of a just man's adherence to justice in spite
of contrary inclinations of benevolence or self-love is
conscientiousness or 'a sense or duty'. But this motive
cannot be appealed to in explanation of this unless we
presuppose that justice is known to be virtuous, unless we
presuppose a system of justice accepted as imposing obligations
upon us. Hume's problem then is - could we rive an
intelligible account of the origination of these rules of
conduct in the first place, without circularity, by appealing
to natural motives only in our explanation?
Hume's problem is a real one, for even though justice is
useful end benefits human beings generally, Hume cannot maintain
that extensive benevolence is the original motive to lustice.
He cannot appeal to such a natural principle simnly because he
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has denied its existence. Human passions are naturally
biased in favour of self and those closely related to us.
In the same way love is influenced by merit in such a way as
to clash on occasions with the attitude dictated by strict
equity. It is important to bear this point in mind, a point
Hume emphatically stresses in the following passage:
"in general, it may be affirmed, that there
is no such passion in human minds as the
love of mankind, merely as such,
independent of personal qualities, services,
or of relation to ourself. If is true,
there i3 no human, and indeed no sensible
creature, whose happiness or misery does
not, in some measure, affect us, when
brought near to us, and represented in
lively colours: but this proceeds merely
from sympathy, and is no proof of such a
universal affection to mankind, since this
concern extends itself beyond our own
species" (T.H.N. Ill, p.187-188; p.481).
The only benex^olence which is natural to human beings is
•biased* because it is accounted for by an appeal to the
principle of sympathy which varies with the nature and closeness
of relations. This principle furthermore influences our
conduct towards animals as well as men. It cannot therefore
be the foundation of justice which only relates to our dealings
with human beings. We can be unkind to animals but not unjust,
V I ■
Hume seems to be implying. The reason for this is that animals
cannot enter into the kind, of convention that leads to justice.
It certainly cannot be put down to their lack of sympathy, for
"It is evident that sympathy, or the
communication of passions, takes place
among animals, no less than among men"
(T.H.N. II, p.112; p ,398) •
It is similarly their incapacity for objective judgment which
explains why they are capable of the indirect passions and yet
cannot morally approve and disapprove.
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Private benevolence or 'regard to the interests' of the
party concerned would quite often prompt behaviour contrary to
ju3 tic e•
"For what if he be ray enemy, and has
given rae .lust cause to hate him?
What if he be a vicious man and
deserves the hatred of all mankind?
What if he be a miser, and can make
no U3e of what I would deprive him of?
What if he be a profligate debaucher,
and would rather receive harm than
benefit from large possessions? What
if 1 be in necessity, and have urgent
motives to acquire something to my
family? In all these cases, the
original motive to justice would fail;
and consequently the justice itself,
and along with it all property, right
and obligation" (T.H.N. Ill, pp.188-189;
p.482).
Thus we see that we can neither explain why people have
come to behave justly nor can we account for the emergence of
the obligations to just acts by treating it as a natural
result of a motive we already approve of. It appears
therefore we must conclude that the only motive to justice is
conscientiousness or the sense of duty. Since we have already
seen that this motive can only bo effective if we presuppose
that justice has been accepted as virtuous, we adam to be
committed to accepting the circular argument already referred to.
"From all this it follows, that we have
no real or universal motive for
observing the laws of equity, but the
very equity and merit of that
observance; and as no action can be
equitable or meritorious, where it
cannot arise from some separate motive,
there is here an evident sophistry and
reasoning In a circle" (T.H.H. Ill,
p.189; p.483).
The only solution to the problem seems to be that the
sense of justice arises "artificially though necessarily from
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education and human conventions" (T.H.N. IIIf p.189; p.483).
Hume has to explain how people's natural motives come to
establish the convention that gives rise to justice. He
thinks he must use different arguments to show why justice
comes to be regarded as a virtue, why the term becomes a term
of praise and its contrary 'injustice' a term of condemnation.
Let us discuss the two problems in the order in which Hume
himself tackles them.
In explaining the pattern of human actions it is not
enough to point to men's motives alone. We must take into
account the situation in which men find themselves and their
ability to satisfy their interests in that situation.
Hume points out that the physical endowments of human
beings seem strikingly inadequate to satisfy their many needs.
It is not surprising that men should come to cooperate in
societies, for this seems the most efficient method for
securing the satisfaction of man's needs in spite of the
infirmities of each individual taken separately.
"By the conjunction of forces, our
power is augmented; by the partition
of employments, our ability increases;
and by mutual succour, we are less
exposed to fortune and accidents. It
is by this additional force, ability,
and security, that society becomes
advantageous" (T.H.N. Ill, pp.191-2;
p.485).
Hume, however,is careful to remember that utility alone
will not explain the origin of society. People might never
have discovored the utility. He therefore emphasises that
there is a primitive instinct drawing people together, the
sexual instinct. He sees in the ^amily the seed of larger
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society. The human child must be cared for through a long
period of development if it is to survive at all. Hume
believes parents have a natural inclination to protect their
offspring and prepare it for independence.
7
But, granting these social Inclinations that are limited
in extent in any case, Hume is full well aware that there are
features in human nature which would seem at first sight to
stand in the way of effective cooperation. The chief of these
is the selfishness of man.
I have already argued that Hume is not a psychological
egoist, hut he always stresses the •biased' nature of even our
benevolent natural inclinations. This would he as great a
hindrance to an effective cooperation in society as narrow
selfishness, though the anti-social tendency o** these motives
would become much more obvious as the society grows larger.
"For while each person loves himself
better than any other single person,
and in his love to others bears the
greatest affection to his relations
and acquaintances, this must
necessarily produce an opposition of
passions, end a consequent opposition
of actions, which cannot but be
dangerous to the now-established
union" (T.II.N. Ill, p.193; p.487) .
The motives lust mentioned tecome most anti-social in
the case of goods that are transferable in such a way that one
individual or group can take than from another, leaving them
with 1e s 3. In the sense in which I can transfer to another my
enjoyment it is in no way decreased. My physical advantages
cannot be transferred from me to another. Only external roods
can be transferred in the way mentioned and it is consequently
with regard to these that friction is most likely to arise.
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Hume does not mention here the obvious fact that we may
be tempted to impair another's physical endowments in order to
make him incapable of acquiring or defending floods we desire.
Thus it would seem the rules of 5ust1.ee could be looked upon as
relating to physical violence as well as the violation of
property rights in the narrower sense. Hume would of course
entirely reject any notion that we have a natural property in
our body and the labour theory of property rights founded upon
it by Locke. (Locke: Second Treatise of Civil Government)
But it is entirely consistent with his view that there should be
a convention established to refrain from impairing your fellow-
man's physical capacities. There is no reason at all why this
should not count as part of lustice.
At this point we might remind ourselves of the fact that
the natural passions, essentially biased, are not corrected by
our evaluation of them. Our approval of them on the contrary
depends unon their being biased in this way. Thus we think
greater concern due to friends and family than to strangers. We
blame a man for neglecting these completely in favour of a total
stranger,though we should also blame a man who "centres all his
affections in his family"* Here we seem to have a reference to
a du© mean in our affections so much insisted upon hy adam Smith.
The important point to remember here is that we cannot ,'ust
appeal to 'natural morality' as the agency which corrects the
bias which Rustico must overcome.
"The remedy, then, is not derived from
nature, but from artifice; or, more
properly speaking, nature orovides s
remedy, in the ludgmenta and understand¬
ing, for what is irregular and
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"incommodious in the affections"
(T.H.N. Ill, p.194; p.489).
It is obvious from the way in which Hume goes on to
explain his meaning at this point, that the Judgment or under¬
standing do not rive rise to any new motive which opposes and
can be contrasted with the passions. The understanding only
changes the direction of the passions. By a change In
direction is simply meant that the same passions or motives
come to give rise to different actions. The passions are the
same and set the same end. We only come to see that there are
more efficient means of satisfying them. Thus reason still
furnishes no motive to the will, and Hume is in no way
constrained to change his view that all the ends of human
actions are set by the desires and passions. Thus reason is
still only the 'slave' of the passions.
Our selfishness and limited benevolence seem to be the
greatest obstacles to the establishment of society and Justice.
Yet it is these very same motives that can be seen to give rise
to the convention through which Justice is established. This
comes about when people see that they can best serve their own
interests and those of their friends by having some rules
regarding the possession of property. This Is seen to he
essential because of the unstable nature of material goods
already referred to and the relative scarcity of some of them.
People soon see
"that the principal disturbance in
society arises from those goods,
which we call external, and from
their looseness and easy transition




"'seek for a remedy by putting these
goods as far as possible, on the same
footing with the fixed and constant
advantages of the mind and body" (Ibid.).
It is because of the fact that he thinks the sexual
instinct is as old as man, leading to people's living
together at least for a period, that he c onsiders it fanciful
to assume a state of nature preceding society, a state of
nature where ,1ustice would be unknown. We should only have
reason to presume that such a state of nature must have existed
if we can give reasons for believing that at some stage in the
past history of man there was such a plenty that division of
goods was unnecessary. Perhaps in extreme scarcity of goods
each man would be exclusively ruled by the motive of self-
preservation, assuming the principle that each individual loves
himself more than he does any ot^er one individual. Even here
one might feel that factions would tend to arise because of our
limited generosity if it were not completely swamped. There
would thus be little likelihood we have ever had a state of
affairs that could legitimately be described as the war of
all against all.
It could of course also happen that we might have had a
state of nature preceding justice if human nature had radically
changed, if we could assume that at some distant time in the
past our ancestors had possessed complete and. universal
benevolence. But we should only be justified in believing
this if we had some empirical evidence in support of that
belief, Hume does not seem to think there is any such
evidence. He takes human nature as he thinks it is and asks
'Gould we on the basis of our knowledge of human motives
exolain why people have come to invent rules of Justice?' .
It is not altogether clear that Justice would not be
established if man were wholly egoistic. At first sight it
would seem to necessitate a war of all against all. Perhaps
as long as we consider intelligence as part of our nature, a
certain amount of foresight in man, we might still see how
justice would arise from prudence. But it would not be at all
obvious that it would arise necessarily in the family. The
male, being the stronger, might restrain the wife by force and
might even welcome some friction among the children in order to
make a combined attack upon himself less likely. He might
find that prudence would dictate for him the well known policy
'divide et inpera'.
Perhaps one might say that Hum© does not five enough
weight in his account to the possibility of the love for power
standing in the way of the establishment of Justice. Perhaps
he would say that a tyrant must at any rate have rules regulating
what others can do with regard to him with impunity and that
here we should have rules of Justice inevitably coming in. But
in such a state these rules would certainly not be established
by a mutual compact of the nature Hume proceeds to describe, for
the simple reason that mutual restraint of the passions would not
be involved.
In his account of the nature of the contract that gives rise
to justice Hume is most insistent that we are not to understand
that people consider themselves bound by the contract because it
is of the nature of a promise. We cannot understand the
contract in this way for the simple reason that promise-keeping
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is itself an artificial virtue. To fail to keep p. promise
is vicious because it is a violation of a rule established by
an artificial convention.
The contract is rather to be understood to involve a tacit
understanding between people to behave in a certain way in regard
to each other, not from the motive of duty, but simply in order
to satisfy limited benevolence and self-interest. There is, we
might say, a natural obligation but not a moral obligation to
justice, and this state of affairs might conceivably persist even
after a system of rules of justice has been firmly established.
These natural motives come gradually to bind us to just conduct
"by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the
inconveniences of transgressing it".
Hume compares the establishment of justice with the way in
which human conventions gradually give rise to language. There
is no reason to believe that we come to use a common system of
signs in communicating with each other by any explicit mutual
promise. Similarly we see no reason to assume that the motive
leading to the establishment of language has been anything but
self-interest, awareness of the convenience of this method of
communication for satisfying our needs and interests. Above all
we may not assume that because of the immense general utility of
language the motive leading to the emergence o^ languages must
have been general benevolence.
Let us now assume that we have an established system of rules
concerning the stability and transference of property. We can
now give sense to the concept of right which is to be defined in
\
terms of the rules. We can now give sense to the concept of
property which Involves in its definition the concept of right.
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We can now give sense to the concept of obligation, for this
too would be defined in terms of the rules established by the
convention.
The sense of 'obligation' in this context seems to be
different from the sense of duty referred to earlier in this
chapter and again in our discussion of promises. Obligation is
specifically, it seems, tied to the artificial virtues. Since
Hume maintains it is possible from a sense of duty to do the
actions a benevolent man w?ould naturally do, we can see that this
is not tied to the performance of actions in conformity with the
artificial virtues. One of the faults of Hume's moral theory
is that he does not give a clear enough analysis of the concepts
of duty and of obligation.
We can now see why Hume thinks it a mistake to define justice
In terms of property. We can make no sense of the notion of
property unless we already have the notion of 'ustice and right In
terms of which we must define it. The relation a man has to his
property is not a natural but a 'moral' relation. It is what he
has a 'right' to and what others are obliged to allow him to
dispose of according to his will. The rules established by the
convention give rise to property and. justice together. There is
another reason why one cannot 'define' justice in terms of
property. There are other conventions that lead to the emergence
of justice than the convention regarding property, e.g. the
convention which leads to promises.
But it does not seem at all obvious that the convention, as
we have so far considered it, gives rise to the concepts of
•right' and 'obligation' in a moral sense. We still do not know
231 -
why 'respecting' property rights Is a virtue, Hume himself has
indicated that a separate explanation must he given of our
reasons for calling justice a virtue. We should also have to
explain why obligation considered as a motive should be attached
to justice by the mere existence of a convention. Can Hume here
be referring to the natural obligation to justice, i.e. self-
interest and limited benevolence? This 1s possible but hardly
plausible, because there seems no reason to believe that obligation
in this sense is unintelligible without presupposing the convention.
It seems more plausible to assume that the terms 'right1 and
•obligation1 are considered here as legal terms. They are here
both defined in terms of the laws of society, written or unwritten,
established by the convention.
If the preceding account is correct, we still have to account
for the way in which we come to consider ourselves under a moral
obligation to be just. We still have not explained how there
arises in man a separate motive to adhere to justice which Is
capable of overriding the strongest natural inclinations of self-
love and limited benevolence,
Hume at this stage only argues that avarice, the strongest
enemy of justice, can only be restrained by itself. Here we
might understand by 'avarice' desire for things for ourselves and
those closely related to us. There is no other 'natural' motive
strong enough to keep us steadfast In the path of justice. Since
we are dealing with a natural motive that can either lead to
desirable or undesirable conduct according to the adequacy of the
factual judgments which direct the course of the actions It leads
to, it would obviously serve no useful purpose to call It either
wicked or good as such. We nowhere get a clearer indication of
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Hume's view that self-interest is not necessarily a vicious
motive. He most emphatically rejects the view, apparently
held by Hutcheson, that benevolence is the only good motive.
Nor would it seem can one defend those commentators who think
that Hume only deems virtuous those actions that issue from a
limited class of motives we mifrht call social.
We have emphasised that the natural motive to justice is
self-interest and limited benevolence, but Hume insists that
the connection of the rules of Justice with self-interest is
"somewhat singular, and is different from what may be observed
on other occasions". fiven when we have come to identify our
own interest with the public interest through enlightened
•self-love' we must still observe that a single individual act
of justice may neither serve the public interest nor need it
benefit the agent himself.
"When a man of merit, of a beneficent
disposition, restores a great fortune
to a miser, or a seditious bigot, he
has acted justly and laudably, but the
public is a real sufferer" (T.H.N. Ill,
pp .201-2; p.497).
Hume, however, seems to think that were our self-interest
enlightened enough we should see good prudential reasons for
adhering scrupulously to justice even in these cases. If we
only become sufficiently aware of the fact that without rules
of justice strictly adhered to there could be no effective
cooperation in society, we should see that the alternative is
les3 attractive.
"And. even every individual person must
find himself a gainer on balancing
the account; since, without justice,
society must immediately dissolve^-.
1. My underlining.
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"and everyone must face Into that savage
and solitary condition, which is
infinitely worse than the worst
situation that can possibly be supposed
in society" (T.H.N. Ill, p.202; p.497).
Hume's argument here is not altop:ether convincing, for
there is little reason to believe that the alternatives are
as clear cut as he seems to think. When one sacrifices
justice for the welfare of the public in an individual case,
one ha3 not thereby chosen the dissolution of justice
altogether. We need only remind ourselves that unjust actions
are In fact freauent and yet we have not sunk into that 'savage
and solitary condition' which Hume speaks of. If in fact
unjust actions had only the natural consequence of making
cooperation more difficult if it became widespread, our
temptation to act unjustly would be much greater than it actually
is. Many people are not kept on the straight and narrow path
of justice by these 'natural' considerations but rather because
of the sanctions attached to injustice by the law.
The reason why Ilume does not mention this incentive to just
behaviour is obvious. He is explaining the origin of justice
through the workings of 'natural* motives and the 'natural*
condition in which man finds himself. In showing the possibility
of the contract being formed he cannot therefore assume as
incentives any consenuences which follow injustice only in an
established society with an orderly system of laws and punishment.
If he did this he would be begging the question, since
•punishment' for injustice presupposes that justice has already
been established.
Must we then say that the 'natural' motives that Hume
appeals to are insufficient to account for the convention being
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formed? The first thing to notice is that Hume need not
commit himself to the view that these natural motives will
secure that the parties to the convention will universally
and always act justly. It is enough if individuals can
intelligibly beccme conscious of the advantage of having
some fixed rules about property which it is to the interest
of both parties to adhere to. One can then see how the
following of this line of conduct may come to be associated
in a man's mind with his own interests so as to furnish a
countermotive to the immediate satisfaction of a short-term
interest.
We have already observed how Hume considers the growth
of a society as having its origin in a small group, that the
first trace of social life can be seen in a family unit. In
a small group of men it is much easier to see how cooperation
is essential in order to derive the benefits of being a member
of the group. It is much easier to see how an individual can
come to look upon his own interests as dependent upon successful
cooperation. The alternative is to be left alone, to be
banished from the group. This is perhaps why Hume thinks in
terms of the alternative of abiding by the convention or
alternatively "fall into a savage and solitary condition".
He probably had a small group in mind when he wrote this. In
duch a small group it is therefore intelligible how the natural
obligation to justice may have sufficed to keep people on the
whole from violating the conventional rules. It may perhaps
be further noticed here that the influence of the 'confined
benevolence' which Hume takes to belong to our nature would be
much greater here and would make us more sensitive to the
- 935 -
interests of other members of the group. There would be no
•total strangers'. We should be more affected by the
pleasures and pains of others through sympathy.
We must, I think, imagine that we are dealing with a
society of this kind, a small group, when considering how
justice comes to be considered a virtue. The moral approval
of the lust man's behaviour is supposed to depend upon the
utility of justice. This utility is much more easily seen in
a small society though the natural motives may be less obviously
in need of moral incentives in order that the system may be
upheld.
If we have in mind a tacit agreement between people to
behave in a certain way, we see that a failure to do so will
cause disappointment in the other parties to the agreement who
have come to count upon our behaviour. Thus injustice comes to
have an injurious consequence in virtue of the convention having
been formed. Combine with this an awareness that the rules of
justice generally make social life safer and more 'commodious'.
Though this may he more easily overlooked in a large society we
cannot avoid noticing the ill effects of suffering injustice
when we ourselves or those close to us are the sufferers. We
thu3 come to think of unjust actions as the causes of unpleasant¬
ness and pain. We sympathise with those who are adversely
affected by it and come to dislike the cause of it, ultimately
the agent. This dislike becomes moral disapproval when we look
upon the case of injustice abstracting from our personal point
of view, when we look upon it as impartial spectators. It may
be noticed that this account makes it much more obvious why we
- S3* -
should disapprove of injustice then approve of justice,
since the utility of the latter is pot so easily seen as the
ill effects of the former. This may not he thought a grave
fault in the theory, for we find in fact that iustice needs
to be exceptional for it to be warmly approved of, whereas we
disapprove of all manner of injustice. The reason for this
may well be that a fair standard of justice is required of us.
It is only when the minimum requirement is surpassed that
justice is considered a virtue in a man.
We have seen that our approval of justice and disapproval
of injustice arise out of our contemplation of the actions of
others. We extend it, however, to cover our own case and
approve of justice in ourselves and disapprove of our injustice.
"The general rule reaches beyond those
Instances from which it arose; while
at the same time, we naturally
sympathise with others in the
sentiments they entertain of usH
(T.H.N. Ill, p .204; p.469).
Hume insists in thi3 chapter that a full account of the
reasons why we approve of justice and disapprove of injustice
cannot be given before the natural virtues have been examined.
This is because he has not yet given an account of objectivity
in evaluations, the way in which we come to evaluate actions and
characters from an Impartial point of view. Hume's order of
exposition is unfortunate and has given more plausibility to a
wrong interpretation of his statement here.
When he explains how our sympathy with the judgments others
form of us help to make us approve and disapprove of ourselves,
it seem3 that this approval or disapproval stem from a desire
to be well thought of. It seems that we are describing the
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outlook of a man who wants to be res pec tab!e. Thus the
feeling lingers that this would be no genuine moral disapproval.
This however is too onesided an interpretation, for we must
understand Hume's statements here in the light of his doctrines
as expressed in Book IH, Part III, Section 1, There is no
reason to believe that sympathy with the unfortunates who suffer
from our own injustice has nothing to do with our disapproval of
injustice in ourselves. When we look upon ourselves with
approval or disapproval we in fact view ourselves as if we were
any other person.
It might further be pointed out that when Hume uses the
phrase 'sympathise vith others in the sentiments they entertain
of us'' he may just mean '^gree with others In their condemnation
v '• * ' '
or praise of our actions'. If theirs is a genuine approval or
disapproval based upon the same factual judgments of the case as
we ourselves have, we would In fact naturally sympathise with
their judgments of us.
Hume Is here concerned to show how our motives to justice
come to be strengthened so as to explain why we so often act
justly even against our own and even the public interest. He
emphasises and that rightly that once justice comes to be
considered a virtue, politicians and educators may strengthen
people's allegiance to just conduct through utilising the
evaluative force of the term. He can also quite legitimately
point out that people's desire for respectability may be used
for this purpose. Parents may see that a just man gets on better
in the world than an unjust one and consequently indoctrinate
their childreh in such a way as to make them see that it is
prudent to be just. It would be rash to deny that these
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motives are powerful in counteracting the force of temptations
to behave in unjust ways.
We come here up against a real difficulty in Hume's account.
Sympathy with the general utility of Justice may be enough to
account for our approval of the just man. But Hume cannot
consistently with his view of the biased nature of banevolence
maintain that public benevolence is the motive which keeps
people to the path of justice, even in a case where this motive
opposes strong self-interest or confined, benevolence. This is
why he has to search for additional influences wMoh may help to
explain the just man's steadfast adherence to the rules of justice.
We must in any case remember that in society most people would
probably not be fully aware of the public utility of justice end
would thus not be able to value it for the right reasons.
But when justice is classified with the natural virtues,
the same word is attached to both, people generally come to have
the same outlook towards it, strengthened by the propaganda of
politicians in their quest for an orderly society, and the
influence of parents who desire the welfare of their children.
But this propaganda presupposes, is parasitic upon, our natural
moral sentiments:
"Any artifice of politicians may assist
nature in the producing of those
sentiments, which she suggests to us,
and may even on some occasions produce
alone an approbation or esteem for any
particular action; but it is impossible
it should be the sole cause of the
distinction we make betwixt vice and
virtue. For if nature did not aid us
in this particular, it would be in vain
for politicians to talk of honourable
or dishonourable, praiseworthy or
blameable. These words would be
perfectly unintelligible, and would no
more have any idea annexed to them,
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"than if they were of a tongue perfectly
unknown to us. The utmost politicians
can perform, is to extend the natural
sentiments beyond their original bounds;
but still nature must furnish the
materials, and give us some notion of
moral distinctions" (T.H.N. Ill, p.204;
p.500) .
This is in harmony with Hume's general associationist
scheme# The word comes to call up a certain idea which may
be enlivened into a real impression, a passion. But this
association could not be formed without a previous impression
of which the idea is a copy. This explains the Inability of
politicians to give meaning to words of praise in the first place.
This presupposes real approval and disapproval, these being
passions of a special sort with, which the terms come to be
associated, A word Is not a natural cause but acquires its
causal efficacy by convention through its association with some
experience, some perception.
The concepts of duty and obligation do not play a prominent
part in Hume's philosophy. He can of course not admit that
actions can be seen to possess a characteristic which may be
called their •obligatoriness'. Yet we here seem to be faced with
the difficulty that regardfor the morality of an actloh may be
a motive to perform it. Furthermore it is the motive of the
just man. If then the moral characteristic of an action derives
from the nature of the motive, it seems that some actions derive
their morality from regard for their morality. This reasoning
appears to be circular and is taken by liume to be so. In fact
this is the dilemma he states as setting his problem about the
artificial virtues.
We eventually conclude that public utility Is the ultimate
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reason why justice is approved of as a virtue. But has Hume
not denied that there is any such principle as public
benevolence? How then can the consciousness of the public
utility of justice come to furnish a motive to just conduct?
It must be firmly kept in mind that Hume nowhere maintains
that a *just act' in one sense is always performed from the same
motive. It would indeed be absurd if he did maintain this.
Let us imagine a man repaying a loan. This is undoubtedly an
action in conformity with established rules of justice. It
would be thought unjust not to pay. Yet it is obvious that
the motive might not be a sense of duty at all, but the thought
that the person needed the money and a consequent desire for his
happiness might lead to the action. The point is of course
that benevolence may often lead to behaviour we should describe
as just. On other occasions self-love might be the motive.
We might want to enhance our reputation, or our intention might
be to secure the possibility of another loan from the same
source later on. There is thus an obvious sense in which it is
untrue to say that the only motive to conduct called just is a
sense of duty.
But we must remember that in the cases listed above we
should not describe the agent as just if we inferred his motive
to be self-love or benevolence. We should call him prudent or
benevolent, as the case might be. In what circumstances
would the man be described as just, if we distinguish one virtue
from another by a difference in motive and Hume has denied that
there is a special natural motive to lust conduct?
It is here that the problem of the motive of duty intrudes
itself and it is assumed that justice is distinguished from the
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other virtues in that the lust man is motivated by a 'sense
of duty1 as distinct from benevolence or self-interest. The
just man is the man who adheres steadfastly to the rules of
justice even when benevolence and self interest may seem to
prompt to different behavLour, He is able to do this because
the motive of duty has come to be so highly developed. We have
seen that if this motive were supposed to result from the
realisation of the utility of lustice its strength could not be
accounted for. Propaganda and education help to create a
situation where the non-per formanee of .lust actions comes to be
firmly associated with pain in our minds. This helps to
strengthen the behavioural pattern we call just behaviour. So
long as we think of the * sense of the morality* of an action as
benevolence resulting from moral approval, Hume cannot be made
consistent. By 'sense of duty' we must understand 'being
pained at the thought of the absence of an action or character*.
But Hume has put forward two apparently incompatible views.
1) That no virtue has the sense of duty as its motive and
2) That this is the characteristic motive of the lust man.
Perhaps it is due to awareness of this that he sometimes seems
to insist that properly enlightened self-interest would suffice
to keep a men to the path of justice. This would, however,
reduce justice to prudence. When the just man would be acting
from a sense of duty this would be an indication of a lack of this
virtue of prudence. He would be doing what the prudent man
would do.
I cannot see that the difficulty mentioned in the previous
paragraph is ever fully redolved by Hume. There is a sense in
which a virtue whose characteristic motive is the sense of duty
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is impossible on his theory. Yet we must remember that even
though our sense of duty may be partly impressed upon us through
an appeal to self-interest and our limited benevolence, this
does not necessarily entail that when we come to achieve
objectivity in our attitude our feelings of duty are entirely
non-moral. Do we not in fact recommend the virtuous life to
our children very largely through an appeal to one or other of
these motives?
The doctrine of artificial virtues is not propounded in the
same form in the Ennuiry. This may have been due to a dissatis¬
faction with the theory of the Treatise, or Hume may merely have
wanted to leave out this rather difficult doctrine. Hume in any
case only attempts in the Enquiry to show 1) that justice
derives all its \*alue from its utility and 2) that this utility
presupposes a convention, i.e. the useful consequences do not
follow each act by nature. In both versions, however, the
i
doctrine is essentially utilitarian. It may for example be
remembered that justice is in both works distinguished, from
superstition on grounds of utility.
It has been recently maintained that all virtues are
artificial. Howell-Smith In his Ethics points out that
"the phrase 'natural virtue' is in fact
ambiguous. It can either mean 'mode of
conduct which is natural and also
praised' or it can mean 'mode of conduct
which is naturally praised" (Ethics, p.249).
He uses the expression in the second of these senses and
argues that in that sense all virtues are artificial. His
reason Is that it is a maxim to be accepted in philosophy not
to assume that anything is part of the original constitution of
human nature If we can assign a cause to it.
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"There is an obvious connexion between
the modes of conduct that men believe
to bring about consequences towards
which they already have a pro-attitude"
(Ethics, p.249).
It seems to me that in so far as it has been made out that
sympathy enters into the approval of all virtues Hume would
endorse Howell-Smith's view. The normal effects of dualities
of mind always determine our approval.
Hume denies that justice 'admits of degrees' in the way
in which natural virtues do. These run insensibly into vice.
You become less and less benevolent until your lack of
benevolence has become a vice. We must not understand this to
mean that a man cannot be more or less just as he can be more
or less benevolent. The man who is more just follows the rules
of justice more often, breaks these rules more rarely. But an
individual act, and this is Hume's point, must be either just or
unjust. a man's action may be more or less benevolent, but
there is no such sliding scale in the case of justice. The
main reason for this is to be e0und in the fact that property
admits of no degrees. Either you own something or you do not.
Once we remember how closely Hume ties justice to property we
can partly see the reason for his views on this point. Even so,
he admits that proprietary claims to a thing may by an
arbitrator be deemed so equal that a division in property is
called for. It remains that Hume thinks in terms of inflexible
rules which the just man is obliged to follow.
"Were men, therefore, to take the liberty
of acting with regard to the laws of
society, as they do in every other affair,
they would conduct themselves, on most
occasions, by particular judgments, and
would take into consideration the
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"characters and circumstances of the
persons, as well as the general nature
of the question. But it is easy to
observe, that this would produce an
infinite confusion into human society,
and that the avidity and partiality of
men would quickly bring disorder into
the world., if* not restrained by some
general and inflexible principles1'
(T.H.N. Ill, pp.233*234; p.532).
I agree with MacNabb that Hume's view is open to the
interpretation that the rules are not only inflexible but our
observance of them should be inflexible. According to MacNabb
a principle may have many qualifying clauses indicating
conditions where it would not apply and yet be inflexible.
Given these exceptions there Is no further latitude. He takes
the example of a friend who falls 111 in his house. The
telephone wires are broken and the roads blocked. A bottle of
medicine is in the house which would save his friend's life.
MacNabb now asks:
"is it theft to use the medicine, however
valuable? Surely not; the principles
of private property tacitly provide for
such exceptions. And if the owner of
the medicine subsequently sued me at law,
it would be open to the ludge to mark a
technical offence, but dismiss the
charge as trifling under the probation
of offenders act" (MacNabb, n.184).
I think Hume would be bound to say that in the legal sense
it was indeed theft to take the medicine. Hume seetna primarily
to have in mind the legal sense of 'lustice' in writing the
passage quoted above. It is, as MacNabb says, a 'technical
offence'.
Let us remember that if the person in MacNabb's story
refrains from taking the medicine on the ground that it is not
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his property, he could not be charged with Injustice.
We might, however, condemn this behaviour as Inhuman,
This might be one occasion where we should not approve of
behaviour in accordance with the rules of justice. It is
the benevolent man of whom we should approve in this
situation.
Vie now see, perhaps, one further reason why Hume should
be inclined to talk as if the just man must follow the rules
of justice inflexibly. Justice must involve a disposition
to behave in a particular way. Where humanity (benevolence)
or self-interest bids us act contrary to these rules there
may be individual occasions where we should approve of these
exceptions. We still cannot say that it is in virtue of a
man's justice rather than his possession of the natural virtues,
prudence or benevolence, that he makes the exception, gives
his friend the medicine in MacNabb's example.
Iiume maintains that promises ought sometimes to be broken
because keeping them in certain situations would generally be
against public utility. But it is not in virtue of our
dependability that we do this. This being understood, it
must be granted that there is no very obvious reason why,
because of the general inutility of the sanctity of property
in certain cases, it might not be understood that the general
rules governing property do not apply.
Though it may be undeniable that you have given a promise
to a robber, it may still be the case that you are under no
obligation to keep it. The inutility of promise-keepihg in
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this kind of case is tacitly recognised as Justifying you
in ignoring the fact that you made the promise. The rule
that one ought to keep promises may still he 'inflexible' in
this sense, that the exception would extend to all similar
case3 . It is because the situation is of a particular kind
that you are not under an obligation to fulfil your promise
on this occasion.
PROMISES
I shall riot be concerned in this thesis with Hume's
political theory. The following discussion of promises
will therefore be limited to the arguments contained in
the section of the third book of the Treatise which Hume
entitles "Of the Obligation of Promises". No mention will
be made of the social contract nor of the relation of
promises to political obligation in general.
Stated in his own words, Hume wants to show "that the
rule of morality which enjoins the performance of promises,
is not natural..." (T.H.N. Ill, p.219; p.51f). This he
proceeds to establish by 'proving' (1) "that a promise would
not be intelligible before human conventions had established
it" (ibid.) and (2) "that even if it were intelligible, it
would not be attended with any moral obligation" (ibid,.).
Let us begin by looking at the way in which Hume attempts
to 'prove' the first of these propositions.
Hume uses the method of presuming what would have to be
the case "if promises be natural and intelligible" (ibid.).
The following is Hume's statement of the condition without
which this could not be the case:
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"..• there must be some act of the mind
attending these words, I promise; rnd
on this act of the mind must the
obligation depend" . (T.H.N. Ill, p.219;
p.516)
Hume considers, and in this Pricherd and Meld en later
followed him, that in promising we place ourselves under an
obligation to do or refrain from doing something. This is
a new obligation in that it arises from the promise. We now
want to examine whether there is an act of mind from which the
obligation could follow. If, as is the case, the obligation
is an obligation to keep a promise, then there cannot be any
such obligation unless a promise has been made. Since making
a promise is the very thing that gives rise to the obligation
we can be 3aid to be considering whether a promise is a mental
act.
Before proceeding any further we must draw a distinction
between the use of the verb 'promise' in mekinp- a promise and
in talking about a promise. When I say to my dentist "I
promise you I will keep my appointment this time" I am making a
rash promise but a promise nevertheless. I might tell my wife
about this by saying when I come home "I promised the dentist I
would keep my appointment". This is a statement about a promise
but in making the statement I am not promising anyone anything
at all. Such expressions as 'he has promised', 'I shall promise'
and indeed all other uses of the verb than the first person
present tense indicative use are of this second kind. Similar
observations may be made about the verbs 'approve' and 'disapprove'.
It Is now accepted usage to call the first parson Indicative use
of such verbs as 'promise' a performatory use of such verbs
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when these are used to do something rather than say that
something is done, will he done, or has been done. Professor
Austin, in his "other Minds" calls this use "ritualistic".
He is justified in using this expression by the fact that
there is something rather solemn about making a promise by
saying "I promise you".
But one can make promises without using the verb 'promise'.
A man who is trying to establish that he did not promise to do
something has not mad© out his case even though he may succeed
in proving to everyone's satisfaction that he did not use the
expression "I promise". "i will without fail", "You can count
on me" and other expressions are sometimes used to make a
promise. The point is a minor one but the quotation from Hume
above does not make it clear that he is investigating not only
whether there is an act of mind "attending these words, I
promise", but whether such an act attends the verbal expression
used to make a promise whatever that expression may be.
A promise then, according to the view we are considering,
la a mental act. This mental act i3 such as to impose upon
the person an obligation. If I could intuit such a mental act
in you without the use of language or any conventional system
of symbols, I could know that you were binding yourself to the
performance of an action by promising to do so. The expression
promise" or an eouivalent expression constitutes no part of
the promise but only indicates that a promise is taking place.
It would seem that the expression would not be performatory but
rather used to state a fact, i.e. the fact that the person is
promising.
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The candidates for the honour of being the act of promising
are limited to three. 1) A resolution, 2) A desire and 3) An
act of will.
1) One cannot equate promising with a resolution, Hume
thinks, for the simple reason that a resolution does not alone
impose an obligation upon the person to do what he resolves to
do. The term 'alone' is important here, for it clearly is the
case that people may consider it morally obligatory to hold
steadfastly to their resolutions. It is of course not the case
that we think that a man ought to stick to any resolution. If
he has resolve? to do something wrong, he clearly ought not to do
this. But the same applies to promises. It seems we ought
not to keep a promise if we have promised to do something wrong.
If I promise to murder an innocent man and think better of it, it
seems absurd to say I am obliged to keep my promise.
There is a sense in which for Hume a promise does not alone
impose an obligation, in that one must presuppose a convention
and the obligation depends upon the social situation in which
the promise is made. But here he is examining a view he takes
to imply that the obligation follows from an act of mind quite
irrespective of human conventions and social situations. He is
thus justified in denying that the act of mind which constitutes
a promise can be a resolution. This is not to deny that there
may be an intimate connection between the concept of "resolving1
and the concept of 'promising1.
2) To promise cannot be to desire to do what Is promised.
It is, indeed, singularly unplausible to suggest that this is the
case, for the fact that I do not desire to do X may be, and often
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Is, a reason why I am made to promise to do X. I promise
my wife not to have too much beer. If I did not like beer
and this was known to my wife,there would be no point in
promising not to overindulge. I promise to do what I don't
desire to do and my aversion may, as Hume says, be 'declared
and avowed". (T.H.N. Ill, p.219; p.516) . A man might only
give In to his wife after a long argument and the eventual
promise may simply be due to the fact that he has become fed
up with her nagging. One wants to say the husband is obliged
even though he may have neither a desire nor an intention of
doing what he promises.
3) Is a promise "the willing of the action which we
promise to perform"? (T.H.N. Ill, p.219: p.51p). The reason
why this cannot be the case is as follows. When we promise
something, what we promise is always In the future. If A wants
B to do something now, he would not seek a promise from him.
To will to do something is by Hume taken to have an effect on
the present. It "has an influence only on present actions",
(ibid.) From this it follows that 'to will' and 'to promise'
must be different.
Whatever one may think of the notion of will as a kind of
cause which must have Its effect immediately one must agree that
given this concept of 'will' Hume is entirely correct in
rejecting the view that 'to promise' can be equated with willing
In this sense. If we treat 'willing' as an act of mind
distinguished from 'resolving' then It seems not unreasonable
to give it the interpretation Hume here presents us with. One
must remember that he is Investigating whether a promise can be
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said to be a natural act of mind.
Iiume concludes from the fact that none of the candidates
considered can be said to produce the obligation which
attaches to a promise that "it must necessarily be the
willing of that obligation which arises from the promise".
He invokes ordinary ways of speaking in support of this
conclusion. We say "we are bound by our consent, and that
the obligation arises from our mer<=> will and pleasure" (T.H.N.
Ill, pp.219-220; p.517) .
The problem now facing us is whether an obligation can
arise from a volition. Prichard, who certainly did not
agree with Hume about the nature of moral obligation, denied
that this could occur. In his "The Obligation to Keep a
Promise" he says:
"In fact,the difference between doing
something and promising to do it seems
just to be that while in the one case
we bring something into existence, in
the other we bring into existence the
obligation to bring it into existence.
Yet an obligation seems a fact of a
kind impossible to create or bring
into existence. There are, no doubt,
certain facts which we do seem able to
create. If e.g. I make someone angry,
I appear to bring into existence the
fact that he is angry. But the fact
that I am bound to do some action seems
no more one of these than does the fact
that the souare of three is odd." (M.O., p.169)
Prichard may, I think, be criticised here for suggesting
that (a) doing something is always bringing something into
existence, and (b) when you promise you always promise to do
something.
It may be the case that whenever you do something you
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always bring into existence the fact that you have done it.
What else have you brought into existence when you run a
mile in under four minutes? Frichard seems misled by the
example he has in mind i.e. making someone angry, when it
seems proper to say you have brought the man's anger into
existence.
As regards the question ?/hether to promise is always to
promise to do something, one must be careful to note that this
is only true if 'to do something' is used in such a way as to
make it true to say that when you refrain from doing something
you are in fact doing something. Priehard is most likely
aware of this,but he fails to make his meaning clear.
The reason why Prichard thinks an obligation cannot he
created by an act of will is that as an objectivist he thinks
that obligations are 'discovered'. The analogy he draws with
mathematics is instructive. Vie may choose to promise and
thus bind ourselves, but we cannot choose that the square of
three be even. This, he would most likely say, we discover.
We can no more choose to change our moral obligations than
we can choose to change the truths of mathematics. This,
however, seems precisely to take place in promising. This
creates the problem for the ob.iectivist.
Returning now to Hume, we find a different kind of
argument. The reason why an obligation cannot arise from a
volition is that volitions cannot give rise to new feelings.
The argument presupposes Hume's view on the nature of obligation:
"All morality depends upon our sentiments;
and when any action or quality of the
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"mind pleases us after a certain manner,
we say it is virtuous; and when the
neglect or non-performance of it
displeases us after a like manner, we
say that we lie under an obligation to
perform it." (T.H.N. Ill, p.220; p.517)
Several points can he made about this passage.
1. Hume italicises the expressions that make it clear that
it is not the case that any pleasure arising from the
contemplation of a mental quality that constitutes approval.
This is in conformity with the interpretation of Hume given
in this thesi3.
2. He writes in the first person. He seems in fact to be
analysing the situation in which we should say that we lie
under an obligation. This we do when the non-performance of
an action displeases us.
On© may suggest that there is at least this much truth
in Hume's contention that we should not say we were obliged to
do something if it were the case that the performance of the
action pleased us, but we should not have been displeased at
its non-performance. It seems to me that Hume need not be
understood to be only giving an account of the circumstances
in which the agent would say himself that he was obliged.
We can equally say of another person that what he did pleases
us and we think him truly virtuous though we don't think it
his duty, we should not have been displeased If the person had
not done the deed.
Though there may be a close relation between 'being
pleased' and 'approving', 'being displeased' and 'disapproving',
it would not be true to say that 'to be pleased with' is
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equivalent to 'to approve of and 'to be displeased with'
equivalent to 'to disapprove of'« This is strictly speaking
incorrect. I can approve or disapprove of anyone but I can
only be pleased with or displeased with the performances of
people closely connected with me, or my own. It would not be
odd for me to say I was displeased with my daughter's
behaviour, but I could not say I was displeased with the
behaviour of Mao's daughter, if he has a daughter.
■ ■ t \
Hume does not think we can arouse new sentiments at
will. Since we only say we are obliged when a special
sentiment is aroused under certain circumstances a new
obligation cannot arise from the will. Is It the case
then, that it Is a purely contingent matter that one cannot
will an obligation? Is it the case that people might gain
3uch power over their emotions as to be able to change them at
will and would this mean that Hume's argument would fall flat?
Prichard's reason for the same conclusion seemed to be such
that no change in the world could alter the situation. To
suggest an obligation might be crested immediately through
man's will would involve a logical absurdity.
But it turns out we are wrong in thinking that for Hume
It lust happens to be the case that man is incapable of
willing an obligation. He puts the question thus:
"The only question then is, whether there
is not a manifest absurdity in supposing
this act of the mind, and such an
absurdity as no man would fall into,
whose ideas are not confounded with
prejudice and the fallacious use of
language". (T.H.N. Ill, p.220j p.517)
To talk of willing a new obligation is, in that it
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involves willing a 'new sentiment*, it seems, to talk
nonsense. It is to say something 'unintelligible*. Yet
it must be said that Hume is not at all clear as to the kind
of absurdity involved in this ^or he later talks as if it
were- possible to 'feign* an act of mind we call willing an
obligation. If this is so it seems it must be possible to
understand what is involved in such an act though it may in
fact be such as to be impossible to the powers of man.
There is, however, a further point that might be made
clearer than Hume makes it. When we have made a promise we
are from then on under an obligation to perform the action
though we ourselves may not happen to feel pained at the non¬
performance of it. We may not feel obliged. Here it would
be whether the spectators of our actions would feel disapproval
at the non-performance of our action which would determine
whether we were said to be under an obligation to perform it.
We should thus have to be able to will a change in the feelings
of others if our obligation were to follow from the promise.
One might al3o want to make the point thet what one wills
on this account would be a possible future feeling. Since
this feeling does not arise as I promise, whereas the obligation
does, Hume's oontention that the will can only make a change to
the present would be valid against the possibility of willing an
obligation, given his account of this concept.
But Hume does not think the case hinges upon his special
views on obligation. He tries in a long footnote to show
that even though we thought obligation consisted in relations
an obligation could not arise fromua volition.
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1. If It is the case that the obligation to keep promises
arises from a volition without any change in the universe
taking place, this is inconsistent with morality consisting
in relations since without a change in objects no new
relation could arise. On this view there could thus be no
natural obligation to keep promises.
2, If the act of will is itself a new object and therefore
a new relation may result from It, we are no better off.
Hume puts the point as follows:
"Should it be said that this act of the
will, being in effect a new object,
produces new relations and new duties;
I would answer, that this is a pure
sophism, which may be detected by a
very moderate share of accuracy and
exactness. To will a new obligation
is to will a new relation of objects;
and therefore, if this new relation of
objects were formed by the volition
itself, we should, in effect, will the
volition, which is plainly absurd and
impossible. The will has here no
object to which it could tend, but
must return upon itself in infinitum."
(T.H.N. Ill, p.220, footnote; pp.
517-518)
It is not easy to see what precisely this argument
amounts to. The difficulty arises from the interpretation
of the expression 'is formed by the volition itself'. I
take this to mean that the volition is supposed to form one
of the terms between which the relation, which is supposed to
constitute the obligation, holds. This new relation is
supposed to be at the same time what you will, since you will
the obligation. But in any such case the same volition cannot
be at the same time part of its own content. If then the
obligation which arises is supposed to consist In the volition
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and something else, you always need to presuppose a volition
which is the willing of the obligation, which consists in
turn in a volition in relation to some other object. You
are hence forced into an infinite regress of volitions. If
you therefore try in this way to account for the obligation to
keep promises, you always need to presuppose another promise
to account for the obligation to keep any promise you may
choose. (See Melden p.51 for a different interpretation of
this argument).
We have been looking at Hume's attempt at proving the
first of the propositions listed at the beginning of this
chapter. We have in fact found that an answer has been given
to both. "The will never creates new sentiments", therefore
no new obligations. But Hume adds an argument he has already
made use of in the discussion of lustice. There can be no
natural virtues nor any 'natural obligations' unless there is
a motive in man that leads to their performance. It is our
duty to look after our children, but we are also inclined to
do this. But for this inclination there would be no
obligation. The keeping of promises is different. Hume says:
"But as there is naturally no inclination
to observe promises distinct from a sense
of their obligation, it follows that
fidelity is no natural virtue, and that
promises have no force antecedent to
human conventions." (T.H.N. Ill, p.221; p.519)
What Hume says in this passage is, I think, essentially
sound whatever one may think of his account of the obligation
attaching to natural virtues. What we now want to know is
the original motive leading to the making of promises.
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Hume points out that where we have cases of the exchange
of goods or the return of service rendered, it is quite often
the case that when the deal is made, delivery has to he
delayed. Similarly it may he to our mutual benefit that I
should help you with the harvest op your corn in return for
a similar service from you. We can understand how these
things come about because the individuals concerned, find these
arrangements useful.
But this self-inter©3ted 'commerce of men' must, Hume
thinks, be distinguished from the cases where I help a man
because I want to, return a service because I am grateful.
"In order, therefore, to distinguish
these two different sorts of commerce,
the interested and the disinterested,
there is a certain form of word invented
for the former, by which we bind
ourselves to the performance of any
action. This form of word constitutes
what we call a promise, which is the
sanction of the interested commerce of
mankind." (T.H.W. Ill, p.224? pp .521-522)
If I think you will, out of the goodness of your heart,
help me If I should need help, it would be pointless for me
to try to p*et you to promise to do this. Only in this sense
is the form of words used in promising a way of distinguishing
the interested from the disinterested 'commerce of men'.
In certain cases 'I promise you' is used to make a threat.
"I promise you I shall not forget this insult in a hurry". But
in the case of genuine promises it seems the promisee is always
thought to have something to gain from the promise being kept.
Once the form of words \ased to make a promise has come to be
generally accepted, a man is in fact staking his reputation as
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trustworthy person if he fails to keep his promise. So long
as he has something to gain from being thought trustworthy,
he ha3 a certain motive to keep his promises even before it
comes to be thought a man's duty to do so.
We have now explained bow the convention of promises came
to be established without making any reference to the fact that
fidelity to promises is thought a virtue.
The case is entirely comparable ?^ith that of justice and
the reason why fidelity to promises is considered a virtue is
the same as the reason why justice comes to be approved of.
"Public interest, education, and the artifices of politicians
have the same effect in both cases." (T.H.N. Ill, p.225? p.523)
In a promise the promisee has a right to assume that the
promise expresses a resolution in all normal cases. But since
no obligation is in such cases attached naturally to resolutions,
there seems to be a problem about a mere form of words making
all the difference in the case.
"Here, therefore, we feign a new act of
the mind, which we call the willing of
an obligation? and on this we suppose
the morality to depend," (T.H.N., III, p.225;
p.523)
The 'feigning' Hume talks of is by Melden called a
"remarkable bit of self-deception" (Melden, p.52) because Hume
has already maintained that it does not make sense to talk of
•willing an obligation'. He compares it with the feigning
that leads us to believe in the continued and independent
existence of objects external to us and in our self-identity,
One might get the impression from reading Melden that he is
reporting a comparison drawn by Hume. This is not the case.
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Hume does not compare the act of feigning that leads us to
believe we can will an obligation with the other cases.
I think the answer to this problem is to be set out on
the following lines, A distinction is implicit between
the philosopher and the vulgar, the general public. A
philosopher will, indeed, understand what is involved in a
promise. He will, in so far as he has mastered the true
Humean view, know that there is no such act as willing
yourself to be under an obligation with the magical power of
binding yourself to a promise. But in so far as this is
understood, he will have no use for feigning anything at all.
We don't have here any remarkable feat of self-deception on
his part. But the general public, in so far as they are
unable to see why 'a certain form of word3' should bind them,
will feign an act of volition in that they come to think that
the obligation belongs to promises because of the act of
binding yourself to them. This is, in fact, a natural error
to fall Into if we remember that we can of course choose to
make or not to make a promise. If we choose not to do so,
we in effect choose to avoid the obligation. We fail to
realise that this does not mean that if we make a promise the
keeping of the promise is only obligatory because we have
willed it to be so. We don't choose the obligatory nature of
the promise.
If the preceding explanation is accepted it is not
strictly analogous to the case of continued independent
existence of external objects and personal identity. In the
case of these latter, the ^self-deception' is inevitable and
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cannot be dispelled by any philosophical analysis whatever its
result. To believe in promises being obligatory because of
an act of mind is in no sense a 'natural belief.
The will which is supposed to lead to an obligation must
be expressed by certain signs if it is to bind a men to a
promise. The expression then comes to be thought of as "the
principal part of the promise" (T.H.N. Ill, p.225; p.523). A
man is no less under an obligation though he does not intend to
keep his promise, though he has not resolved to try to do so and
has in fact no intention of binding himself to it. Here the
form of words is taken to constitute the promise.
Hume thinks that although it is the case that the form of
words constitutes the promise on most occasions, there are
exceptions. a) If he does not know the meaning of the phrase
he uses and does not intend to promise, he is not bound by "I
promise to X" or any equivalent expression, b) Even if he does
know the meaning, but talks in ,1e3t and makes it obvious that he
is doing so, the words don't bind him.
We must not think that in all cases where a person does not
intend to keep his promise in uttering the words 'I promise' or
an equivalent expression he is not obliged to do so. If we
granted this a deceitful promise would not oblige. This is
absurd. Even in cases where we know the promise to be deceitful
because we are alive to the signs that Indicate deceit, this does
not absolve from responsibility.
If we look upon the obligation attaching to promises as a
human convention, we can easily explain why it is that in 3ome
cases the actual expression and in other cases the man's intention
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should be counted as the principal part of a promise. These
differences in the case are determined by considerations of
utility. It appears indeed a mystery how an obligation can
arise from the will. It is in this similar to baptism or
communion or holy orders. But whereas in these latter cases
the sacrament is destroyed if the priest withholds his
intention one cannot he absolved from a promise by simply
withholding one's intention to perform it. Terrible
consequences may follow from this but Hume thinks it has less
effect because men are less concerned about their future state
than this one. The explanation here offered is hardly
convincing in that it seems one would have to accept the whole
thing as a mere human convention if one were to accept that
the words alone quite apart from the intention with which they
were uttered made the whole of the sacrament in these cases.
There is also nothing comparable to the authority of the priest
in the case of promises.
Hume's account also seems to make it possible to explain
why a certain kind of foree should invalidate contracts. The
concluding remarks of the chapter put the point well:
"If we consider aright of the matter,
force is not essentially different from
any other motive of hope or fear, which
may induce us to engage our word, and.
lay ourselves under any obligation. A
man, dangerously wounded, who promises
a competent sum to a surgeon to cure
him, would certainly be bound to
performance; though the case be not so
different from that of one who promises
a sum to a robber, as to produce so
great a difference in our sentiments of
morality, if these sentiments were not
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"built entirely on public interest
and convenience." (T.H.N. Ill, p.227; p.525)
In the case of the robber we have, indeed., a promise
which is not considered binding. We should not nevertheless
want to say that no promise was made to the robber. This is
a case where it is Justifiable to break a promise. Here then,
we see that it cannot be correct to say that a promise consists
in placing, yourself under an obligation.
It is also Important to note that there is a tremendous
difference in the Importance of promises. The obligatory
nature of the promise is closely related to whether what was
promised was or was not trivial. Hume does not discuss this,
but there is no reason to think he believes that one ought
always to keep one's promises irrespective of what is promised.
I think, indeed, that Melden grossly overestimates the
strength of the obligation to keep promises in saving "I can be
indifferent to my promise only by being indifferent to my own
moral status" (Melden, p.65). It Is certainly not the case
that our whole moral status is on trial in the case of every
promise, however trivial it may be.
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A COHCLUDIHG REMARK
I should like to conclude by emphasising one particular
aspect of the argument of this thesis.
In treating of evaluation as a special aspect of our
emotional nature, Hume has in fact drawn our attention to the
great variety of emotion concepts that either are forms of
evaluation or can throw light upon the nature of evaluation.
These concepts are of interest to the philosopher, and Hume has
in fact something interesting to say about a number of them.
We may want to reject Hume's apparent atomism, that each
passion ij3 a simple impression. But we must remember that if
passions differ there must be a difference in the attendant circ¬
umstances of their occurrence. Hume's account of these circum¬
stances is often illuminating. Thus when Hume describes pride,
he in fact states the necessary conditions for pride. These
coincide with the logical limits of this concept as I tried to
argue in talking of the indirect passions.
The associationist psychology may be out of favour with the
psychologists. We err if we infer from this that a philosopher
has nothing to learn from Hume's attempt at applying it3 principles
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